Israel’s immediate concern is the US plan for the day after in Gaza, which could end up resembling the day before if both sides aren’t careful

W

hen Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) flies home after he visits Washington, D.C., next week, he will return on the same luxury Boeing 747-400 jet that brought him there, not on a Lockheed Martin F-35.

Arms deals don’t happen quickly in Washington, and fulfilling MBS’s wish list, which reportedly includes 48 of the world’s most advanced stealth fighter jets, requires a lengthy vetting process, including Congressional approval. With Turkey also requesting F-35s and Egypt seeking advanced F-15s equipped with long-range rockets, it’s clear that the starting gun has been fired for a new Middle East arms race. This raises questions about America’s long-standing commitment to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME), which for decades has ensured Israeli military superiority.

There are many ways to compensate Israel, such as selling it B-2 bunker-buster bombers, like the ones the US used to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, or selling F-35s to Arab states that are not as fully outfitted as Israel’s F-35s, which are upgraded with advanced capabilities. These ideas will be raised during upcoming negotiations between the US and Israel over the extension of the next Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which will determine the size and scope of US military aid to Israel from 2028 onward.

Israel’s immediate concern is the US plan for the day after in Gaza, which could end up resembling the day before if both sides aren’t careful. This issue is still evolving, with Ron Dermer, in his new role as Prime Minister Netanyahu’s special envoy, visiting the US this week to ensure the IDF maintains its freedom of action to respond to any Hamas attempts to rebuild its fighting capabilities.

At press time, US plans reportedly called for a UN Security Council mandate in Gaza to authorize an international security force to keep Israel and Hamas apart for the next two years while waiting for a “reformed” Palestinian Authority (PA) to take over after that. No nation has yet committed to sending troops. If it comes to fruition, Israel, Egypt, and the PA will oversee the process, while two separate Muslim blocs, either Saudi Arabia and the UAE or Qatar and Turkey, would lead the effort. Israeli think tanks are divided over which option is better for Israel. Some favor the Saudis and the UAE, who have initiated deradicalization efforts in their own countries, including religious reeducation and changing school textbooks, to counter extremist ideologies. Others argue that Turkey and Qatar can better pressure Hamas to disarm.

Don’t Get Fooled Again

Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum, argues that both options are poor choices for all parties involved.

“The idea that Arab states, let alone Israel, should trust an empowered Palestinian Authority in Gaza, as some think tanks have suggested, is both naive and a recipe for disaster,” Rubin wrote in an article originally published in the National Security Journal.

Israel certainly cannot afford to delegate its security to an international force empowered by the UN. Israel has been there and done that, most recently after the 2006 Second Lebanon War. The UNIFIL peacekeeping force turned its face to Israel and its back to Hezbollah, a situation Iran exploited to arm Hezbollah to the teeth. The Palestinian Authority has long advocated for UN “peacekeepers” in the West Bank to keep Israel at bay.

So why does Israel go along?

Aside from Trump’s pressure, it’s well-known that IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir opposes a long-term Israeli presence in Gaza, citing the costs, risks, and strains on an army already stretched by two years of war and facing threats on multiple fronts.

Netanyahu may have reluctantly agreed to Trump’s 20-point plan, likely driven by his increasing urgency to secure the hostages’ release as protests against his government surged. However, he probably wagered that the remaining 19 points would unravel due to their complexity.

If so, it was quite a high-stakes gamble, especially given Trump’s firm resolve to end the conflict on his own terms, amidst reports that the US is sidelining Israel in the decision-making process.

The Need to Win

Trump’s persistence leaves Netanyahu in a bind, but Trump faces his own challenge: avoiding being trapped by his vision.

Trump is urging Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. The Saudis have tied normalizing relations to an Israeli agreement that would open a path toward a Palestinian state. Trump’s Gaza plan is his pitch to MBS — that Gaza will eventually develop into some form of a Palestinian state — so MBS can return home and persuade his people that he  stood firm for Palestinian rights. It’s a grandiose plan that relies on the outdated Western idea that Saudi Arabia, as the keeper of Islam’s holiest sites, leads the Muslim world. Once it normalizes relations with Israel, the rest of the Arab and Muslim world is expected to follow.

Saudi Arabia has many rivals for the title of leader of the Muslim world, including Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar. They’re not going to drop their hostility to Israel, even if MBS signs the Abraham Accords with an autopen that Trump provides. Ceremonial Abraham Accords signings, such as the upcoming one with Kazakhstan, which already established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, are purely symbolic, and become irrelevant when Israel faces escalating political tensions with a hostile Turkey, deals with Egypt and Jordan violating their peace treaties by smuggling arms to Israel’s enemies, and ongoing, unresolved conflicts with Syria, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran.

So why is the US pushing so hard?

Vice President JD Vance voiced the Trump administration and MAGA forces’ sentiment last week when he said: “I care about establishing peace overseas so our resources can be focused at home.”

Trump aims to end wars, but often, the best way to end a war is for someone to win it — like Israel — rather than pulling the plug on it too soon, as the US did in Israel’s wars with Lebanon, Iran, and now Gaza.

Before forcing deals with Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Gaza, the US must realize that any agreement that weakens Israel’s security or gives the impression that the US and Israel are at odds only encourages Israel’s enemies, destabilizes the region, and undermines the very goals that Vance outlined.

Trump values strength and peace through strength. The IDF has demonstrated over the past two years that it is the most formidable armed force in the Middle East. As Michael Rubin wrote in last month’s National Security Journal: “The war will only end when Hamas surrenders unconditionally.” If the Trump administration genuinely wants to promote stability and focus on its domestic priorities, it should support the winning side — Israel — and stop demanding concessions from Israel until Hamas waves the white flag. America must help the IDF manage its growing challenges, rather than adding to them.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1086)