Whether Qatar will play a role in any negotiations between Washington and Tehran remains to be seen

Photo: AP Images

Since taking office, President Donald Trump has brought a sea change in US foreign policy toward the Middle East. His proposal for the US to take over the Gaza Strip and resettle Palestinians elsewhere has completely upended the apple cart of discussion. He has also executed a 180-degree turn from the Biden administration’s policy with regard to Iran. He has reinstituted the “maximum pressure” campaign with sanctions on Tehran, all the while insisting he wants a deal.

Trump’s Gaza proposal has sent the Arab world scrambling to try to come up with an alternative. But if they don’t manage to come up with something acceptable to Trump, he has made clear that he is ready to proceed with his plan. In either scenario — an Arab alternative, or Trump’s takeover proposal — the Gulf state of Qatar is likely to play a leading role.

Qatar has long been a foreign policy paradox; it hosts a major US military base in the region, but is also a leading financial supporter of Hamas and other terror-linked groups. Qatar frequently serves as an intermediary between America and hostile actors — notably, Iran.

Whether Qatar will play a role in any negotiations between Washington and Tehran remains to be seen. Trump has left the door wide open for an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and he has supported Israel’s policy of cutting off the tentacles of Iran’s proxies. At the same time, several administration officials, as well as the president himself, have increasingly spoken of reopening talks with Tehran in the hopes of finding a diplomatic solution that ends its rapidly advancing nuclear threat.

To gauge the chances of success for President Trump’s Middle East initiatives, Mishpacha spoke with two experts from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), a foreign policy think tank in Washington. Natalie Ecanow is a senior research analyst focusing on the Gulf states. Behnam Ben Taleblu serves as senior director of FDD’s Iran program.

Natalie Ecanow

“Track Qatar’s actions and statements carefully”

The Trump administration has declared that it is ready to lead a completely new approach in postwar Gaza. Do you feel they have a clear vision of what they want it to look like?

The administration wants to see a future Gaza that is rid of Hamas and more prosperous than it has been under Hamas rulership. I don’t know if there is a clear path for achieving that goal yet.

If Gaza’s reconstruction is financed by regional investors, Qatar is likely to seek a major role. What do you feel Qatar’s motivations would be for sinking major investment into Gaza?

Publicly, the Qataris will likely say that their goal aligns with Washington’s goal of seeing Gaza reconstructed as a prosperous place where Palestinians can have a better life, out from under Hamas’s grip.

But the Qataris are a regime that has sponsored Hamas politically and financially for well over a decade. They’ll say that they sent money to Gaza to help stabilize the enclave and to moderate Hamas. But clearly, that is not what happened, which raises questions about what their actual motivations have been.

When the Biden administration told the Qataris to expel senior Hamas leaders, they waffled on whether Hamas’s office in Doha would permanently close or not.

If the Trump administration is thinking of inviting the Qataris to lead the reconstruction effort, it should do so very soberly with an understanding of exactly who it is they’re getting involved with.

Track their actions and statements carefully, and if Doha continues supporting Hamas, it’s time for Washington to get tough and reconsider our partnership with them.

What do you think the implications of a stronger Qatari hold on Gaza would be for Israel?

In the past, the Israeli government green-lit some of Qatar’s payments to Gaza. Going forward, the impact of a Qatari presence there hinges on whether Qatar continues to support Hamas or is ready to go down a new path.

There is a divide among US policy analysts on Qatar. Some view it as a possibly amoral actor, but one that is a useful ally and helpful intermediary with hostile powers. FDD takes a far more skeptical view of Qatar’s role. Why is that?

My response to those who acknowledge that Qatar is not fully aligned with the US but see the Qataris as useful pragmatic partners is to ask — if so, why is Qatar considered a “major non-NATO ally”? Why are we accepting Qatari funding in various sectors across the United States? If Qatar is sponsoring terror groups, why are we so interested in deepening ties with them?

Washington should bear in mind that Qatar’s Hamas support is not just financial or political. Qatar has continuously sided with Hamas rhetorically, throughout this conflict. Right after October 7, Doha issued a statement holding Israel solely responsible for the attack. More recently, the emir seemed to reiterate that position at the UN. He also held Israel responsible for war in Lebanon, without acknowledging Hezbollah’s provocations. These factors are important to bear in mind when choosing partners for future plans in the Middle East.

It seems that whichever party holds power in Washington tends to take a more charitable view of Qatar. Why do you think that’s the case?

You can chalk it up to the status quo — or the billions of dollars that Qatar has spent buying influence in the United States. Qatar’s been a major regional ally for decades and hosts CENTCOM’s forward command at Al-Udeid Air Base. There’s a lot that ties US interests to them. Those same factors give Qatar a lot of leverage over the US, and makes it difficult to put more distance between us and them.

