"Hamas is irrelevant" — Gen. (Res.) Yaakov Amidror on the IDF's battlefield success

Photo: Flash90

Bit by bit over the last ten months, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has escalated into an international war. Rockets from Lebanon, drones from Yemen, ballistic missiles from Iran, and American naval forces have marked each new stage.

The recent assassinations of key terrorists — Ismail Haniyeh and Mohammad Deif of Hamas, Fuad Shukr of Hezbollah — have pushed tensions to their highest point since October 7. While Iran has assumed a greater direct role, the two original fronts, Gaza and the Lebanese border, still pose a clear and present danger. And now to the grief for the dead and the despair over the hostages must be added the suffering of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people who cannot return to their homes.

Yaakov Amidror, Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies and Distinguished Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, is a career military man. He fought in the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, attained the rank of major general, and served as the head of the research department of Israeli military intelligence, as well as national security advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu and chairman of the National Security Council.

Major General (res.) Amidror spoke with Mishpacha and offered his evaluation of the performance of Israel’s security forces in the war, assessing that, “Hamas in Gaza is already militarily irrelevant.”

Ten months into the war, the focus has shifted from Gaza to Iran. Does that mean the offensive against Hamas has succeeded?

Let me offer an example that will help illustrate the situation. When Deif or Haniyeh were eliminated, no one in the world asked how Gaza responded to the attacks. Why is that? Because Hamas in Gaza, in terms of its military capabilities, is practically irrelevant. They killed Hamas’s number two, killed the person considered the leader of Hamas in Tehran, we were supposedly responsible, and what was the response from Gaza?

The fact is, in military terms, Hamas in Gaza has lost a significant portion of its capabilities. We dismantled and killed a large part of their general staff, they have no reinforcements to bring in from outside because we are occupying the border between Gaza and Egypt, and we have apparently destroyed most of the weapon factories in the Strip. Hamas is not currently refraining from attacking Israel now because they don’t want to; they could not attack Israel if they wanted to. Israel assassinated the number one Hamas figure globally and the number two in Gaza, and Hamas in Gaza cannot do anything — they are irrelevant.

This week, some media outlets, particularly CNN, suggested that Hamas has been rearming and adding new forces. Is this credible?

CNN is talking nonsense. Let’s say that initially they had a force of 1,000 men, and we killed 700, including generals, captains, and military leaders. Then they went out onto the streets and hurriedly recruited another 200 or 300 men. Does that mean that the group has the strength it had before? No. Because those who died were seasoned terrorists, veterans, and the ones they recruited know nothing, have no experience, no one trusts them for logistics, they have no fighting capabilities....

So one might mistakenly say, “The group only lost a small percentage and is now rearming,” but that’s not true. First of all, I don’t believe they’re rearming. And even if they manage to recruit large numbers, it’s not comparable to what they had before, because these are people with no combat experience, no training, no intelligence capabilities — they have nothing.

One of the major points of contention is control of the Philadelphi Corridor. Can you explain why it is so important?

The Philadelphi Corridor is the border line between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. It’s obvious that if the State of Israel dominates this corridor, then Hamas terrorists’ chances of escaping or even using underground tunnels drop to zero percent.

Additionally, the majority of the weapons we’re fighting against were not manufactured in Gaza; they were smuggled into Gaza from Egypt. So if we control this passage, they won’t be able to smuggle weapons or machinery into Gaza.

There has been speculation that control of the Philadelphi Corridor is one of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s nonnegotiable points for reaching a ceasefire agreement. How much room does Israel have to negotiate regarding its control?

To prevent infiltrations, it’s not necessary for the Israeli army to be permanently stationed at the Philadelphi Corridor with all our forces. For Hamas to be able to cross from one side to the other, they have to dig tunnels. So if, along the entire length of this corridor — which isn’t that long, only 14 kilometers [roughly nine miles] — there were sensors that could alert us when someone approaches the border, or when someone is digging, or when someone is moving, we could quickly send forces. And if someone tries to do something, we eliminate them. It’s only 14 kilometers, you can be at any point along that corridor in just half an hour.

