Is the Trump plan for a new Gaza a dangerous dream?

Photos: Flash90, AP Images

Jared Kushner’s plan for New Gaza has a Board of Peace, computer-generated slides, and even a technocratic head. But is this amorphous plan all a path to a Palestinian state?

Donald Trump never does anything halfway. For most presidents, blowing up the annual Davos summit with threats to invade Greenland would be enough. But Trump went one better: On the sidelines of the prestigious meetup, he presented his much-touted Board of Peace to rebuild Gaza.

Beyond a few slides showing a futuristic-looking paradise on the Mediterranean, complete with gleaming office towers and data centers, much is still unclear. But one sign that something serious is in the works is the choice of the person who will be the face of the new initiative.

About two weeks ago, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey announced the appointment of Dr. Ali Shaath as head of the “National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.” Four days later, in a Cairo hotel, Shaath signed the body’s mandate document, his first official act in the role.

Shaath, a 67-year-old civil engineer who has held various positions over the years within the Palestinian Authority, is meant to lead a committee of 15 Palestinian technocrats tasked with managing daily life in the Strip. Among the tasks waiting for the Administration to tackle: 68 million tons of rubble, 2.2 million residents — nearly all of whom have been displaced at least once — collapsed water and electricity infrastructure, and destroyed hospitals and schools.

But beyond the immense technical challenge, more fundamental questions arise. What exactly are Shaath’s powers? Is he meant to confront Hamas? Does he have the authority or capacity to disarm the organization? And to whom is he really loyal — the Palestinian Authority that he comes from, the Americans who backed his appointment, or perhaps no one at all?

Mystery Man

Ali Abd al-Hamid Shaath was born in 1958 in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip. He is a member of the large Shaath clan, many of whose members identify with Fatah. Shaath himself has lived for many years in the West Bank, not in Gaza.

On paper, his education is impressive. In 1982 he completed a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering at Ain Shams University in Cairo, followed by a master’s degree there in 1986. In 1989 he received a doctorate in infrastructure planning and urban development from Queen’s University Belfast in Northern Ireland.

His career within the Palestinian Authority included a wide range of roles: deputy minister of planning and international cooperation; secretary-general at the Ministry of Transport (during a period in which he was described as “Arafat’s deputy” in that field); chairman of the Industrial Zones and Free Trade Authority; chairman of the Palestinian Housing Council; and head of the Ports Authority. In 2005 he served as a member of the permanent-status negotiation teams, dealing with technical matters such as borders, ports, and maritime access.

What is known about his political positions? Not much. In a 2011 interview with Israel Army Radio, he expressed support for a two-state solution and nonviolent struggle. “I think our people are content not to return to violence,” he said at the time. In the same interview, he argued that Jews seeking Palestinian citizenship could live in the West Bank and purchase land — a position rejected by many in Palestinian society. Sources close to his family told Arab media that he consistently avoids factional politics. On the other hand, there is almost no public information about his activities between 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza, and 2023.

Middle of The Road?

Shaath’s path to appointment ran through the corridors of both Arab and western capitals. President Trump’s 20-point plan stipulated that Gaza would be administered by a “technocratic and apolitical” Palestinian committee. In November, the UN Security Council endorsed the plan in Resolution 2803.

At the same time, negotiations were conducted between Fatah and Hamas. The rival organizations agreed on a list of 40 possible candidates, from which 15 were ultimately selected. The final choice was made in coordination with Israel, the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. Nickolay Mladenov, the Bulgarian diplomat who previously served as the UN’s Middle East envoy, was the one who approached Shaath and offered him the position.

Israeli security officials who approved the committee’s composition said it consisted of “Fatah figures who are not extreme, similar to Palestinian Authority officials we already work with.” Shaath’s low profile — the fact that he is largely unknown to the wider public and has not been associated with scandals — was apparently considered an advantage.

But the question can also be framed differently: Was Shaath chosen because of his abilities, or because he isn’t a threat to anyone? He’s a civil engineer, not a security man; a technocrat, not a political leader; someone who knows how to manage projects, not someone who knows how to confront an armed organization.

By the Board

The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza has 15 members, all defined as politically independent technocrats — even as many have clear ties to Fatah and to Palestinian Authority institutions. Shaath serves as chairman and is also responsible for the energy and transportation portfolios.