Behnam Ben Taleblu

“If you’re going to dance with the devil, get the right deal”

The Trump administration re-implemented its maximum pressure campaign with the goal of completely stopping Iranian oil sales. Do you think this is attainable?

If Trump’s first term is any indicator, then yes. The Trump administration broke the taboo that one needs multilateral sanctions to have a major macroeconomic impact on the Islamic Republic. In about a year and a half, his first administration did more macroeconomic damage than a decade of multilateral sanctions leading up to the JCPOA. That included but was not limited to stopping oil sales.

What I would note, however, is that then [in its first term], the Trump administration took a more phased approach. After leaving the deal, it took about nine months to fully restore sanctions, and six more to begin cutting waivers. Even so, while it did not get Iranian oil exports down to zero, it reduced them down to a much lower level, which is feasible to do again now.

There are reasons that sanctions could be even more effective now. Firstly, Iran is presently in a weak position, making it a good target for financial pressure. Secondly, China also buys oil from the opposite side of the Persian Gulf — Saudia Arabia.

By combining energy diversity and appealing to Chinese mercantile instincts, President Trump can replicate what happened during the middle years of the Obama administration, when Chinese reduced their importing to get more leverage over pricing.

Do you think it’s likely the Trump administration will support Israeli airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities?

President Trump is now giving more room for diplomacy, but I also think he’s personally committed to preventing a nuclear Iran.

Overall, I don’t think US policy has changed since Iranian nuclear facilities were first revealed in 2002 — that all options are on the table. Different presidents moved the military option from the front burner to the back burner. But I think President Trump’s track record in gutting Iran’s threat level is pretty strong, going back to killing [IRGC chief] Qassem Soleimani. When push comes to shove, he’ll use force.

How that pairs with a joint operation with the Israelis remains to be seen. The Israelis did something historic in 2024 by beginning to use force directly against Iranian territory. Ironically, in the very short term, President Trump is using the space created by Israel’s military success to press for some kind of diplomatic resolution.

Still, looking at the ideology in Tehran today — that it means what it says when officials chant “death to America” and “death to Israel” — my bet is that diplomatic process probably won’t go very far.

That leaves the Trump administration increasing sanctions and seeking some kind of diplomatic off-ramp, all while very publicly being seen planning with the Israelis.

Do you think it is likely we will see Iran renew talks with the Trump administration?

That is more dependent on Tehran than on Washington. President Trump was quite clear about a desire for a deal.

Tehran will fundamentally be put to a choice. It can either submit wholesale, to verifiably dismantle its nuclear program, or have it dismantled militarily and risk regime collapse altogether.

Because Tehran is in this bind, they’re playing a very clever game. There’s a whole host of reporting over the past few weeks saying that... Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Khamenei] is rejecting talks. They’re actually just raising the asking price.

What Tehran desperately needs is a diplomatic road to sanctions relief, which is inherently tied to stabilizing the regime amid the present economic turbulence there. Its leaders know that they [need a bargaining chip and] can’t afford to trade away talks as a tool.

Iran’s leaders understand that they’re in a tight spot. Maximum pressure just re-started, and the currency, the rial, is already at record lows. What the regime wants to do now is use the prospect of talks as a human shield, of sorts, against an Israeli military strike.

Is there reason to think that Iran’s weakened regional power affects its diplomatic calculus with the US?

The regime’s weakened position makes it a better target for coercive diplomacy, or coercion in general. US dealmakers can prey on their present weakness. That differs from prior diplomatic overtures, which tried to lure Iran to the table by bolstering the regime’s sense of security. I think the approach now is to get them there by bolstering the military threat against them.

What terms would the Trump administration seek in talks, and what would Iran accept?

I don’t believe an agreement that is both politically and strategically worthwhile for this administration is really achievable.

Given how advanced Iran’s program is, if the president is serious about a deal, the only framework that makes sense is disarmament. That’s the only type of deal worth pursuing if you’re really going to try to dance with the devil here. Not a limited arms control deal like the JCPOA or the INF treaty with the Soviets.

It would have to be a comprehensive verifiable plan to remove Iran’s nuclear threat.

Is there any reason to believe Iran would agree to disarmament?

History has shown that the regime will only respond if faced with massive and sustained pressure that has the potential to challenge its hold on power.

Given how weak the regime is, what Trump can do is to  benefit from the changing pattern of street protests, which have been pushing away from reform and [toward] seeking wholesale revolution. At the 46th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, we recently saw crowds chanting “death to Khamenei” in at least four cities. Playing on that unrest is the only way to get concessions out of Tehran.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1050)