What could be next for the Trump administration’s moves in Latin America and how do they play into the president’s broader game?

F

ew American news watchers think much about Venezuela. The South American country has long been a thorn in the side for the US, but it was managed with minimum resources and public attention.

With a series of strikes on drug smuggling boats and a bolstered military presence around the region, the US looks like it is up to more than the ostensible counternarcotics mission.

What could be next for the Trump administration’s moves in Latin America and how do they play into the president’s broader game?

What is going on?

Beginning in September, the US military has carried out strikes against Venezuelan drug-smuggling boats in the Caribbean and Pacific.

In all, at least 16 vessels have been sunk.

In mid-October, the President authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations in Venezuela. The DOJ raised the bounty on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s head to $500 million, citing his collaboration with drug gangs operating in the US.

During the same period, the US steadily built up an arsenal around Venezuela.

Mostly notably, the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier group was ordered to the region. The massive and highly advanced crafts had been deployed in the Mediterranean, fending off Houthi attacks. They join around ten vessels capable of enabling rapid air, land, and missile attacks along with squads of jets and special operations units operating out of Puerto Rico, Trinidad, and other islands within striking distance of Venezuela.

President Donald Trump summed up his goals at a White House event.

“I don’t think we’re going to necessarily ask for a declaration of war, I think we’re just going to kill people that are bringing drugs into our country. Okay? We’re going kill them. You know? They’re going be like, dead.”

Pressed in a subsequent interview, the President said war with Venezuela was unlikely.

Why Venezuela?

Since Hugo Chavez gained power in 1998, and increasingly under his successor Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela has descended into financial ruin and repression, while allying itself with anti-Western powers.

“In addition to their involvement in transnational crime, Maduro and his criminal state structure have turned Venezuela into an advanced base for Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere,” said Leonardo Coutinho, Executive Director of the Center for a Secure Free Society, which focuses on Latin America.

Venezuela does not produce drugs, but it is the staging ground for smuggling much of the cocaine grown in neighboring Colombia.

Under Chavez, and then Maduro, its government and military officials formed a partnership with drug lords and gang leaders, creating what became known as the Cartel of the Suns.

Weapons from Russia and Iran are key to Venezuela’s defense infrastructure and China is a major purchaser of its sanctioned oil. In exchange, all three enjoy a friendly base of operations a few hours from Miami. The now depleted Hezbollah has long based its Latin America activities in Venezuela.

The Great (Migration) Overlap

The third prong of Venezuela’s threat is its role in driving migration towards the United States. Some of this comes from the eight million Venezuelans who have fled their country since 2015. Many more have been driven by the ripple effects of its drug trade.

“The cocaine that the Maduro regime sends to Haiti turns the country into a minefield with migratory impact towards the United States,” said Mr. Coutinho. “The brutal violence in Central America and Mexico is driven by cocaine…. The erosion of public security in Central America is at the root of the migration crises and pressures on the United States.”

Is this really all about drugs?

All agree that a US naval and air armada are not traditional tools to shut down narcotics trafficking. If so, what are the administration’s goals?

“To reestablish deterrence and cut off the narco-state’s logistical lines,” said Mr. Coutinho. “It’s about hybrid warfare, sponsored by Caracas with support from Iran and Hezbollah and strategic cover from Russia and China. Drugs are part of it. But we’re talking about multiple threats combined, such as the Tren de Aragua gang, which has been exported to the United States and other countries.”

In a recent interview, President Trump acknowledged the actions were not solely about drugs, but “many things.”

Regime Change?

The US military buildup and CIA authorization sparked a good deal of chatter that the Trump administration is working to oust Mr. Maduro.

Given his promises to minimize US troop deployments and ending “forever wars,” few think President Trump is considering invasion.

According to reports on a recent classified Congressional briefing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said the administration lacked authority to carry out land strikes and that none were in the offing.

Yet, some posit that US military presence is intended to signal to elements in Venezuela that now is an opportune time to throw off the Maduro yoke.

Mr. Coutinho called the goal a “soft coup,” that would fracture Venezuela’s power holders leading to Mr. Maduro’s “negotiated exit,” followed by “retirement” in Russia.

Many are skeptical about this scenario, saying that Mr. Maduro has successfully insulated himself from coup threats by leaving only highly loyal officials in the upper echelons of leadership. During past attempts to pressure his regime, no significant fissures emerged.

Reactions in MAGAland

The focus on Venezuela comes as the Trump administration casts a broader glance at Latin America. A recent spat with Colombia’s leftist president, Gustavo Petro, ended with the President suspending aid to the nation.

Varying explanations have been given for the shift after a year when the administration spent much of its foreign energies on the Middle East and Ukraine.

Some point to the influence of Marco Rubio, whose career has been marked by consistently advocating for a harder line on Venezuela. If so, it appears that he has won an internal White House debate, as the administration’s earlier Venezuela actions involved swapping limited sanctions relief for cooperation on deportations and some prisoner releases.

While some question how heightened involvement in another theater would play to “America First” elements in the President’s base, the apparent change in focus has been pretty well received.

A poll by the Economist and YouGov shows 82% of Trump voters support the strikes on drug boats.

Moreover, a neo-Monroe doctrine, prioritizing interests in America’s own hemisphere, is largely cheered by those on the right skeptical of involvement in the Middle East and Ukraine.

A political advantage of shifting focus to Latin America is that goals there speak directly to the President’s banner priorities, including crime and immigration.

“[It represents a] re-hemispherization of security efforts,” said Mr. Coutinho. “[This is] defense of the homeland. Fewer gangs and drugs in cities and less risk of the region becoming a focus of conflict with extra-regional actors.”

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1086)