If Herzog pardons Bibi, he’ll enrage the left, but if he doesn’t, he’ll risk slighting Trump

PHOTO: SHUTTERSTOCK.COM / NOAMGALAI

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sraeli president Isaac Herzog suddenly found himself in a political no-man’s-land last Thursday, when he came under scathing criticism from his American counterpart, President Donald Trump. After a meeting with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Trump called Herzog “disgraceful” and said the people of Israel should be “ashamed” that their president had not granted Netanyahu a pardon.

The broadside caught Herzog in distant Sydney, Australia, where he was visiting the Jewish community still mourning the victims of the Chanukah terrorist attack. Those close to the Israeli president described him as “shell-shocked.” Herzog could hardly believe that he was at the center of such a tumult.

Nothing is more contrary to his temperament than being dragged into a such a dustup. As the son of President Chaim Herzog, his instinct has always been to avoid direct confrontation. Throughout his long political career, while Israeli discourse has grown increasingly heated, Herzog is among the few who’ve continued to behave with gentlemanly restraint.

“I left the building in time,” he once remarked about the Knesset, when I visited him at the presidential residence.

Herzog is also remembered for the line that became a running joke at his own expense — that at the end of Election Day, he would simply go to sleep and wake up the next morning to hear the results.

A leak soon emerged from the President’s Residence that subtly pointed an accusing finger at Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who coincidentally was meeting with Trump last week. The leak suggested that a red line had been crossed — if indeed someone in Netanyahu’s circle “warmed Trump up.” Even here, the wording remained cautious.

Herzog’s dilemma is twofold. An official refusal of the pardon request could be interpreted as a slight to Trump — whose retaliation could be painful. Granting the pardon, on the other hand, would ignite the fury of the Kaplan-protest camp, which would view it as entrenching Netanyahu’s rule — a danger equivalent, in their eyes, to the Iranian threat.

Herzog’s preferred path of “walking between the raindrops” is nearly impossible under these circumstances. The pressure from both directions is therefore likely to intensify.

Netanyahu, however, returned from Washington with the feeling that this seventh trip — despite his brief stay, with his total flight time exceeding the duration of the visit — was worth it. On this trip, he managed to bypass not only the countries he couldn’t visit because of the ICC arrest warrant, but also the Oval Office intermediaries — Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner — who had been counseling “containment.”

Netanyahu flew to Washington with a dual understanding. First, that he must once again present his case directly to Trump rather than through emissaries with their own agendas and personal considerations. Second, that Trump has a supreme interest in achieving a breakthrough in the Middle East, more than anywhere else.

Trump’s envoys presented the option of an agreement with Iran as a gateway to a broader regional arrangement, free of the risks of launching an open-ended military operation. Netanyahu explained that precisely such an agreement would strengthen Iran in the long term and provide tailwinds to China and Russia at America’s expense.

During the three-hour conversation, Netanyahu presented detailed intelligence showing that the ayatollahs have no intention of honoring commitments, and that any agreement would merely grant the regime time to rehabilitate and rebuild. Trump may love deals, but he does not appreciate negotiating partners trying to rip him off.

Netanyahu explained to his cabinet that, given Trump’s challenges (not only with public opinion but also with his Republican base), Israel must raise warning signs without appearing to push the United States into a military confrontation. The decision not to hold a press conference after the meeting was an Israeli interest.

Trump’s post-visit statement declaring regime change as the objective, delivered without Netanyahu standing beside him, indicated that Netanyahu’s message had been heard — at least until the next whisperer arrives.

No Potted Plant

This week, Netanyahu sent Foreign Minister Gideon Saar to Washington to serve as Israel’s representative at the inaugural meeting of Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza. This was the second time Netanyahu delegated such a role to Saar, one he would normally reserve for himself — the first being several weeks ago, when Saar was sent to manage dialogue with Secretary of State Marco Rubio after Trump announced that Turkey and Qatar would sit on the same board.

As a rule, there are no free gifts. Sending Saar in his stead is convenient for Netanyahu; the diplomatic neighbors in that forum are not particularly photogenic from a political perspective. A personal photograph of Netanyahu standing with Qatari and Turkish representatives would be readily weaponized during an election campaign. Even Trump’s presence wouldn’t help — the image is too reminiscent of that famous photo from Netanyahu’s first term alongside Bill Clinton and Yasser Arafat.

For Saar, however, the assignment is a gift. The trip positions him as an influential figure in Washington. Unlike foreign ministers in previous Netanyahu governments — labeled “potted plants” — Saar is perceived as a diplomatic actor whom Netanyahu actually counts. The preferential treatment stems not only from appreciation of Saar’s diplomatic abilities but also from political arithmetic; his presence in the coalition, providing four additional seats, extended the government’s life and put Netanyahu firmly in the driver’s seat.

Gaza was also on the agenda during Netanyahu’s three-hour meeting in Washington last week, yet it was clear to all that the paramount objective remains Iran.

Upon returning to Israel, Netanyahu reassured the ministers “to the right of the right,” as his circle calls them, that Israel and the United States see eye-to-eye on the goal in Gaza: the total demilitarization of Hamas. All weapons, even light weapons, will be eliminated. Hamas won’t be able to launch even a single incendiary kite.

The utopian goal of a demilitarized Gaza will not be achieved by Indonesian forces stationed in the Strip. But that’s only if the grand deal collapses and the IDF reconquers Gaza. Here, too, as with the question of striking Iran, Netanyahu prefers not to be perceived — either in Washington or in American public opinion — as the one who blew up the agreement, but rather as the one who gave it a chance, working with the administration until it failed.

Netanyahu is betting that Hamas will ultimately blow up the deal, while Witkoff and Kushner — who still believe it has a chance — remind observers that even the hostage deal was ultimately forced upon Hamas by the Turks and Qataris, against all expectations.

Israel’s hope, on both fronts, therefore rests on the expectation that the murderous regimes in Gaza and Tehran will find it difficult to change their nature, even for appearances’ sake — and will, in effect, do the work for Israel. Until then, all that remains is to strengthen ourselves in tefillah during this prolonged waiting period.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1100)