Ex-Shabak chief Avi Dichter sees stratetic Philadelphi Route as key

Photo: Flash90

I

was awakened in my home in Israel’s south at 4:20 a.m. on Sunday by the roar of dozens of fighter planes taking off for Lebanon. As a longtime neighbor of the airbase, I could deduce the type of aircraft, their flight direction, and the armaments they carried. The more heavily the plane is armed, the louder the noise at takeoff. I knew this would be a big attack.

Sunday morning, for the first time since October 7, Israel launched a widescale preemptive strike on Hezbollah, a Six Day War surprise attack in miniature. The operation was launched after the terror group’s forces were spotted moving weaponry ahead of its retaliation for the assassination of Fuad Shukr.

As of this writing, with Israel’s security cabinet still in session, the attack was partially successful, with hundreds of Hezbollah missiles and rockets destroyed on their launchpads. But at the same time, Hezbollah managed to extend its range.

What’s clear in the short term is that the hostage talks with Hamas will suffer a setback, as Sinwar holds out for the opening of a second front. The coming days will reveal whether this exchange of blows leads to an escalation and all-out war in the north, or rather to a US-mediated ceasefire deal in both north and south to prevent a full-scale regional war.

Like a shrewd Chicago street hustler, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu exploited Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s overeagerness to secure a hostage deal before the Democratic National Convention. Netanyahu showed flexibility on almost every parameter, giving the impression of progress, but drawing the line at IDF control of the Philadelphi Route along the Egypt-Gaza border.

To get a sense of the mood in the security cabinet, I sat down last week with Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter, a resident of the southern city of Ashkelon, a former head of the Shin Bet, and the Likud member with the most experience in the security forces, alongside Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

What are the security cabinet’s red lines in the negotiations currently underway?

I don’t recommend discussing Israel’s negotiating positions in the press. It’s absolutely clear that our aim is for Hamas and Islamic Jihad to no longer represent a threat to Israel at the end of the war. This includes denying them the ability to rebuild, which means that Israeli control of the Philadelphi Route is nonnegotiable.

We’re seeing stubborn resistance to that, not only from Hamas but also from Egypt.

Ever since the 1978 agreement between Israel and Egypt, it’s been agreed that Israel occupies the Philadelphi Route, so the Egyptians can’t complain about that either.

A few days ago, the IDF recovered the bodies of six abductees murdered by Hamas. Does Israel need to insist on holding the Philadelphi Route, even at the risk of leaving the hostages in captivity?

In my view, on the tactical level, Israel can control the Philadelphi Route without a presence there for the month-and-a-half truce we’re offering in the negotiations.

And do you see Israel returning to the route at the end of the deal, in the final stretch of the US elections?

The war will end with Israel in control of the Philadelphi Route. The Israeli presence there is part of our agreement with Egypt. Israel pulled back from it unilaterally during the [2005 Gaza] disengagement, which got us to where we are now. I’ll remind you that the PA controlled Gaza for two years after the disengagement, until it ceded the strip to Hamas in just three days of fighting.

As far as we’re concerned, this issue is closed. Israel will return to our original deal with Egypt. Our control of the route is part of the agreement with Egypt, and we’ll implement it.

It seems America is exerting all its considerable diplomatic might to push Israel to a deal at any price.

The United States is a world power. It sees exactly what’s happening in the region, from Iran to Israel and everything in between — not just from a bird’s-eye view, but from its satellite cameras. It’s also looking west toward Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, and south toward Yemen. And it has its own perspective.

There has been grumbling from the right side of the aisle about how America could have supported us more.

You have to understand that the United States is a global superpower and maintains a significant presence in the region to prevent a flareup that could have global ramifications. Given that Russia is now tied to Iran through mutual arms deals, the United States has to look at these developments from a different perspective.

From that point of view, its efforts to cool the region are more than legitimate. The fact is that Israel is the only non-Arab, non-Muslim country in the region, and the United States has its own interests to consider. It doesn’t want the Suez Canal drying up.

You’re a member of the cabinet. We’re all aware of the disagreement between Prime Minister Netanyahu and defense establishment heads about whether to accept the terms the Americans are trying to dictate to us, with Netanyahu taking a more hawkish line. As a member of the defense establishment and a former head of the Shin Bet, do you support Netanyahu’s position in defiance of almost the entire system?

I don’t exactly know what these reports are based on. I think that ultimately, differences of opinion between the political and security echelons are not new, and I would even say they’re a good thing. At the end of the day, the political echelon makes the final decision, taking into account security, political realities, and other factors to make the best decision for Israel at any given moment. So I wouldn’t think about it in terms of Netanyahu being more or less hawkish. We need to arrive at the decision that does the most for Israel, or allows Israel to do the most.

Do you feel that Netanyahu’s considerations are disinterested, or is he thinking about his political situation, as his rivals claim? We’ve heard the threats from Ben Gvir and Smotrich to bring down the government if the hostage deal presented by President Biden is accepted, and that does seem to be influencing the decision making.

Ultimately the cabinet will meet and a majority decision will be reached. Anyone making threats in my view is waving an empty gun. These threats work in the short term for impressing the base, but they themselves know that the decision will pass the cabinet, even if they vote against. They’ve seen that in the past. So I think they would do well to show a little more professionalism when it comes to this issue.

I know it isn’t always easy to make decisions that go against your position. But anyone who has some experience in this area — and I daresay I do, having served in the cabinet as both a minister and head of the Shin Bet — knows that no one has a monopoly on truth.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1026)