Photos: Menachem Kalish

W

eeks after the arrest of alleged Iran spy Gonen Segev, it’s becoming clear just how much damage he may have caused.

Segev was a former minister of energy and infrastructure who knew the exact details of Israel’s energy plans. He was also a highly placed official whose contacts in the military and political arenas could have been appropriated by Iranian intelligence.

After his arrest, Segev reportedly told state investigators that he had intended to set himself up as a double agent — working on behalf of the State of Israel while duping the Iranians. Indeed, testimony exists to support Segev’s claim that he informed Israeli sources about his contacts with Iran, but it’s unclear whether such a deal had ever been finalized.

Ram Ben-Barak, a former deputy head of the Mossad, told Mishpacha that there’s a constant undercover war between Israel and Iran. And in such a war, each side tries to recruit potential sources, targeting people who have a particular gripe or ideological motivation.

“As far as the Iranians are concerned, a former energy minister, former MK, and former officer of the paratroopers is a tremendous catch,” Ben-Barak said, referring to Gonen. “Such a person can, for example, explain the complex system of political and business ties in Israel, as well as the influence of the defense establishment. He also has far-reaching knowledge about Israel’s energy industry, which has always been a prime target of the enemy.”

This isn’t the first time Segev has been suspected of espionage and attempts to sell information to enemy agencies. Former Shin Bet chief Yaakov Peri told Mishpacha that, already in the late ’90s, Segev had contacted Kais Obeid, an Arab Israeli from Taibe, who brokered deals with agents from the Persian Gulf who apparently worked for Iran.

According to Gad Shimron, former director of operations in the Mossad, Gonen could have most harmed the state with his knowledge of the energy infrastructure. Gonen became minister of energy and infrastructure in 1995, after Israel’s modern energy grid had been established. “As energy and infrastructures minister, Gonen Segev knew a great deal about Israel’s infrastructures in 1995, including various secrets about emergency power stations, control centers, water supplies, and more,” Shimron said.

Lior Ackerman, former deputy department head in the Shin Bet, said the agency is ever on the alert to discover Iran’s espionage plans. Ackerman believes Gonen would have been most valuable to the Iranians as an electronic doorway to other top officials.

“In today’s cyber age, Segev’s contacts with Israeli sources in the defense, energy, and foreign establishments are extremely valuable, and have tremendous potential to inflict harm on Israel’s security,” Ackerman said. “All he’d have to do was establish a few connections — ostensibly for business, between those contacts and the Iranians — for him to be of great use.”

A defense source told Mishpacha it’s likely the Shin Bet has expanded its investigations to ensure that the Israeli businessmen and defense company representatives who’d been in contact with Segev have not been exposed to Iranian intelligence.

“If they paid with a credit card, sent him an e-mail, or called him on a cell phone, they were exposed to Iranian spy operations,” the source said.

For instance, with just the credit card or e-mail details of a senior representative of one of the defense companies in Israel, a foreign intelligence agency can implant a “worm” that penetrates a computer system as soon as that contact enters the system.

One of the defense sources who spoke with Mishpacha said it’s possible that the meetings Segev orchestrated between Israeli businessmen and various representatives around the world were meant to enable the Iranians to penetrate classified databases. At this stage, experts can’t yet estimate the scope of the damage to Israel as a result of Segev’s operations; however, they say, the deeper the entry into the databases, the greater the potential harm.

Segev, who earned a medical degree at Ben-Gurion University, reportedly first contacted the Iranians in 2012, when he worked as a doctor in Nigeria. He had fled to that central African country in 2007 after being released from an Israeli prison, where he served a short prison sentence for smuggling illegal contraband. The cover story for Segev’s contacts with the Iranians was that he was helping them establish and launch a medical system.

As soon as a spy’s cover is blown, the first question for the Shin Bet is whether the spy’s activities have caused immediate harm to the state. If he has, imprisonment takes place without delay. If not, sometimes an intelligence agency will attempt to convert the spy into a double agent. Another method is to allow him to continue operating, but to feed him false information.

A former defense source told Mishpacha that sometimes intelligence agencies follow a spy in order to expose his handlers. That, in turn, could help expose other spies. The source stressed that following handlers in this way in the age of cyberwarfare could net information that’s “worth its weight in gold.”

“By eavesdropping and getting into their lives,” he said, “it’s possible to learn very quickly what the other side knows, and through digital means, to enter the enemy’s most sensitive computer systems.” (Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 716)