Will Iran undergo a regime change, and if so, what form might it take?

Following a coordinated military operation by Israel and the United States to eliminate Iran’s “Supreme Leader” Ali Khamenei and his ruling circle and obliterate Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs once and for all, two critical questions loom.

Will Iran undergo a regime change, and if so, what form might it take?

Will Israel’s remaining adversaries learn a lesson from Iran’s experience and recalibrate in response to the overwhelming display of US-Israeli military dominance?

Let’s start with regime change, which is quite common. Two academic studies have identified at least 260 regime changes in well over half of the world’s countries since World War II. Martin Paldam, a professor of economics at Denmark’s Aarhus University, produced one of these studies, noting that a “triggering event” is a prerequisite for regime change.

Israel and the US pulled that trigger.

However, we must clearly distinguish between a “leadership change,” which occurs when the leader is removed while the governing system remains intact, and a “regime change,” in which the entire political order collapses or undergoes fundamental restructuring.

A collaborative study led by political scientists Barbara Geddes (UCLA), Joseph Wright (Penn State), and Emily Frantz (Bridgewater State College) identify three possible outcomes when an autocratic leader (as Khamenei was) falls. Either a member of the incumbent leadership group replaces him, and the regime persists; or democratically elected leaders replace the incumbent leadership group, or the incumbent leadership group loses control to another group, which replaces it with a new autocracy.

Option number two, a democratic Iran, is the most palatable but least plausible for two reasons.

Historically, more than half of all regime changes since World War II have simply replaced one autocracy with another, and fewer than 25% have resulted in democratic governments. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the numbers are even worse. Since the 2011 Arab Spring, regime changes have occurred in seven nations, most recently in Syria, but only Tunisia has experienced a brief period of democracy.

Over Iran’s last 100 years, two consecutive autocracies — the Pahlavi Shahs (1925-1979) and the current Islamic Republic — have ruled the nation, with no democratic interludes.

In addition to Iran’s lack of experience with democracy, it’s crucial to note that 85% to 90% of Iranians share the same religion as the ayatollahs who have governed Iran for the last 47 years. While the younger generation may not be as strict as the mullahs, their faith remains their primary guiding principle.

President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu have both stated that regime change is the overriding goal of the current military campaign. History and the odds are stacked against them, and the campaign must be approached with realistic expectations. Eliminating Iran’s military capabilities — and not leaving them to fight another day under a similar regime — is a more important and more achievable goal.

Adversarial Relationships

Prime Minister Netanyahu has made Iran a legacy issue for himself. The coordinated US-Israeli attack has vindicated his approach, but Israel still faces a long list of adversaries that will complicate Trump and Bibi’s efforts to craft a new, more peaceful Middle East.

Turkey

President Erdogan’s long-term strategy has been to position Turkey as a more acceptable strategic ally to the US than Israel, which remains a pariah in much of the Muslim Middle East. Turkish power would support US interests, allowing the US to extricate itself from regional involvements.

With the US now more likely to remain a strong force in the Middle East, and with Israel proving to the US that it remains its most reliable ally, does Erdogan pivot? Or does he double down, believing that a weak Iran gives Turkey more clout to pursue its objectives of restoring the Ottoman Empire to its former glory?

Saudi Arabia

One reason for the Saudis’ initial interest in the Abraham Accords was that it shared Israel’s fear of a nuclear Iran. If Iran no longer poses a nuclear threat, does that further reduce its incentive to normalize relations with Israel? Or is there a chance Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) will warm to Israel again after Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Israel, with talk of constructing a high-speed rail line to move goods from India to Europe? That would serve MBS’s goal of diversifying Saudi Arabia’s economy away from oil. The tracks would pass through both Saudi Arabia and Israel, necessitating at least tacit Saudi normalization with Israel.

Syria

A couple of months ago, reports indicated that the Trump administration would pressure Israel in March to reach an agreement with Syria’s Ahmed al-Sharaa and begin the process of an IDF withdrawal from outposts it seized when the previous Assad regime fell. Israel maintained it needed those outposts to ensure that its fighter jets could reach Iran, on a shorter route, over Syrian airspace.

If Iran is degraded as a threat, does that make it more likely that Trump will push Israel on that front? Or will Trump sour on al-Sharaa, as just another autocratic leader of an unstable nation?

The 3 H’s: Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis

The Houthis will be weaker without funding and logistical support from Iran, but they are armed and trained well enough to be a nuisance that can close shipping lanes in key international waterways. Their missiles have reached Ben-Gurion Airport and Eilat, forcing Israel to temporarily close the Port of Eilat. Hamas and Hezbollah still represent unrepentant border threats to Israel. Israel has more freedom of action to use military force against Hezbollah in Lebanon, but its hands are tied in Gaza by Trump’s 20-point peace plan, which could blow up in everyone’s faces without a real plan to disarm Hamas.

Egypt

Egypt violates the Camp David Treaty by building troop strength and positions in the Sinai that exceed what’s allowed. It’s also aiding and abetting weapons smuggling to Negev Bedouin who could turn them against Israel. Egypt is blocking Gazans who want to exit the war-torn strip for greener pastures. The Trump administration and Congress have taken a hands-off approach with Egypt, and Israel hasn’t exerted sufficient pressure to force an Egyptian retreat. That only emboldens Egypt, which has recently mended fences with Turkey to form a stronger anti-Israel alliance. It’s a clear and present danger that needs close scrutiny.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1102)