Iranian drones over Kyiv scramble Bibi's Russia policy

Aphone call last week between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky threw a spotlight on a new foreign policy dilemma facing Israel’s new government.

Last week, as the UN General Assembly was about to ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to give an opinion on “the legal consequences of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories,” Netanyahu spoke with Zelensky in what Israeli media described as “a tough call.”

Netanyahu asked Zelensky that Ukraine oppose — or at least abstain from — the upcoming General Assembly vote. Zelensky, in return, wanted to know what Israel’s new government is planning to do to support his county — whether it will provide him with defensive weapons systems like Iron Dome, while noting that he needs those systems to counter Iranian drone attacks.

It wasn’t the first time that Zelensky has asked for Iron Dome, and probably won’t be the last. Israel is reluctant to share the anti-missile system with non-allies, and it is even less interested in being directly involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

In the end, Ukraine’s UN representative did not participate in the vote, a step described by Kyiv in Israeli media as a “one-time favor.”

This incident, which took place mere hours after the new government was sworn in, highlights the catch-22 it will face in the new calendar year: The Ukraine war — not the Palestinians, and not even China — is going to determine the future relationship between Washington and Jerusalem.

On the one hand, the Democratic administration is literally invested in Ukraine’s success, hoping to inflict significant financial and diplomatic damage on Russia.

On the other hand, Israel’s incoming prime minister prides himself on striking the right balance between the Kremlin and the White House. Israel regularly attacks Iranian targets in Syria, which requires close coordination with Russia — as happened on Sunday night, when Israeli air strikes hit close to Damascus. In the absence of IDF consultation with Russia’s significant forces in Syria, that would have essentially been impossible.

But now there’s effectively a third angle to this relationship: Russia and Iran are now in active partnership to manufacture drones. The two countries, increasingly isolated and suffering from international sanctions, were driven to help each other.

This new angle affects how Washington sees Tehran, and could figure in any future decision to rejoin the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement. It also clarifies how Israel sees Russia: not as a friend or someone to trust. Nevertheless, taking the step to provide Zelensky with Iron Dome would anger Putin in a way that is hard to predict.

This evolving phenomenon will inevitably affect US-Israel ties, says Richard Goldberg, senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“In the early days, there was quiet tension as the US expected allies to toe a solidly anti-Russian line, without taking into account regional dynamics that left Israel vulnerable to Russian security decisions in Syria,” Goldberg tells Mishpacha. “There was also a bit of short-term memory loss in Washington as to why Israel has the Iron Dome and needs as many active batteries as possible — with the Iranian terror proxy threat continuing to surround the Jewish State.”

But as ties between Moscow and Tehran have warmed, Goldberg says, “Jerusalem sees more benefits to aiding Ukraine militarily, to gain advantage against Iran — while the Biden administration grows increasingly flummoxed by the enormous political hurdle the Ukraine war poses to reaching a nuclear deal with Iran.”

Goldberg — who served on Trump’s National Security Council as director for countering Iranian weapons of mass destruction — last week hosted Netanyahu on his “Limited Liability” podcast to discuss a variety of foreign policy issues, including possible normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia. Given that Netanyahu had prided himself on his good ties with Putin, I ask Goldberg if Netanyahu will still be able to strike a balance between the Russia and the US, or if Biden will demand that Israel actively condemn Russia.

“Unless the US commits to a deeper military presence in Syria — which I don’t see happening — Israel will still have a Russia problem on its northern border,” Goldberg says. “That said, if Jerusalem can leverage its support for Ukraine into global isolation of Iran, Netanyahu may see increased value in boosting support for Kyiv.”

With Russia now in active drone partnership with Iran, will that affect the way Israel sees Putin? “Reports that Moscow will provide Tehran advanced weapons in exchange for Iran’s drone and missile support could be a game-changer for the Israel-Russia relationship,” Goldberg says. “In the past, Moscow has avoided crossing red lines in that arena, at Israel’s request. If red lines are crossed now, all bets are off.”

The more significant question, from Israel’s standpoint, is the future of the JCPOA: Would the Moscow-Tehran axis dampen US enthusiasm for rejoining the agreement? Goldberg says, “In Congress, yes, absolutely. In the White House, it doesn’t yet appear so.”

And indeed, with the new Congress being sworn in this week, the next act will play out on Capitol Hill. The Biden administration has signaled in the past few weeks that a deal is “not on the agenda,” but it would definitely prefer to have some wiggle room for negotiations in the future. A Republican-led Congress, on the other hand, will press for legislation that would make it harder for Biden to rejoin the deal without getting Senate approval, which is the case with international treaties.

The bottom line is that Washington will be laser-focused on Ukraine in 2023. Biden suffered a significant blow in Afghanistan, and Ukraine is his foreign policy ticket. He will want to show that he is a competent president who stood up to Putin.

When China was Washington’s primary nemesis — under both Biden and Trump — it was relatively easy for Israel to avoid being caught in the middle. But that will be much harder with the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as both parties are demanding that Jerusalem take sides in a conflict it wants no part of. Bibi may find that his balancing act has become an impossible challenge.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 943)