It’s not just the Israeli government that is jumping the gun; Israeli citizens are also expressing premature enthusiasm

Being overly eager to make peace with an enemy is foolhardy — and is often costly. Israel demonstrated this, once again, when it offered all the concessions before last week’s meeting with Lebanese, American, and French representatives.

The sides agreed to form three working groups to discuss border security, the current IDF deployment at five bases in Lebanon, and settle longstanding border disputes. Despite what was widely reported, Lebanese officials denied that normalizing relations with Israel was on the agenda.

David Mencer, who conducts daily briefings for the English-language media on behalf of the prime minister’s office, clarified that Israel’s goals are to stabilize the region and enable Jewish residents of the north to return home safely.

“Every country of goodwill, every moderate and forward-thinking Arab nation in our region, and certainly Israel, should be willing to see Lebanon succeed and shake off the deadly influence of Iran, the Shia militias, and Hezbollah,” Mencer said, adding that before the meeting, Israel agreed to release five Lebanese prisoners, including one Lebanese soldier, as a goodwill gesture to Lebanon’s new president, Joseph Aoun.

This raises a pressing question: Why is Israel making goodwill gestures toward a country that fired over 10,000 rockets and drones during more than a year of warfare, terrorizing Israel’s northern regions and forcing over 60,000 Jews to flee their homes? In addition, the Lebanese Armed Forces under Aoun’s control have demonstrated a “lack of will” — in the words of Lebanese military analyst Khali Helou at a Washington Institute policy forum — to fully deploy troops in southern Lebanon in place of Hezbollah.

In releasing the Lebanese prisoners, Israel has lapsed into the familiar trap of making concessions to a hostile nation without receiving anything tangible in return, other than the promise of talks and more talks.

It’s not just the Israeli government that is jumping the gun; Israeli citizens are also expressing premature enthusiasm. A day after the talks began, the popular Israeli blog Abu Ali Express conducted an online survey on its Hebrew channel, showing that 69% favored normalizing relations with Lebanon. About 18% were opposed, and 13% were unsure.

It would be nice to feel optimistic about Israel’s desire for peace, but those sentiments aren’t reciprocated in Lebanon or the broader Arab world.

Arab Barometer, a nonpartisan research network, surveyed citizens in eight Arab nations over the past year and found that no more than 13% in any of those countries supported normalization with Israel, including Lebanon. In Morocco, an Abraham Accords member nation, public support for their participation in that pact plunged from 31% in 2020 to 13%.

An Arab Barometer poll from five years ago found that 38% of Lebanese Christians supported normalization with Israel. Lebanon’s President Aoun is a Maronite Christian, which may account for Israel’s interest in taking some chances.

Regardless, Israel must proceed with caution. Like any parliamentary head of state, Aoun is dependent on his cabinet. Although Hezbollah’s political influence has waned since Aoun assumed power in January, Hezbollah and its Shiite ally, Amal, still hold five of Lebanon’s 24 cabinet positions. Even with the best intentions, Aoun faces an impossible mission to make Lebanon orderly again.

Since gaining independence in 1943, modern-day Lebanon has experienced chronic instability. President Eisenhower sent the Marines to Lebanon in 1958 to salvage its Christian government. Muslim and Christian factions engaged in a prolonged civil war from 1975 to 1990. Lebanon has long been a refuge for anti-Israel terrorists, including the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hezbollah, and Israel has been compelled to invade Lebanon on several occasions since 1978.

Disrespect and Disregard

Before engaging in wishful thinking and expending diplomatic capital on Lebanon, Israel should first reassess its relations with Egypt and Jordan, who view Israel with malice and scorn despite having signed peace treaties.

Jordan participated in the US- and British-led military coalition that helped Israel intercept the missiles Iran launched at Israel last April. However, Israel’s 300-mile border with Jordan has sprung too many leaks.

“Smuggling networks rely on Palestinian and Jordanian Bedouins as well as seasoned arms traffickers who know the border intimately,” wrote Ahmad Sharawi, a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “These networks, often linked to organized crime, facilitate the movement of weapons, drugs, and cash, exploiting the border’s vulnerabilities for substantial financial gain.”

Egypt’s sizeable military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula, meanwhile, violates the 1979 Camp David peace treaty with Israel. The establishment of forward military bases intended for offensive operations poses a significant military threat to Israel.

Egypt’s tone toward Israel has become increasingly contemptuous. Kobi Michael and Yoel Guzansky, researchers at the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University, analyzed the final Arabic-language statement from the Arab summit hosted by Cairo to create a framework for Gaza’s “day after.”

“The statement glorifies the resilience of the Palestinian people against Israeli aggression and includes harsh rhetoric condemning Israel’s alleged crimes,” Michael and Guzansky noted.

The unofficial English translation of the communique shows contempt for Israel, referring to it as the “Israeli entity” while consistently designating Palestine as the “State of Palestine.”

Israel’s Best Strategy

Pinning hopes on the Trump administration revitalizing the Abraham Accords is also likely to prove futile. If Trump had won a second consecutive term, he could have built momentum and included more countries, such as Saudi Arabia. But after four years of the Biden administration, during which the Saudis lost confidence in the US and prioritized deescalating tensions with Iran, they are now playing hard to get. In return for Saudi normalization, Israel could face pressure to end its military campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and open a new track toward a Palestinian state, all of which would be reckless on Israel’s part.

The lure of doing more business with the Saudis will not compensate Israel for the risks it will take. Israel’s actual economic gains from the Accords have been meager. In 2023, Israel’s exports to the two largest Abraham Accords signatories — the UAE and Morocco — totaled $779 million, barely more than 1% of its total exports that year, which totaled $69.3 billion.

“Realistically, Israel has little to offer the Arab states beyond what they were already getting in an informal capacity,” wrote Omar Rahman, a fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, in an article published in mid-2023 by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. “Clandestine military and intelligence coordination was [already] taking place, and the Arab side had access to Israeli surveillance technology for purchase.”

Despite the long odds and the opposition, Israel will continue cooperating with any Trump administration initiatives to promote regional understanding. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with playing along. Still, considering the sentiment in the Arab world and the number of battlefronts Israel is facing, no Israeli government can afford to fool itself or be pressured into taking risks.

Israel must continue to demonstrate its military strength and readiness to use it. During negotiations, it must break its habit of making one-sided concessions upfront and signing lopsided deals and start maneuvering the other side into blinking first whenever it can.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1054)