Can Israel Fight on Three Fronts?
![](https://mishpacha.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/contributor4.jpg)
Many experts suggest that the Israeli Air Force’s bombardment was intended for a broader audience than the Houthis
Photo: AP Images
T
he flames burning in Yemen’s port of Al Hudaydah for hours last weekend were meant to send a message: If you attack Israel, you can expect retaliation, now matter how far away you are, or how many other battles Israel is fighting.
The official IDF explanation for Operation Outstretched Arm against Yemen’s main port on the Red Sea was retaliation for the Houthi drone attack launched against Tel Aviv on July 19, which left one civilian dead (Yevgeny Ferder Hy”d, 50) and dozens injured. However, many experts suggest that the Israeli Air Force’s bombardment was intended for a broader audience than the Houthis; it was aimed at the terrorist masterminds in Iran.
“I don’t think this attack will stop the Houthi assaults, because Iran is behind them, and Tehran doesn’t care how many Houthis or Arabs die,” says Alexander Grinberg, a retired captain from the IDF Military Intelligence research department and an expert on the Israel-Iran conflict for the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. “But on the other hand, part of Iran’s strategy and that of its proxies is that they don’t believe Israel will be able or willing to do anything. This attack changed the calculus.”
Part of Tehran’s calculus, Grinberg tells Mishpacha, is based on the vast distance separating Yemen from Israel. “The crucial point is that the Israeli Air Force planes, we’re talking about several dozen, traveled a distance of about 2,200 kilometers [1,400 miles] — greater than the distance to Iran. They flew low to avoid detection by enemy radars, which usually takes more time, and yet they completed the mission and returned home without problems. The Iranians understand that Israel could do this in Tehran.”
A Simple Drone
Operation Outstretched Arm also showcased a new aspect of IAF prowess — the F-35 fighter jet, known as “Adir.” These jets, part of Israel’s fleet upgrade from older models like the F-15 and F-16, are harder for enemy radar to detect, have sophisticated sensors that improve targeting accuracy, and can strike dozens of different targets, hundreds of kilometers away. The IDF has acquired 50 of these aircraft from Lockheed Martin, and the success of this mission suggests it was a wise purchase.
However, the defense establishment does not want to let this success overshadow the miscue that led to a relatively simple drone breaching Israeli airspace and killing a civilian.
The Houthi Samad 3 drone, of Iranian origin but modified by the Yemeni terrorists, managed to travel for 16 hours over 2,500 kilometers. The UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) was launched from Yemen west toward Sudan, then it veered north through Egyptian airspace, east across the Mediterranean Sea, and finally hit Tel Aviv. There are reports that Israel’s defense monitors detected a blip, but it was overlooked due to human error. This account would contradict Houthi assertions that their drones were “undetectable by Israeli radar.” Regardless, the drone’s impact on Israeli soil should set off alarm bells among security officials.
“Israel has limited capacity to defend against drone attacks,” says Liran Antebi, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies who manages the Advanced Technologies and National Security program. “This is because some drones cannot be detected by radar, and sometimes human errors come into play.”
Antebi tells Mishpacha that the Houthi drone in the deadly attack was detectable, but human error led to its impact. She acknowledges, however, that a Hezbollah attack would be harder to thwart. “If Hezbollah decided to launch a massive drone attack from closer proximity in Lebanon, Israel has systems to counter such attacks, but it depends on the types and duration of the offensive.”
Direct Approach
The Houthi drone attack shifts Israel’s focus to a new front in its war against Iranian proxies, in addition to Hamas and Hezbollah.
“Israel cannot handle a war in Gaza, Yemen, and Lebanon simultaneously,” says Grinberg. “Moreover, the IDF is not interested in initiating a war with Hezbollah now, nor does Iran want that — essentially because the Iranians and Hezbollah are not willing to sacrifice themselves for the Palestinians.”
According to Grinberg, Iran’s strategy is “to save Hezbollah for a more critical situation. As long as Israel doesn’t attack their gas supplies or significant residential areas, Iran isn’t interested in harshly attacking Israel.”
Nonetheless, despite both sides preferring to avoid direct conflict, the situation in northern Israel has become unbearable. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, and it’s known that they won’t return to their homes until the Hezbollah threat is neutralized.
“The problem is that, despite talks of a diplomatic agreement with Hezbollah, no Israeli living in the north will believe in any deal with Hezbollah that they won’t attack,” Grinberg says. “To reach a permanent solution, Iran must be dealt with directly.”
He emphasizes that the US elections could significantly impact the conflict’s development. “Things take time, but time is also limited: Iran cannot be allowed to possess a nuclear bomb. Suppose Donald Trump wins the elections, as seems plausible. The Iranians take Trump seriously, so they might accelerate their atomic plan before he takes office. The big problem is that nuclear powers usually reserve that strength to deter attackers, not to actively destroy opponents. No one assumes Russia intends to use its nuclear power to destroy the US, or vice versa. However, Iran does not recognize Israel’s right to exist, making it extremely dangerous for Iran to become a nuclear power.”
Grinberg says the Iranian people themselves could factor into Israel’s defense plan. “We must not forget that most Iranians hate the regime and would be happy if Israel launched strategic attacks on military targets. They don’t hate us like the Palestinians do. There are ways to gain the support of the Iranian people.”
Although Grinberg believes confronting Iran is the only way for Israel to achieve lasting peace, he is skeptical it will happen. “Much of Israel’s leadership fears acting without US approval. But American mentality poses a problem for us. The US can live with the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear power. Israel cannot afford that.”
Grinberg believes the military success against the Houthi port is a necessary first step. “What happened is not enough, but it sends a clear message to the Iranians, and this is the path Israel should follow.”
(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1021)
Oops! We could not locate your form.