Declassified docs reveal how Israeli self-deception paved the path to war

Photos: AP images, Flash 90

In 2021, Israel bombed Hamas, then declared victory. Hamas leaders concluded the opposite — that the time was ripe for an all-out war of destruction

IN the litany of intelligence blunders that paved the way to October 7, the IDF’s misreading of its war with Hamas in 2021 was one of the worst. Operation Guardian of the Walls was seen in Israel as a strategic success that degraded Hamas’s capabilities and strengthened Israel’s deterrence. Israeli officials, from the prime minister on down, emphasized the blow to Hamas’s tunnel network (the so called “Metro”) and assessed that Hamas wouldn’t attack Israel again for years.

But documents captured recently in the Gaza Strip paint a very different picture: Hamas saw the operation (known on its side as the battle of Saif al-Quds — “Sword of Jerusalem”) as a historic victory and a humiliating defeat for Israel.

The documents reveal how Hamas’s triumphalism led its leadership under Yahya Sinwar to develop a new strategy that would culminate in the surprise attack of October 7, 2023. The documents provide clear evidence of Hamas’s insight into Israel’s weaknesses, the terror organization’s longterm thinking, and its capacity for deception and strategic planning. The translated Hamas communications make for painful reading — a slowmotion train-wreck of Hamas cunning and Israeli blindness that led to the worst Jewish disaster since the Holocaust.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1064)