Will a friendly administration allow Israel to take out Iran?

Michael Doran, senior fellow and director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at the Hudson Institute and a veteran of the George W. Bush administration, has long warned of the Iran threat and emphasized the importance of Israel to US interests. Dr. Doran has a direct line to many of Donald Trump’s advisors and is hopeful for a more robust US foreign policy, but he sees the incoming administration consciously tempering hawks with voices from the MAGA camp’s isolationist wing.

A Catholic raised in the Midwest and California, Dr. Doran lived in Israel as a young man and picked up fluent Hebrew and a deep attachment to the country. In 2005, he left his Princeton University post to serve on the Bush National Security Council and later as a State Department advisor and as deputy assistant secretary of defense.

He was among the few Bush advisors to embrace Mr. Trump’s first-term approach, urging fellow members of the “expert class” to see past the nontraditional veneer and judge the strategy by its effectiveness.

Dr. Doran shared his views with Mishpacha on what the debate in the new administration could mean for Israel, Iran, and a fraught Middle East.

There has been much talk about the influence of figures like Tucker Carlson and Tulsi Gabbard on Trump’s foreign policy appointments. What are you hearing about the administration’s direction on Middle East policy?

I’m really struck by how supportive of Israel — and how tough on Iran — President Trump’s national security team is turning out to be. The choices he has announced — for national security advisor, secretary of defense, ambassador to Israel, ambassador to the United Nations, director of the CIA, and secretary of state — are making Jerusalem joyous and Tehran nervous.

Having said all that, we can’t forget that within the Trump-aligned Republican Party, there are two distinct strains on foreign policy. One includes figures like Senator Marco Rubio and Congressman Mike Waltz, who hold traditional national security attitudes toward Iran and the Middle East.

The other strain includes the “restraintists,” figures like Tucker Carlson, Tulsi Gabbard, and Elbridge Colby. They are skeptical of military commitments to the Middle East and often suggest that a strategic accommodation can be found with Iran. They are also skeptical of Israel, as the agent that might force the US into a confrontation with Iran. Some of J.D. Vance’s ideas overlap with them as well, although Vance is very supportive of Israel.

We need not be overly worried about this situation. The two strains always existed in the Trump coalition. And what President Trump is going to do is the same thing he did in his first administration — very effectively — which was to straddle them.

One thing I think everyone can see now is that Trump is a very good politician, and his ability to straddle has been an essential part of how he’s kept his coalition together and expanded it.

In his first term, this straddling sometimes looked messy. There was an episode when the Iranians downed a US drone and Trump was very public about the fact that hawks like John Bolton were advising him to hit Iran and that others were telling him not to. In the end, they prepared a strike plan, but Trump called it off at the last minute and said too many people would have died. To traditional foreign policy types, that looked haphazard, idiosyncratic, and sloppy. But the next time such a question came up, Trump had Qassem Soleimani killed. Part of the strategy of Trump’s straddle is, you never know what you’re getting.

That unpredictability is a principal Trump wants to keep. He wants to show that he is the decider and keep foreign leaders guessing about how he’ll react.

For most administrations, tugging in different directions would be seen as a liability. Trump found a way to exploit it — both in terms of domestic politics, in how he appeals to constituencies with different points of view simultaneously, and in terms of foreign adversaries, whom he keeps off guard.

Do you think figures like J.D. Vance see Israel as a way to threaten foreign enemies without risking US troops, thereby playing a direct role in their America First vision?

I hope that is true. I do expect this team to understand the value of Israel as a guardian of the American interest in the Middle East. We will have to wait to see how they turn that belief into concrete policy.

I think the key factor is that J.D. Vance understands the important of the evangelical Christian vote and the votes of a majority of other Americans, no matter what religion they are, who have a gut level identification with Israel. Trump also understands the importance of the evangelicals, and for that reason, he has appointed Mike Huckabee as his new ambassador.

The situation in the Middle East right now could not be better for the arrival of the Trump team, with its anti-Iran inclinations. The decapitation of Hezbollah and the attacks Israel carried out against Iran open a whole new set of possibilities for US-Israeli military cooperation. Israel’s achievements in the war showcase the utility of Israel to the security of the United States.

It’s hard to say with any certainty just how deeply that’s seeped into the Trump team’s strategic thinking yet. If it hasn’t, it soon will. I’m certain of that.

Past administrations came into office with plans for taking a direct role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Does the Trump team have a vision, or are its goals more modest?

Trump learned in his first term that the Palestinians should not be given a veto over normalization between Arab states and Israel. It remains a Democratic dogma that the road to normalization runs through the Palestinian issue. In a Trump administration, that idea will once again go by the wayside.