Among the prominent members: Sami Nasman, a retired officer from the Palestinian General Intelligence who was previously imprisoned by Hamas, was appointed to oversee internal security. Ayed Abu Ramadan, chairman of the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, was appointed to be responsible for economy and trade. Hana Tarazi, the Strip’s first Christian female lawyer and an expert in Islamic law, is also a committee member.

What is the committee supposed to do? According to its official definition, its task is the routine management of public services: electricity, water, health, education. Clearing rubble. Rehabilitating infrastructure. Managing international donor funds. In the mandate document Shaath signed, the committee expressed a commitment “to rebuild the Gaza Strip not only in infrastructure but also in spirit.”

But it is no less important to understand what the committee is not meant to do. Shaath himself has stated this explicitly in interviews: “Security issues and coordination with armed factions are not among the committee’s tasks. The committee is not an army — it is made up of 15 Palestinian experts for reconstruction, supported by staff; more minds than weapons.”

In other words: Disarming Hamas is not the committee’s responsibility. That task is supposed to fall to an International Stabilization Force (ISF), which has yet to be established. The committee has no political authority to represent Gaza’s residents internationally. It is not a sovereign government, but rather a temporary administrative body operating under the supervision of a complex structure: a “Peace Council” chaired by Trump with overarching and symbolic oversight; an “Executive Council” including Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and Tony Blair in an operational role; and Mladenov as the senior representative on the ground.

Here lies the significant gap between rhetoric and reality. When US envoy Witkoff announced the start of the second phase, he spoke of a “transition from ceasefire to demilitarization.” But the committee itself is not charged with demilitarization. Shaath is not a military commander and has no enforcement power. He is an engineer tasked with managing a reconstruction project in an arena where an armed organization effectively controls large areas.

Dirty Work

The central question hanging in the air is simple: Is Shaath meant to confront Hamas?

The official answer is no. By definition, his role is limited to civilian administration. Disarmament is the responsibility of the ISF. But the ISF has not yet been established. And Hamas effectively controls large swaths of the Strip, east of the so-called yellow line.

Hamas welcomed the establishment of the committee. That alone raises questions. The organization declared its willingness to transfer civilian powers to the committee, but did not commit to disarming. In other words: Hamas is prepared for someone else to take responsibility for electricity, water, and education, while it retains military power.

Palestinian researcher Jihad Harb put it bluntly: “The committee’s ability to maintain security will be limited because the actor that controls Gaza is Hamas. Shaath’s mandate is confined to civilian, economic, and aid issues.”

This is precisely the scenario Israel fears, the so-called “Hezbollah model”: a civilian administration for appearances’ sake, responsible for reconstruction and routine management, while military and security control remain in the hands of the armed organization. A civilian facade for a military force.

And what happens when there is a clash? When the committee needs to do something that Hamas opposes? When enforcement or policing are necessary or a conflict of interest arises? Shaath has no police force. No armed units. He has 15 experts and a budget that relies on international donations.

PA to the PA

In interviews since his appointment, Shaath has outlined a three-stage plan: an emergency aid phase lasting six months; a recovery phase of about two and a half years including rehabilitation of infrastructure and basic facilities; and a reconstruction and development phase. All told, he said, Gaza would require seven years of serious work to recover.

“We are not talking about rehabilitation but about rebuilding,” he said in an interview on Palestinian radio. On clearing rubble, he floated a creative idea: “If I bring bulldozers and push the rubble into the sea, I will create new islands, new land for Gaza, while at the same time removing the waste. It won’t take more than three years.”

On security, he has said almost nothing. He has not addressed Hamas directly in his public interviews. In the mandate document he wrote that “peace is the only way to achieve the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.”

Worryingly, Shaath is a veteran Palestinian Authority figure. He held senior posts under Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. His family is identified with Fatah. Most committee members share a similar background — PA officials, Fatah affiliates, or at least people who worked within PA institutions.

From an Israeli perspective, this is a problem. Prime Minister Netanyahu has repeatedly stated that “the Palestinian Authority will not rule Gaza.” Yet the committee is largely composed of PA figures. Sharp-eyed observers noted the PLO flag that appeared in a video Shaath recorded — not by accident.

Is Ali Shaath what Gaza needs? The answer depends on what one wants to happen there. If the goal is to manage an infrastructure reconstruction project under international supervision while someone else deals with Hamas, perhaps Shaath is the right man. If the goal is to establish a governing authority that replaces Hamas and actually rules the Strip, it is hard to see how a civil engineer without enforcement power can do that. It’s also hard to see how this is anything but a backdoor move to restore power in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1097)