This is the critical question: Which administration will we get?

1

TO paraphrase Tolstoy, each hostage’s family is unhappy in its own way. In the dramatic moments of the deal’s signing, I spoke with Yitzhar Lifshitz, son of two of the hostages: Yocheved, who was returned during the first deal, and Oded, who remains in Hamas’s tunnels. Yitzhar’s 85-year-old mother is still as sharp as a tack.

“I don’t know which is preferable at this point,” he told me with pain, “to be lucid, or to be unaware of your surroundings.”

Yitzhar’s remark encapsulates the reality of Israeli life recently. Netanyahu made the decision to go for a hostage deal lucidly, but in serious pain, as he’s still recovering from his surgery. That neatly parallels the mixed feelings among Israelis about the hostage deal.

What changed this week? Why did it happen now? I asked one cabinet minister who supports the deal.

It’s true that Netanyahu couldn’t refuse Trump, but that’s only half the story, he replied. Netanyahu is eager to explain that Trump’s deal is much better than Biden’s previous proposal; but the truth is that for all his talk of total victory, Netanyahu had agreed to a deal in principle as early as last May.

At the time, it was former president Biden who outed Netanyahu’s consent, which he hadn’t voiced in public out of fear for his coalition’s survival. Then, Biden outlined the terms of the deal, emphasizing that Israel had already given its consent.

Since then, Netanyahu has tried to keep all the balls in the air — and the magic act worked, until Trump showed up.

Bibi counted on Hamas’s intransigence, and on Biden’s refusal to put pressure on Qatar, the mediator on Hamas’s behalf. But then came Trump, who made the release of the hostages his personal goal, warning of heavy retribution if the hostages weren’t released by the time he took office.

From that point on, it’s been clear that Trump’s number one priority was to get a deal before his return to the White House. As Trump saw it, Netanyahu had already agreed to the price, and his message was clear: “Don’t take advantage of my return to raise the price. If you’re okay with the terms and it’s Hamas that turned them down, leave it to me to get Hamas’s agreement.”

In Trump’s Washington, that’s how business is done, but even in Bibi’s Jerusalem, some believe that this wasn’t simply a matter of Israel folding to the fearsome pressure of the old-new president.

With the IDF bogged down in Gaza, it was clear to everyone that this couldn’t continue. Bibi has known for months that he needs a deal, but decided to wait for Trump’s inauguration to curry favor with the incoming president.

2

Last Friday night, it was Shas chair Aryeh Deri — who was consistent in his advocacy for a deal — who took the stage at his party’s conference in Jerusalem to announce that the deal had been finalized.

Deri, who knew that it was too late for Israel to pull back, was tired of the conflicting reports that had emerged from the prime minister’s office throughout the day, and stood up to make it clear for the sake of the families that the deal was final and there was no going back.

If a referendum were held in Israel’s chareidi population centers, opposition to the deal would be well represented, or even in the majority. But after consulting with their rabbanim, chareidi representatives voted in favor of the deal, to a man.

This position continues a long tradition of chareidi support for hostage deals supported by the prime minister and the security establishment. The chareidi “conceptzia” of accepting the professional echelon’s verdict was maintained, though this time with the addition of a more parochial but no less significant factor.

“As long as the war continues, we’ll struggle to pass a draft law,” Shas chair Deri told me previously.

When almost every day begins with an announcement of more soldiers falling in Gaza, it’s impossible to pass legislation exempting yeshivah students from military service. The deal’s chareidi approval could thus have ramifications for the draft law as well, but the million-dollar question now is whether the coalition will survive the threat from the right.

In the weeks preceding the deal, Netanyahu reinforced the coalition by bringing Foreign Minister Gideon Saar back into the government and then back into the Likud. Later, he outflanked Ben-Gvir within the latter’s own party, drawing Otzma Yehudit MK Almog Cohen out of Ben-Gvir’s orbit. He even humiliated opposition chair Yair Lapid, with Yesh Atid MK Idan Roll defecting from the party to caucus as a right-leaning independent.

Netanyahu was looking ahead to the moment he announced a deal, and as of this writing, it seems that the government will survive the shock. True, Ben-Gvir announced his resignation from the government, explaining in a conversation with me that Israel folded completely, even vis-à-vis the Philadelphi Corridor, contrary to Bibi’s claims about having secured better terms than the previous proposal and the implementation of a “Lebanon Doctrine” that would give the IDF freedom of action in Gaza as well.

Ben-Gvir slammed the door on his way out, only to leave it open to his return, clarifying that he wouldn’t topple the government from the opposition, and promising to return should the deal implode ahead of phase two — a realistic scenario in the event that Hamas fails to return each of the hostages promised.

The question of whether Bezalel Smotrich stays in the government is far more significant, given the opposition to a deal within the ranks of the Religious Zionist movement. Should Bibi overcome this challenge, the chances of the government’s survival will climb dramatically, especially given the right’s hopes from the incoming Trump administration.

I caught up with Yossi Dagan, chair of the Samaria Regional Council, this week on his way from Mar-a-Lago to Washington as a guest of the Republican Party. Shortly after launching a Congressional lobby for Judea and Samaria, Dagan told me of the reception received by settlers, who see the Trump era as an opportunity to dramatically increase construction in the settlements.

Looking forward to the day after the deal, this is the critical question: Which administration will we get? One that invites settler leaders to the inauguration, or one influenced by Qatar, that will dash the dreams of a post-Biden golden age?

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1046)