The episode has highlighted the staying power of one of the true long-term survivors of this government

1

There’s never been such a stark contrast between sacred and profane, politics and defense. For an entire day, the media was abuzz with reports of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s impending dismissal and replacement by Gideon Saar.

The Israeli media gossiped and speculated feverishly about the notes being passed to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu during security deliberations, with the prevailing assumption being that he was receiving constant updates from the talks with Saar. Only in retrospect did it become clear that Netanyahu was actually fully immersed in an operation to maim and kill thousands of Hezbollah members. According to foreign media reports, those pushing the plan were the head of the Mossad and the prime minister, in the face of skepticism from other heads of the security establishment.

The pasuk from Shiras Hayam, “Tipol aleihem eimasah va’fachad [May fear and terror befall them]” has never been so topical. The operation, which seems like something straight out of sci-fi, only gets more astonishing when you remember the state of the Israeli intelligence community just one year ago. “When they fall, they fall to the abyss; when they rise, they rise to the Heavens,” Chazal said of Am Yisrael, in a phrase that perfectly describes the Israeli intelligence apparatus.

Netanyahu wasn’t going to proceed with the plan to fire Gallant at such a sensitive moment, but their relationship hasn’t changed one bit, and the petty politics is here to stay. Until further notice, the talks between Netanyahu and Saar in the days before the exploding pagers operation should be taken with a grain of salt, as either a concrete plan whose implementation will have to be delayed to a quieter time, or as mere political scheming that will never actually bear fruit.

But it was not political considerations that kept Netanyahu from following through with the plan. What prevented Netanyahu from taking the plunge and replacing Gallant with Saar in the days before the operation in Lebanon was concern for Israel’s security, clear and simple.

“The man [Saar] served as an intelligence NCO and never even served as an officer,” Netanyahu said to one of the chareidi representatives who tried to persuade him to cross the Bibicon and make the switch.

That concern only intensified in the wake of the events in Lebanon, which could well be the opening shot to a full-scale war. At this juncture, replacing an experienced defense minister with a civilian felt like one step too far.

2

But whatever the fallout from Netanyahu’s flirtation with bringing Saar on as defense minister, it’s clear that the move is indicative of a wider shift on Israel’s right wing. Saar may not be waiting in the wings for his turn as defense minister, but in the meantime, the talks with Netanyahu brought Saar’s troops in his New Hope party back into the right wing’s ranks with Likud.

And Saar himself has changed his views on the weekly protests in Tel Aviv calling for the hostages to be brought home and for Bibi’s ouster. He’s gone from being a sometime participant to issuing condemnations of the protesters’ actions. This sea change would have been almost unthinkable in the political environment of the last few months.

Meanwhile, United Torah Judaism was instrumental in bringing the change about. At first, this was pitched as a change in the Defense Ministry. United Torah Judaism has been careful to emphasize from the beginning that they aren’t involved in security decisions, but their hands were forced by the government’s action — or inaction — on the draft law.

A number of considerations led Netanyahu to finally move ahead with the Saar option after months of marked restraint, not only on the northern front but also vis-à-vis the defense minister. Bibi’s fuse ultimately blew when Gallant ratcheted the tensions up to intolerable levels. A minister in the security cabinet told me this week about the tense atmosphere in the room, with ministers on the edge of their seats for the constant barbs Gallant was directing at the prime minister. On the rare occasions when Netanyahu retorted, the exchange was leaked to the press before the meeting even concluded, and Netanyahu always came out looking like the bad guy — a pretty good indication as to the source of the leak.

The beef between the prime minister and defense minister has a long history, but what changed recently and led Netanyahu to begin seriously considering the Saar option was the ultimatum on the draft law delivered to Netanyahu — from the Gerrer Rebbe, conveyed through his representative, Housing Minister Yitzchak Goldknopf. Accustomed to keeping way too many balls in the air, Netanyahu wasn’t initially impressed by the chareidi threats.

Netanyahu’s response, reiterated time and again was simple: It’s not me, it’s them. The attorney general, Supreme Court justices, even Gallant — they were all scheming to bring down the government via the chareidim and install a new government led by Lieberman and Lapid.

And in the face of this plot, Netanyahu echoed Shimon Peres’s message after the Oslo Accords: “What’s the alternative?” At first, the tactic worked, and the chareidim remained loyal to the government despite one adverse High Court ruling and attorney general directive after another.

3

But that has now changed. From the moment the Gerrer Rebbe himself intervened, instructing his representatives — Minister Goldknopf in the government and advisor Motti Babchik in the corridors of power — to block the state budget until a draft law is passed, Netanyahu realized that the countdown had begun.

As the son of a historian, Netanyahu is well versed in the annals of Israeli politics. He remembers how a rav’s outrage over train work on Shabbos brought down the Barak government in 2001 — and that’s just one example.

The chareidi draft law ultimatum made Netanyahu realize that every angle pointed to Gallant’s dismissal. Military considerations, given his disagreements with Gallant on almost every issue. Political calculations, in light of Gallant’s refusal to pass a new draft law. And diplomacy, in light of Gallant’s coordination with the Americans behind his back. All roads led to a fast-tracked process to replace Gallant with Saar as defense minister.

Has the road to Gallant’s ouster turned into a cul-de-sac after the events in Lebanon? Going by reports from closed-door talks this week, Netanyahu has made clear that the plan is only on hold. His relationship with Gallant has reached a point of no return, and Netanyahu took pains to update Saar on the situation over the past week.

For the time being, however, the episode has highlighted the staying power of one of the true long-term survivors of this government: Yoav Gallant.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1030)