In that case, there’s no need to be constantly stationed there. You can have a system and reach an agreement with the Egyptians and the Americans so that we don’t have to ask permission in every situation, ensuring that when our sensors detect something, we act accordingly. Then there’s no need to be permanently stationed there.

What should be the long-term plan in Gaza?

In the long term, we need to be in a position that allows us to act against any enemy that tries to emerge in Gaza. Much like what we do today in Jenin, to a greater or lesser extent. When there’s intelligence about a group of terrorists, we go in and eliminate them. That’s what’s needed in Gaza.

Let’s move to the other battlefront, the North. Do you think it’s possible to reach an agreement, or are we heading for war?

The Americans say they’re making an effort to reach a diplomatic agreement that would see Hezbollah retreat a bit further north. Theoretically, if they succeed, a war won’t be necessary. But the chances of reaching that agreement are slim.

In the end, there will be no choice but to go to war. The question is when and under what conditions. But eventually, the State of Israel will have to deal with Hezbollah. We can’t just leave them as they are.

These days, there is both anticipation and, to a certain extent, fear of an Iranian attack. Wouldn’t it be better to strike first before being attacked?

The Iranians think the exact opposite. They think we already struck first. They say, “Look at the Israelis — they won’t take responsibility, but they were definitely the ones who killed Haniyeh, a special guest of the government!”

Consider that Haniyeh was the guest of honor at the inauguration of the new president, Iran hosted him in an official residence of the Revolutionary Guards, and they killed him inside the room! They say, “The Israelis have gone mad!”

At some point, the world thinks, “What more do you want? You killed Haniyeh in Tehran!” The world says, “Isn’t it enough that you killed Haniyeh? Now you also want to attack Iran?!” It’s very likely that sooner or later Iran will attack.

Assuming Israel was behind the assassinations, do you think they were worth it?

I don’t know. We’ll see how they respond. Haniyeh’s death has no military value, though it does have significant symbolic value. He didn’t have military influence in Hamas, but what Israel is saying through this is, “Dear ones, Hamas will pay the price anywhere in the world, not just in Gaza. What they did to us on October 7 is unacceptable.”

After Haniyeh’s assassination, Sinwar was appointed as the new political head of Hamas. What ramifications will this have?

It has no importance. It means nothing.

We’ve talked about the conflicts in the South and the North. How would you assess the performance and strategy applied by the IDF in the war so far?

There’s always room for improvement. You can always point out where something wasn’t done right or could have been done differently. The best military plan is always the one that wasn’t chosen.

But generally speaking, if I look at the results in Gaza, Israel has almost dismantled Hamas, with a very low number of casualties, compared to what was predicted before the war started. Before the war, they said there would be twice or four times as many deaths as we’ve had. So that’s a very positive outcome.

I think it was done a bit slowly. It could have been done a little faster, although that’s not always possible, because there are the Americans, there are the hostages… there are many elements at play. But ultimately, the achievements in Gaza are very good — taking more time than I initially thought, but with fewer casualties than I imagined.

And in the North, the IDF is conducting a very good defensive war. To date, we’ve killed around 400 Hezbollah members, and another 100 from other terrorist organizations, and our casualty number isn’t even ten percent. Unfortunately, we had to suffer the tragic attack that killed 12 children, but beyond that, our casualty numbers are very low. Moreover, I think the attacks against Hezbollah have been precise in a way that will facilitate a potential war against them in the future.

Our last question is about an internal issue that has tarnished the reputation of the IDF. Some soldiers have been accused of abusing their authority at the Sdeh Teiman detention center, and there’s a discussion about whether we should protect soldiers more, even when there are certain excesses. Some even say that these proceedings against soldiers weaken the morale of the forces. What’s your opinion on this?

The army cannot behave like a guerrilla group or a mafia. There are laws, there are generals, there are rules. Those who break the rules must be investigated, and if it’s found that they broke the rules, they must be punished. If we don’t maintain order and firm rules in the army, everything will collapse. The secret of the army is order.

What punishment should be given? That needs to be evaluated. But anyone who doesn’t follow the rules or does things that are prohibited must be punished. And it doesn’t matter why they did it. Whether it should have been done one way or another, I won’t get into that, because I don’t know the details. But it’s clear that the army cannot operate like a gang. Anyone who breaks the rules must be punished.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1024)