The Trump team does have a set of ideas that they’ve inherited from Jared Kushner’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan, but the chances of those being accepted by the Palestinians are small, especially in the current circumstances. Trump may try to revive the plan, but I will be surprised if much comes of that effort, due to the intransigence of the Palestinians.

The Middle East priority for Trump is going to be Iran. Trump learned in his first term that, contrary to what the Democrats believe, Iran cannot be a solution to our problems in the Middle East. That was Obama’s outlook, and one that Biden tried to resurrect. Now, ultimately, that’s also where Tucker Carlson and Elbridge Colby end up, whether they say so explicitly or not.

But Trump already rejected the idea of Iran as a solution when he was in office the first time. He rejected it explicitly while on the campaign trail. And his picks for top national security positions reject it. After at least two Iranian assassination attempts against him, and hearing some of his top advisors — including Brian Hook, who is leading his State Department transition team — I think Trump is more likely than ever to see Iran as a big problem, regardless of what some influential people in his circle are telling him. And he will see Israel as a big part of the solution to the problem.

Bottom line: Trump will approach Israel more with an eye to solving the US-Iran challenge than to solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Trump said that Israel should wrap up its current operations quickly. How does that translate into policy regarding the conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah?

Those were campaign statements. They may reflect Trump’s belief in peace through strength, but they also reflect his political skill. He effectively sent the message that on the one hand, I want Israel to win, and on the other hand, I want this fighting to stop sooner than later, so the suffering of Palestinians will stop. At the same time, that statement also says, “I don’t have any intention of sending American troops into this fight.” From a domestic political point of view, promising to keep America out of wars is the most important commitment.

How much latitude do you think the Trump White House will give Israel regarding direct strikes against Iran, especially its nuclear program?

That remains the $64,000 question, and I don’t have a clear answer to it. I think the way to frame the issue is to ask, “What role will Israeli hard power play in the delivery of a credible American threat against Iran?”

When I look at Trump’s choices for major national security positions, my impression is that they’re going to be more favorably inclined toward seeing Israel as an instrument for delivering that threat to Iran. But still, there’s a big difference between using the Israeli military as a threat and greenlighting a serious plan to carry out military operations to degrade or destroy Iran’s nuclear program. I don’t know where precisely they will come down on that question.

Do you think the administration will act to stop Iranian oil sales to China, and if so, how?

Brian Hook’s statements that the Trump administration is not going to carry out regime change, but will isolate Iran and weaken it, tells me that they are going to go hard after oil sales to China. There are different ways to do that. One is tracking down the front companies and transfers on the high seas, which are difficult processes.

There are two straighter paths, but they come with their own complications. One is to come to an agreement with China, or with its banks and insurance companies, that they’ll stop buying Iran’s oil. The other is to turn off the oil at the source by having Israel strike Iran’s energy infrastructure.

Getting China on board might not be as far-fetched as it sounds. The Chinese did not fight Trump on this issue in his first term. It might come down to how high Trump prioritizes it in his dealings with China. If it’s a priority, it could happen.

Part of the answer might run through Trump’s “drill, baby, drill” energy policy. If we’re flooding international markets with American oil, and China can continue to buy relatively cheap oil on the open market, Iran has less to offer. Perhaps the Saudis can be persuaded to give us a hand. We will see.

Do you see the Trump administration removing US troops from danger spots in Iraq and Syria?

They have a strong inclination to pull the troops out of northeast Syria, which is something Trump’s base expects to see happen. That increases the importance of calculations with Turkey, since working with them is the most obvious way of filling the vacuum in Syria and preventing it from being filled by Iran or another ISIS. That’s why I would expect Trump to consider redeploying those troops to southern Turkey, where, together with the Turks, they can continue to patrol the region.

How will the US strengthening diplomatic ties with Turkey affect Israel policy?

It could have a very large effect, but in an indirect way that takes a couple of steps.

Trump prioritized reaching a negotiated peace between Russia and Ukraine. That will likely be in close coordination with the Turks, who have the second-largest army in NATO and are strong Ukraine supporters. Trump will need to offer Ukraine some kind of security guarantee, and since it won’t be done through NATO, the most logical place to turn is Turkey.

If talks start, it will become clear very quickly that Putin doesn’t have a lot to offer by way of concessions. But Trump will need to show that a deal is not just Ukrainian capitulation. So where does Russia agree to concessions? It could be in Syria, where Russia currently works with Iran to prop up the Assad regime.

The Israelis will also promote linkage between Ukraine and Syria. Israel would like to see Syria made inhospitable to Iran. It will promote the notion that, if Russia wants to benefit territorially from the war in Ukraine, it should make concessions in Syria, by standing aside as Israel hits Iran there. That’s a complicated set of factors, and I’m not suggesting this deal is out there waiting to happen. But it shows how interlinked everything is with everything else.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1037)