Shas chairman Aryeh Deri is an integral part of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s small coterie of close advisors and decision-makers

 
Photos: Flash90

Shas chairman Aryeh Deri occupies a rarified seat in Israel’s government, a seat on the small security cabinet. That position affords him a bird’s-eye view of Israel’s Operation Am K’lavi on Iran last month, as well as the American participation in the attacks that disabled the Islamic Republic’s nuclear weapons program.

Much more will be written about what happened in those dramatic hours in the command bunker, when Israeli Air Force planes penetrated Iranian airspace and the country’s leadership closely monitored their flight. No doubt that after all the details are fully revealed, we will be struck by the magnitude of the wonders that the Creator in His mercy showered upon us that long and tense night.

Aryeh Deri is no longer a member of the regular cabinet. He is instead an integral part of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s small coterie of close advisors and decision-makers. Netanyahu, strategic affairs minister Ron Dermer, and Deri operate as one unit, coordinated down to the last detail. Deri provides experience and outside-the-box thinking, Dermer brings strategic vision and savvy for wangling influence in the White House, and Netanyahu brings everything together into a decision. Together, they are steering Israel through its most dramatic moments in recent decades.

Weeks after the attack, as the White House rolls out the red carpet for Netanyahu’s visit this week, the Shas chairman sat down for a comprehensive interview with Mishpacha. He talks about the prospects of peace with Syria, Israel’s bottom line in any deal on Gaza… and reveals what a life-and-death dilemma looks like from the inside.

Peace with Gaza and Syria

Aryeh Deri believes that the siyata d’Shmaya that enabled Israel’s achievements in the 12-day war with Iran will also lead to sweeping changes throughout the Middle East. When Deri talks about regional change, he extends it to the radicalized terror regime in the Gaza Strip.

“I am convinced,” he says, “that the achievements in Iran will help us, b’ezras Hashem, end the nightmare in Gaza and return the hostages, which is also something that needs a lot of siyata d’Shmaya. I think that in Gaza we need to strive to finish the war on our terms.”

And what are our terms?

“First of all, the return of all the hostages — the living and the dead. Second, complete disarmament of Hamas. Third, the exile of the remaining Hamas forces. There is not much left there, but the heads who are still there need to  be exiled. Fourth, a completely different management for the Strip, run by Arab countries that will also take responsibility for the reconstruction. And last but far from least, really the most important thing — that the responsibility for security will continue to be Israel’s, and that we will be able to intervene at any stage. I don’t call this ending the war, but rather only a ceasefire. We are taking time to see that all our terms are carried out.”

How far are we from achieving the goals you set?

“In my opinion, we need to organize a coalition for this, led by the United States. We need to include as many countries as possible, with the Arab countries in the region. I think that now, after the Iran war, we have the opportunity to put this offer on the table.

“If Hamas accepts this and wants to save its people there — great. If they reject it, or if the Arab countries don’t know how to force Hamas to accept it — and here I’m talking about Qatar and Turkey, currently the two countries with the greatest influence on Hamas — if they don’t know how to bring this about, then Israel will really be left with no choice but to do things that we haven’t done so far.”

When you say the return of all the hostages, that’s actually a rejection of the Witkoff outline, which only talks about returning half of them.

“The Witkoff outline can be a phase. When you discuss the goal of ending the war under these conditions, you put [the Witkoff outline] on the table, obviously, because in the first phase you accept ten abductees, and shortly afterward go on to discuss the conditions for ending the war.

“I’m not saying that we will hold everything up, do it all piecemeal. But we will have to achieve the final goal. First of all, Israel needs to say what it wants, gather a broad coalition around it, and move forward. It is clear that if I can now bring home ten hostages in the first stage — I will. Saving a single life is saving a world. While we’re envisioning dreams for the future, we must also thank Hashem for what we can do now.”

Looking ahead, now that the Iran war has changed the paradigm in the Middle East, does that qualify us to focus on reaching an agreement with Syria, even if it means glossing over the recent past of al-Julani as an Islamic terrorist?

“Of course we are qualified. We must understand that today, the whole negotiating situation has changed in terms of the cards that were on the table before the war. If we make a peace deal with Syria, there is no way the Golan will not be in our hands. It is clear that now we are not talking about such things at all. This is not what it was like years ago, when there was talk of returning the Golan all the way up to the shores of the Kinneret, and the question arose whether or not there would be detente after the Golan is returned. We are no longer in that place.”

Not in that place, meaning the Golan is not even being raised in the negotiations from the Syrian side?

“It is not even an issue that is on the agenda. We are simply not there at all.

