“There was a categorical directive from the Biden administration to avoid attacking oil and nuclear facilities”

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The question of the “day after” loomed over Israel’s retaliatory strike on Iran, as it has nearly every other aspect of this war. Except here, it was not the day after in Gaza, or in Lebanon, or in Tehran. Rather, it was the day after November 5, in Washington, D.C. So I heard from a member of the government (who once outflanked Netanyahu from the right under similar circumstances) on Motzaei Shabbos Bereishis.

The initial plans for strikes prioritized targeting Iran’s oil fields. The Israeli goal was not only to deliver a punishing military blow, but to generate images that unmistakably demonstrated the force of Israel’s response.

But this time, just weeks before the US elections, the American veto was unequivocal. This wasn’t the feeble “don’t” that preceded the IDF incursions into Rafah and southern Lebanon, but a clear and firm demand to avoid images of flames rising into the night sky in the style of the strikes on Hodeida, Yemen.

“There was a categorical directive from the Biden administration to avoid attacking oil and nuclear facilities,” a cabinet member told me. “Something that would have led to a spike in oil prices and would certainly have affected the American election. Given the complex circumstances, even those who felt differently accepted the prime minister’s decision to respect the American demand, and the entire cabinet voted in favor of the attack.

“Needless to say, we would have found ourselves in a bad situation if we ignored the demand and Kamala Harris were to be elected. But even if Trump wins, the president-elect doesn’t take office for two months, and we saw what happened in the twilight between the Obama and Trump administrations — and that wasn’t in a time of war, with the whole world against us.”

In that window, America memorably withheld its veto from an anti-Israel UN resolution, a risk Israel can’t afford as it faces widespread international condemnation after a year of war.

As usual with the Americans, the stick comes with a carrot. The deployment of the American THAAD missile defense system was essential after Israel’s air defense systems failed to intercept about 20% of the Iranian launches in the latest attack. One can only imagine the repercussions had the entire attack been directed at Israeli oil fields.

Was this a “dardaleh [lame]” strike, as Ben-Gvir described the previous Israeli response to the Iranian missile attack? I asked.

“Absolutely not. We pulverized Tehran’s air defense systems, leaving it vulnerable to further Israeli attacks, and we shattered the taboo on a direct attack in the skies of Tehran, something no country has done in the 40 years since the Iran-Iraq war. But even at the tactical level, in three waves of attacks, Israel hit essential elements of factories producing surface-to-surface missiles, which significantly reduces the scope of the threat to Israel.”

This contribution also directly helps the United States on the Russian front; Iran’s rocket assembly line has been at Moscow’s disposal in the Ukraine war.

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IN recent months, the Israeli public perceives Netanyahu as having done the unbelievable, shifting from defense to offense after a year that started from the lowest point imaginable. The string of assassinations, the defeat of Hamas in Gaza, and the degrading of Hezbollah’s capabilities have placed Israel in an entirely different position, militarily and reputationally.

Nevertheless, Netanyahu has emerged from the attack in a worse position. For the first time in months, Netanyahu is the target of sniping from inside his base, despite public backing from right-wing cabinet members.

For many months, Netanyahu was rightly seen as standing in the breach, withstanding American and European pressure on all fronts — from Rafah to Lebanon. Had it not been for his determination to continue the war, Nasrallah and Sinwar would have lived to see Simchas Torah 5785.

Expectations were high for the retaliatory strike on Iran, and a series of statements by Netanyahu in recent weeks only raised the bar higher. Even the delay in response fueled speculation over how carefully the targets were being chosen, and that this time, the response would set an example.

That the attack was many times more significant than last time is not in question. At the strategic level, Israel has displayed undisputed air superiority. Nevertheless, the measured response, focusing only on military targets, and passing over the nuclear facilities and even the oil fields, left a bitter taste in the mouths of many on the right, bringing back memories of the deterrence strategy against Hamas and Hezbollah.

The one who pounced on the opportunity was opposition leader Yair Lapid, who has plummeted to single digits in some recent polls. Unlike Blue and White chair Benny Gantz, who praised the political echelon, Yair Lapid tried to outflank Netanyahu from the right, criticizing the attack as too moderate. But my inside source dismisses that claim.

“Over the past year, Netanyahu has proven to be a pretty good chess player,” the cabinet member told me, summing up his personal view. “I don’t know any other politician who would have withstood so much pressure, but opposing the Democratic administration at a crucial moment of the election campaign would have been one step too far.

“And the final word on the Iranian front hasn’t been said. The Iranians may not respond this time, but it won’t end there, and what happened last Shabbos will be judged by history, not by the hysteria of a few bitter Israeli politicians.”

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The drone attack on Netanyahu’s Caesarea home raised expectations for a similar response against Iranian officials in Tehran. But again, America’s “don’t” led Israel to focus only on military targets.

Netanyahu himself wasn’t at home on the weekend of the attack, according to an official Israeli statement. What the statement failed to mention is that over the past months, effectively since Israel began the string of assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, the Shin Bet’s Personal Security Unit has treated Netanyahu as a figure under constant threat from a group with state capabilities.

It’s not only his Caesarea home that Netanyahu avoids on the weekends. His official residence on Gaza Street, Jerusalem, is also no longer the default choice for a night’s rest — Netanyahu often finds himself spending the night at the Kiryah or other military bases.

Despite the lack of a consistent sleeping arrangement, the fatigue isn’t evident on Netanyahu’s face, as several people who met him recently impressed on me. Netanyahu is apparently the type who can nod off the moment he closes his eyes, under almost any circumstances.

“That’s an ability you learn as a fighter pilot or in Sayeret Matkal,” MK Matan Kahana, who served in both capacities, once told me. “You get used to falling asleep in any situation, because otherwise it just isn’t possible to function in missions on the ground or in the air that require maximal attention.”

Not many know where Netanyahu will sleep on a given night, but over the past year, we’ve seen how the most advanced capabilities collapse without siyata d’Shmaya, and how much we’re need of Heavenly protection.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1034)