At the peak of the conflict over the loan guarantees, and during Bush’s last year in office, President Bush lashed out at the “Israel lobby,” describing himself as “one lonely, little guy” facing “powerful forces.”
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) took the initiative to find a compromise that would please the Bush administration without arousing the ire of the Israel lobby.
To test the waters, Mitchell called Yoram Ettinger, then Israel’s minister for congressional affairs, to a meeting in Mitchell’s Senate office. In a 2010 interview with Mishpacha, Ettinger said a senior Israeli official accompanied him to the meeting.
Mitchell, looking to finalize this deal, and get it off the table to make way for other legislation of import, offered the following compromise: Israel would get the full $10 billion, but the president and secretary of state could stop or suspend this aid at any time pending Israeli “behavior” on settlements.
“What do you gentlemen think about it?” asked Mitchell.
Ettinger, knowing that only Congress has the power to approve spending measures, tried to persuade Mitchell that it would be a mistake for Congress to cede that power to the whims of the executive branch, especially now, when Bush and Baker had developed an adversarial relationship with Israel. When it came time for the senior Israeli official to give his opinion, he heaped praise on Bush and Baker and told Senator Mitchell how badly Israel needed the aid.
“After about ten minutes of this, Mitchell stopped him and said: ‘While you don’t like it, you won’t fight it.’ And the Israeli said, ‘You’re absolutely right.’”
Ettinger recalls Mitchell getting up and saying: ‘Have a nice day, I have another meeting.’ ”
Knowing he was licked, Ettinger slumped in his chair, head down. “I saw everything collapsing,” he said.
Ettinger said that this experience made an indelible mark on him, and on Mitchell, who eventually became President Obama’s Middle East peace envoy: “This experience with the Israeli official [and his obsequious behavior] left Mitchell with the assumption that Israeli red lines are easily transformed into pink lines and that Israel is susceptible to even minimal psychological pressure.” (Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 738)