Ilan Berman is senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council and an expert on the Middle East and Russia

Following through on a promise he made several months ago, President Donald Trump has lifted a long list of economic sanctions on Syria, initially imposed on the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

When Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known by his nom-de-guerre Abu Mohammad Al-Julani) surprised the world by taking power this past January, most Western observers were happy to see Assad go but wary about the direction the long-plagued nation would take. Al-Sharaa’s radical Islamist militia, called Haayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and its ties to al-Qaeda, did not inspire confidence. Yet steady signs of moderation have won Mr. al-Sharaa increasing international support.

The Trump administration’s decision to drop sanctions is a key piece in a larger game the president hopes to play in bringing greater stability to the troubled region. A key angle of this effort is expanding the Abraham Accords, establishing normalization between Syria and Israel, with other long-time foes like Lebanon potentially in the mix.

Ilan Berman, senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council, is certainly familiar with this territory. An expert in the Middle East and Russia, he has advised the multiple presidential administrations, Congressional committees, and the CIA.

Mr. Berman spoke with Mishpacha to share his views and expertise on what could lie ahead on this newly reconstructed Middle East diplomatic map.

Aside from the diplomatic signal sent by sanction relief, what practical impact does it have on the ground in Syria?

The sanctions were built up over the last 12 years or so to serve two purposes — limit Assad’s capabilities to brutalize his own people during the civil war, and isolate the regime economically by severing its links to the international financial system. Trump is trying the fix the latter part to incentivize this perceived political pivot and new moderation in Damascus.

There was a great deal of concern about Mr. al Sharaa and the jihadi past of HTS when he initially took power. Six months later, how do you evaluate his attempt to remake his image?

Time obviously will tell whether the new Syrian regime is earnestly committed to this path, but it’s clear, at least for now, that he’s picked pragmatism.

This is likely because al Sharaa’s main goal is to consolidate power and exert control over the entire country. That’s hard for him to do when his military is weak, when he doesn’t have foreign investment or international partners. He’s trying to demonstrate to the international community that Assad is gone and he, a former jihadist, has turned over a new leaf.

That said, it’s very early, and one can very easily imagine backsliding on the part of the new Syrian regime.

What are the positive signs that you see coming from al-Sharaa’s government?

There were two very legitimate causes of concern when Assad fell. First, that HTS was an al-Qaeda affiliate and could quickly revert to its Islamist roots.

The second was that their coup was orchestrated by Turkey, and that the new regime would therefore become a proxy in a new stage of Turkish imperialism.

If you look at it now, neither of those scenarios have materialized.

Al-Sharaa has consistently sent public signals of moderation. He kicked out many extremist factions. And not just Islamist factions, but groups like the leadership of the PFLP GC, which is a Palestinian secular leftist group. He’s trying to signal that Syria won’t be a haven for terrorism anymore.

The idea that this will be a step in Turkey’s expansion across the Middle East hasn’t played out either. The strongest proof is that Syria is now willing to engage with Israel at a time when Israelis see Turkey as a security threat. That’s a clear indication that the Syrians are not beholden to what Turkey wants.

What strategy do you think lies behind the Trump administration’s Syria moves?

Trump is trying to incentivize Syria to lock in its current political trajectory — to send al-Sharaa a message that moderation will benefit his government and his country as a way of encouraging him to continue down this path.

For instance, this most recent stage of sanctions removal was very closely tied to the start of negotiations between Damascus and Jerusalem.

That’s very on brand for Trump foreign policy: provide economic incentives for countries when they’re doing the thing that you want them to do. Conversely, when countries don’t do the things that you want them to do, we see results like we just saw in Iran.

How do you think these moves impact the administration’s initial plans to withdraw remaining US troops from Syria?

In the early days of the administration, there was a clear desire to scale down America’s presence in the Middle East.

But strategy doesn’t survive first contact with the enemy. What you now have is a greater American presence in the Middle East. Nevertheless, I think that underlying hope remains, and the surest way to scale down our involvement with Syria is to put them on the proper political path. That is why the Trump administration is helping Syria reintegrate into the international community.