“The ones who have an interest today in making a peace agreement are the Syrians, not us, with all due respect. The Syrians have an interest in getting closer to the West, to rehabilitate themselves economically, and the road to that goes through a peace process with us. Today the connection to Israel has become an asset, not a burden.

“So all these changes can happen. I do not rule it out. But I also don’t want to make any casual statements about a ‘new Middle East.’ Clearly, there is a chance here. The great miracle that Hashem has performed for us is huge, and we, as the beneficiaries of the miracle, have to recognize this. And so we opened the faction meeting this week with Nishmas kol Chai.”

The Attack on Iran

We ask Deri if the attack on Iran saved the State of Israel from certain destruction.

“I do not have ruach hakodesh,” he replies. “I can say one thing. First of all, we must be grateful for what Hashem has done with us, miracles and wonders. The threat to the people of Israel was very great, and not theoretical. The threat was that within a few weeks Iran would reach an irreversible nuclear capability, after which we would no longer be able to act against it.

“Iran was also about to put into operation industrial lines for producing hundreds of missiles per month, and that would have meant that within two or three years, Iran would have an arsenal of nearly 10,000 ballistic missiles, which it is impossible to defend against. There is simply no way.

“Our strategic deterrence today against all our enemies in the world is at a peak not seen in decades. I think that since the Six Day War, there has not been such deterrence for Israel. And if we look at the situation we were in before October 7, before Simchat Torah, there is no comparison at all.

“I remind you that before Simchat Torah we were afraid, to the point where we had long, drawn-out discussions for months about that tent Hezbollah set up near the border [referring to a tent that Hezbollah erected on the Israeli side of the security fence in August 2023]. We are in a completely different situation today. We deal with Lebanon every day, and Hezbollah does nothing. Hamas does not fire rockets, because we have almost completely destroyed its launch capabilities. We are in a completely different situation today.”

But despite being pounded for nearly two weeks, the Iranians haven’t moderated their tone at all.

“I remind you that even in Lebanon, it took Hezbollah time to understand the extent of the damage we inflicted on them, and you see how it affects us now. Therefore, in Iran too, in a week or two, after they discover and internalize the extent of the damage from this war, you will see them talking completely differently. They will understand, and they will be deterred. They have received a very big blow in all respects, in the elimination of all the capabilities, the scientists, the commanders, the industry, in all areas.”

And what is your answer to the question that is also raising controversy in the US: Were the nuclear sites indeed destroyed?

“Look. Destruction is a relative matter. You are asking me whether these sites can be used in the coming years? I tell you no.”

And was that one of the small cabinet’s goals? To bring the Americans into the fight so that from now on they will also be watching? So that the Iranians will understand that if they try to rebuild their nuclear program, the United States will come back in again, like they did before?

“There were several goals for this. First and foremost, the Americans are the only ones who could have done this [destroyed Fordow]. They are the only ones who have the capabilities to do what we cannot. The second goal was to get to a point where they would also be partners in the attack and not just offering support.

“This caused no small amount of surprise throughout the world, and especially in the Middle East. Everyone sees that the United States is our ally, not only in terms of support and armaments and UN Security Council vetoes, but also as our active partner in the attack, when the moment of truth comes and an existential threat to the State of Israel needs to be removed.

“Another thing, as President Trump himself has said several times in recent days, is that if someone on the Iranian side thinks of restarting the enrichment program again at these sites, the United States will take care of them. After all, after America entered the incident on the offensive, it will not be able to let them just go back to their program.”

There were moments when you doubted Ron Dermer’s prediction that the Americans would join the move.

“That’s true. He was the most optimistic about the Americans ultimately standing with us, even when we had doubts — and even the prime minister had doubts. There were ups and downs, but Ron was confident. I sometimes thought his confidence was exaggerated, but in the end, he was right.”

Is it true that on that Thursday night, when you decided to launch the attack, the Iranians themselves were planning to launch a preemptive strike against us, and we prevented it by beating them to it?

“First of all, our decision to strike goes back a long way. Yes, the formal decision was made Thursday night by the cabinet, but this isn’t a plan you prepare overnight, or even in weeks or a month. This took many months of planning.

“There was always a nagging fear that the Iranians might strike first. They had prepared a preemptive strike plan and a very large opening salvo of hundreds of ballistic missiles — we’ve seen how powerful those can be over the past few weeks — along with many hundreds of UAVs, each weighing around 50 kilos, and hundreds of cruise missiles, which they didn’t end up using at all in this war.”

And they planned to do this on the same day we began our operation?

“According to what we know, they were considering doing it a few days earlier.”

