When the world invokes the nuclear option to avert nuclear disaster

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here are few diplomatic inventions as strange as the snapback sanctions on Iran under the original nuclear deal. Think of it as the international community’s panic button that locks the whole building when pressed. Essentially, the world gets to buy Iran’s compliance, try it out for a few years, and if you don’t like the fit, it goes right back on the sanctions rack. There are no refunds, no exchanges, and definitely no store credit.

Let’s start in 2015. When the JCPOA was drafted, under which Iran agreed to restrict its nuclear program in exchange for relief from international sanctions, negotiators worried about one thing: What if Iran cheats? What if the centrifuges keep spinning behind the curtain while the ayatollahs smile politely at the negotiations tables?

Nobody wanted to spend months haggling at the UN over re-sanctioning Iran every time they got suspicious. So they invented the diplomatic booby-trap called the snapback. If Iran broke its promises, sanctions would come roaring back automatically after 30 days, unless the Security Council voted to stop them. Which, of course, meant that instead of needing consensus to punish Iran, you needed consensus to protect it. This brilliant little technique marks perhaps the only time the veto power was rigged against Moscow and Beijing instead of for them.

Fast-forward to 2018: Trump leaves the JCPOA, calling it the “worst deal ever, so true, believe me.” Two years later, his team tries to pull the snapback lever anyway. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo shows up at the UN with a legal argument that while America left the deal, technically the US is still listed as a “participant” in the Security Council resolution, so of course it can trigger enforcement. Thirteen out of fifteen Council members basically said: “You can’t quit the choir and then return later to demand a solo.”

Then September 2020 rolls along and the 30-day clock runs out. Pompeo declares victory: “All sanctions are back!” The world yawns. Russia, China, Europe, the UN Secretary-General all shrug. After all, it’s only Trump’s first term, and the real power lies with Robert Mueller. For the time being, the sanctions exist in a Schrödinger’s box: alive in Washington press releases, dead everywhere else. The snapback was technically triggered, but practically ignored.

Now fast-forward again. It’s late 2025 and the situation is different — and not because Iran is behaving. On the contrary, Tehran is enriching uranium at a furious pace, like Terach filling out the manufacturer’s warrantees for his idols the day after. What changed is who pressed the button.

This time it’s France, Germany, and Britain — not the US. They filed the complaint, invoked the mechanism, and let the 30-day clock tick. Russia and China tried a procedural stunt to delay the process, but the Security Council rejected it. And with no resolution passed by Day 30, the guillotine blade fell: sanctions snapped back.

The difference is credibility. When the US did it after storming out of the deal, it looked like legal gymnastics. When the Europeans do it, it looks like law. And when the EU itself announces it is reinstating sanctions that include arms embargoes, financial freezes, and travel bans, the world takes notice. Banks and companies don’t care about Iranian rhetoric; they care about compliance officers with nervous ticks.

There’s another reason this is happening now. See, when President Obama launched the JCPOA, it was only meant to last for a decade. And when his critics grumbled that it would only kick the can down the road, here’s where the can meets the “Dead End” sign and the clock is about to run out forever. The very Security Council resolution that created the snapback mechanism, UNSCR 2231, expires on October 18, 2025. After that, the entire framework dissolves, and there’s no “automatic” anything. If the world wanted to punish Iran later, it would have to start from scratch, and good luck with Russia or China ever agreeing to that, given their burgeoning alliance with the Iranian regime.

So Europe pulled the lever before the window slammed shut. Better late than never, and certainly better than letting Iran waltz into nuclear threshold status under the UN’s nose with no enforcement mechanism left.

Tehran, predictably, calls the move illegitimate. Officials are fuming, threatening to quit inspection agreements, and even float walking out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. Inside Iran, ordinary citizens brace for more economic pain. Another round of sanctions means more isolation, more inflation, and more misery for a population already trapped between clerical rule, geopolitical roulette, and regularly scheduled beheadings.

Do these snapback sanctions bite? On paper, yes. Arms sales get blocked, ballistic missile restrictions are reinstated, and those sweet assets unlocked by Joe Biden are re-frozen. Meanwhile, Iranian generals find themselves re-listed as persona non grata at every airport lounge from Milan to Manila.

In practice, enforcement is spotty. Some countries will comply, others will cheat, and many will quietly hope the Americans do the heavy lifting. It’s a sanctions regime in theory, a sanctions suggestion in practice.

The downside to sanctions is that they rarely isolate the intended target as neatly as advertised. Instead of prying Tehran away from bad behavior, snapback may just as likely push it deeper into the waiting arms of Moscow and Beijing. Every embargoed drone sale is another excuse for Iran to ink a defense deal with Russia; every frozen bank account is an invitation to test new yuan-based workarounds with China. In practice, sanctions can harden the very alliances they’re meant to fracture, creating an axis of grievance that swaps drones for oil, gold for missiles, and resentment for legitimacy.

The irony of the snapback is that it was designed to be automatic, but it only works if enough people agree to believe in the magic trick. In 2020, the world refused. In 2025, with the Europeans pulling the lever and the UN’s legal window closing, the spell seems to hold. For now.

But there’s a paradox. Once snapback is triggered, it can’t be reversed without a brand-new Security Council resolution. Which means the very tool designed as a reversible safeguard could lock the world into permanent sanctions limbo. Think of it like installing an emergency exit that, once used, bricks the entire building.

The snapback is back. Iran is furious, Europe is resolute, and Washington is smugly vindicated. But the real question is whether this diplomatic mousetrap will actually catch the mouse — or whether the mouse, with its back against the wall, will finally acquire its first nukes.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1082)