How much control does al-Shaara have over the country?

This was not a seamless transition. The reason the Turks were able to incubate this coup in the first place was because even Assad didn’t have full control over the country, and significant pockets of opposition remained. The Turks nurtured one of those resistance groups, HTS, and capitalized on it.

That problem remains. Many opposition elements, including ISIS factions, are still active in Syria’s east. Those same groups are now a threat to al-Sharaa’s power. While that situation threatens his authority, the need to counter them is also nudging him to moderate as a means of fighting against these challengers.

Do Russia and Iran still have footholds in Syria?

The conventional wisdom was that the Russians were fully leveraged on Assad, and if his regime fell, they would get kicked out of Syria altogether. But that hasn’t materialized.

Right away, the Russians recognized al-Sharaa’s government and never made an issue of his jihadist roots. Now, they’re still there, still using Syria’s ports, and increasingly engaging in trade with the new Syria.

The Iranians lost a lot, since Assad was a reliable proxy and al-Sharaa is aligned against them, but they’re not really gone either. When Iran came into Syria to help keep Assad in power, they didn’t just bring in fighters, they brought civilians too. They took over towns, and in some areas significantly shifted the demographics in a way to make Syria more Shiite and more loyal to Tehran. In addition, there are still Shia militias active there. So while Iran’s power is much diminished, they still have some significant capabilities.

Do any of the Iran-aligned militias or other elements in Syria still pose a significant threat to Israel?

One of the most important indicators of this will be how willing the IDF is to scale back its presence in southern Syria. After HTS took over, Israel bombed Assad’s military assets and took up a robust presence in southern Syria. Part of the current normalization discussions are about Israel scaling back that presence. The IDF’s willingness to do that will tell you everything you need to know. If the Israeli military tells Netanyahu there’s still a threat, the IDF isn’t going anywhere.

Is normalization between Syria and Israel realistic? The Trump administration is also speaking about outreach to Lebanon. How do you evaluate both prospects?

As unthinkable as it would have been less than a year ago, I think Syria is now the low-hanging fruit in terms of normalization.

Al-Sharaa seems to be earnestly trying to make a break from the Assad regime. That’s logical, in a sense. Any time you try to make a fundamental reorientation, you do the opposite of whatever the last leader did. Here, one way to do that would be to reverse course on Israel.

Secondly, Syria is a very poor country, devastated by years of brutal leadership and civil war. It is not lost on them that Israel is the region’s economic engine, and that this dynamism could help Syria rebuild. If the Syrian government can get away from rejectionist dogma, normalization makes a lot of sense.

What does not make sense is talking about Israeli normalization with Syria and Lebanon in the same sentence. Lebanon still has a law on its books that classifies Israel as an enemy state and prevents direct contact between the two nations. It would take an act of its legislature to even open preliminary talks. There is a lot of distance between their efforts to curtail Hezbollah, though, and being willing to take such a radical step.

Al-Sharaa, on the other hand, inherited empty political space because Assad had taken power away from all the institutions. That now gives him tremendous freedom of action in how he rebuilds the state.

How would control of the Golan be dealt with?

The Golan issue is going to be a bellwether. Israel’s position on the Golan made strategic sense for a long time, since it’s the high ground, strategically. Remember, the US Navy docks in the Haifa port, so they can’t have militant groups being able to target the north of the country.

Recently, we’ve heard that al-Sharaa has shown flexibility about letting Israel maintain sovereignty over the Golan in a normalization deal. That’s a very serious confidence-building measure, but it could also be a stumbling block at home. There are plenty of Syrian nationalists who will say that the Golan is not his to give up.

How would normalization with Israel affect al-Sharaa’s hold on power?

I think that will depend on the degree to which al-Sharaa finds popular support for it at home.

If he can do normalization incrementally and slowly show Syrians that he got Israel to pull back militarily and provide economic dividends, it could work.

I don’t think this happens overnight, but there’s a pathway for him to do this in a way that doesn’t endanger his hold on power.

The converse is also true, however. If he does a quick grand bargain with the Israelis, I think there’s a real risk that it threatens his government.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1069)