Security authorities examine online behavior for signs of intent to commit terror

Tracking down these potential killers also requires the use of wiretaps to monitor communication among thousands of Palestinians. Although the Israeli courts give security forces wide leeway to conduct surveillance some have objected to widespread intelligence gathering. In 2014 for instance 43 IDF reservists signed a letter released to the media announcing their refusal to serve in the IDF’s top Intelligence Unit 8200 on the grounds it was invading the privacy of Palestinians. The IDF dismissed them from military service. The results of Argaman’s efforts speak for itself.

In the past 12 months security forces identified some 2 200 Palestinians in various stages of planning lone-wolf terror attacks and arrested about 800. In some cases authorities only had to send warning letters to the parents of these youths warning of repercussions if their children carried out their intentions. The new techniques also seem to be preventing conventional terror attacks as well. Last year security forces say they prevented 16 suicide attacks at bus stops and in cities in Israel including Haifa and Jerusalem and foiled a similar number of concrete plans to kidnap soldiers and civilians. Similar action is being taken in the fight against ISIS.

In 2016 some 29 ISIS sympathizers were arrested in Jerusalem 11 of whom held Israeli residency cards. Last year some 140 Israeli Arabs inside the Green Line were arrested for terrorist activity with 36 linked to ISIS activities.

At the same time Argaman has tightened coordination with intelligence services in the United States and several Western European countries meeting with at least eight heads of intelligence agencies including the FBI and the British MI6. In the last year jihadists have succeeded in downing four passenger planes. In light of this growing threat and because the EU-US Open Skies Agreement has led to a significant increase in air traffic to and from Israel Argaman has placed special emphasis on civilian aviation security and is crafting a plan to establish a national security authority to oversee this.

While this type of global cooperation was not Argaman’s brainchild he fast-tracked its implementation establishing three new departments and replacing seven department heads who hold a rank parallel to that of general. In essence he has built himself a new headquarters comprised of people he hired and who are answerable to him.

Argaman does have his critics. They say he has filled the ranks of his department with those who lack field experience in the Arab sector. But the innovator answers that managerial experience today is more important than field experience.

Even in the IDF in recent years the top post of Brigadier General in the Military Intelligence units tended to be filled by operational personnel reflecting the growing use of various technologies to combat the spread of such threats as Iranian influence and global jihad from the relative safety of a high-tech office.

In the end apart from the technological innovation Argaman’s biggest contribution may be in the field of cooperation. He is the first Shabak leader to break down the remaining barriers between the Military Intelligence and the Mossad which will lead to better results and better operations to thwart terror and conduct spy operations in distant arenas. (Originally featured in Mishpacha Issue 660)