You mean you had information from within the Iranian decision-making circles that they were about to attack?

“I don’t know what you mean, and I won’t say here exactly what we knew or where we knew it from. I can tell you that we consistently had information about an expected attack from their side, and there was ongoing psychological warfare — various declarations and actions we took. We knew the element of surprise was extremely significant, so we were very focused on preserving that element until the very end. And baruch Hashem, we succeeded, despite how hard it is to keep a secret like this for months — and even more so once we notified the Americans, for whom secrecy is even harder to maintain. And even on our end, once the execution order was given, thousands of people became involved. Many people had to be informed at least of parts of the plan — pilots, supporting units, and more.”

Is it true that the Iranians themselves knew shortly before the attack that it was coming? How did we still manage to maintain the element of surprise and hit the targets?

“That’s absolutely true. From what we know, the Iranians realized in the final hours that an attack was imminent. Why didn’t they respond immediately? I have a simple explanation: ‘They have eyes but do not see, ears but do not hear.’ Hashem completely confused them — He struck them with blindness. Not only did they not launch the preemptive strike they had planned, but even after the bombs exploded in Iran, and despite having a clear protocol for a response strike, they didn’t act. For 17 hours, they didn’t fire a single missile at Israel.”

And from your perspective, what was the significance of those 17 hours without a response? How did that impact the success of the opening strike?

“For us, it was truly a salvation. Those 17 hours that passed before they responded — nearly a full day — allowed us to organize the home front. Remember, due to the heavy compartmentalization [to maintain secrecy], we hadn’t said a word to Home Front Command. The home front wasn’t prepared at all, and we were risking a two-hour window before they’d react. We thought it would take them two hours to respond — and baruch Hashem, it turned out to be 17.

“But more importantly, during those hours, we were able to aggressively target their missile systems — destroying many of their launchers, and attacking fortified tunnels where their missiles were stored.

“We bombed the tunnel openings so they couldn’t launch from them. As a result, we disabled a large part of their missile system that hadn’t been destroyed in the opening salvo but was rendered unusable.

“And of course, we must remember — and this is the problem with all the after-the-fact commentary — that everything we did still doesn’t answer the fundamental question: Why didn’t they fire first? Why didn’t they respond immediately? And the answer is only one thing: massive Hashgachah Pratit. Hashem struck them with blindness to save the people of Israel — literally.”

You’re basically saying that irrational things happened here, things that can’t be explained by any logical standard. There’s no other explanation?

“Absolutely. The entire chain of events — with the United States, with many other elements that still can’t be disclosed, what happened that night and what followed — all of it was nothing short of a miracle from Heaven.

“And I don’t mean to downplay the amazing work of the people involved. I must praise everyone — the defense minister, the chief of staff, the head of Military Intelligence, the head of the Operations Directorate, the head of Mossad — all of them. And of course, the prime minister, who courageously led this operation.

“And I’m telling you — despite everything, I can only attribute it to Divine miracles and Heavenly assistance. And I think everyone agrees with me on that. You saw the prime minister — unlike his usual approach, consistently saying not just ‘with G-d’s help’ but openly speaking of ‘Heavenly assistance,’ as we saw with our own eyes.”

True Friend

It seems it was no simple matter to get the Trump administration on board with Netanyahu’s plan. We were so happy that a strong friend of Israel had won the White House, but then it seemed all his advisors were against us. What can you tell us about the process that ultimately led to Trump joining the campaign?

“We know that the hearts of kings and ministers of the nations of the world are in the Hands of HaKadosh Baruch Hu. Therefore, I have no doubt that HaKadosh Baruch Hu has given us great siyata d’Shmaya.

“Everything you said is accurate — the Republican Party, Trump himself and his entourage, they all love Israel. This is not the Democratic Party, with which we had some problems. But there are some elements among the Republicans that are even more difficult to deal with than the Democrats in terms of isolationism, who only see America and reject intervention in other crises.

“Therefore, the siyata d’Shmaya here is tremendous — that Trump, with all the influence of the ‘restrainers’ around him, went along with us. Not only did he help us attack, and help us with armaments, and help us with defense, and help us with other things, but that night when we attacked, instead of saying, ‘We are not in the picture, we are not interested,’ he came out and said: ‘I told you that Iran will not be nuclear and Israel has the right to attack.’ He gave us tremendous support.

“And the second thing is that he attacked [with the B-2 bombers] at the end, which no one believed would happen, with his special [bunker-buster] bombs that had never been used. This is the greatest siyata d’Shmaya, about which it is said that the hearts of kings and ministers are in the Hand of Hashem.”

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1069)