America has fallen behind its rivals in producing drones, and the Department of Defense is working hard to catch up

T

he $800 billion annual Pentagon budget pays for the most sophisticated military in the world, yet the United States lags behind its global adversaries in one crucial, very low-ticket category — small drones.

Recent conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East have put low-cost, low-risk drones front and center, especially as they have empowered smaller forces to level the playing field against larger forces deploying more expensive assets.

For a multiplicity of reasons, America has fallen behind its rivals in producing drones. Now, the Department of Defense is working hard to catch up.

“Drones are the biggest battlefield innovation in a generation, accounting for most of this year’s casualties in Ukraine,” said Secretary Pete Hegseth in a statement last week. “Our adversaries collectively produce millions of cheap drones each year. While global military drone production skyrocketed over the last three years, the previous administration deployed red tape. US units are not outfitted with the lethal small drones the modern battlefield requires.”

The directive builds on a White House order to “unleash American drone dominance,” which aimed to expand domestic production across the board. Mr. Hegseth’s memo checks at least two boxes on the MAGA list: stimulating American manufacturing and upgrading the military’s lethality.

Meanwhile, China leads the way in production of cheap drones, and there is no shortage of nefarious actors well trained in using them. Whether America can catch up will test the agility of both its fighters and industries alike.

The US has invested tens of millions in developing large, sophisticated drones for long-range reconnaissance missions, which confer an advantage on American forces in any potential conflict. But that funding decision speaks to a fundamental problem: America’s military is over-invested in expensive arms at a time when the threat from cheap weapons is rising.

That disparity not only limits America’s options but leaves it with an upside-down cost-benefit ratio. For example, the Houthis in Yemen deploy drones costing a few hundred dollars each; the US counters that threat with a multi-million dollar missile arsenal. A Heritage Foundation report cited one instance when a US ally used an American-supplied $3 million Patriot missile to down a $200 Houthi quadcopter drone.

Slashing Red Tape

One big obstacle to American drone development has been the Defense Department’s highly controlled procurement system, which requires checking off a long list of boxes and prevents commanders from getting cheaper and more agile unmanned craft.

“There regulations were implemented because the drones being used were mostly large craft that resemble airplanes,” says Dr. Terrence Kelly of the Rand policy think tank. “They needed to be sure they had airworthiness and could communicate with the FAA to steer clear of commercial aircraft and so on.”

But as the military’s needs changed, the regulations did not. Smaller, cheaper drones did not fit neatly into the existing protocol, and all but the most senior officers were usually blocked from the ordering unmanned aerial systems (UAS) best suited for their units.

Secretary Hegseth’s directive rescinds two rules restricting procurement and pushes forces to aggressively build up their drone arsenals, setting a goal for every unit to have its own small UAS by October 2026.

Arming each unit with a drone is not just a means of increasing quantity, but of allowing commanders to tailor UAS’s to their needs.

“The military prefers standardization, and there’s a good reason for that,” explains Ori Swed, director of the Peace, War, and Social Conflict Laboratory at Texas Tech University. “They need to know what the parameters of each unit are, so commanders know what to expect. But when it comes to procuring drones, there needs to be a level of flexibility. A unit that operates in the jungle has different needs than one that operates at sea or in urban warfare.”

The drones most individual units are presently looking to acquire are FPVs (first-person view), which are mostly used for short-range reconnaissance. With the new directive, more units might now add “kamikaze” drones that attack targets with explosive payloads.

The development of such cheap attack drones necessitated another Pentagon policy change. Previously, regulations suited to the expensive reconnaissance drones required commanders to maintain them in long-term working condition — but these attack drones were more properly classified as “consumable” supplies.

“You want to think of them more like ammunition than like a rifle,” says Dr. Kelly. “They’re designed to be used up rather than be preserved. If you’re using them like little guided missiles that small units can fly into enemy targets and explode, or even ones that are designed to go out and find where the enemy is, you don’t want commanders overly concerned about whether they can bring them back.”

Ukraine and Israel offer two examples of militaries successfully deploying drones with very loosely structured acquisition procedures. Ukraine’s works on a merit system: The high command assigns lists of targets it wants attacked. Unit commanders are awarded drone hardware based on their past track records and on how their strike plans meet the high command’s priorities.

While the highly structured United States military is unlikely to adopt Ukraine’s model, it is conducting an ongoing internal discussion on how to adjust protocols to maximize drone effectiveness. One aspect of the debate focuses on whether the armed forces should develop a corps dedicated to drone use, as Ukraine has done; or if it should require divisions and smaller units of each branch to develop UAS uses that best compliment their specialties.

“It’s important to get the organizational part of this right,” says Dr. Swed. “You want commanders to get what they need and act without having to call the Air Force or anybody else for assistance. They also need collaboration between services, so your drones won’t interfere with your own planes or artillery, or that you’ll fly one toward a target and it gets shot down by another unit.”

Leveling the Playing Field

Ukraine and Middle East theaters offer many lessons for the US, but they also provide an ominous warning. American military dominance has long been based on an ability to rule the skies with a large air corps and arsenal of complex weapons. Yet recent experience has shown how cheap drones can empower small states, terrorist groups, and militias against more powerful forces.

“The US created defense architecture focused on ground threats, assuming that threats from above would either be very rare or implemented by a very capable and advanced force,” said Dr. Swed. “Now, everyone can buy a drone from Walmart and put explosives on it. It’s a democratization of capabilities, and the air defense architecture we have now is not outfitted to deal with it.”

American servicemen have already felt the sting. Last year, three were killed and 40 injured by a drone attack on a base in Jordan carried out by an Iran-backed Iraqi militia. ISIS regularly conducted drone attacks on US troops in the region, reaching as many as 100 per month in 2017.

While Secretary Hegseth’s directives are focused on building up America’s own drone capabilities, many are calling for anti-drone defense to take a higher priority.

“We do have a lot of counter-drone solutions in place, but they need to become available almost everywhere, not only on the frontlines, but protecting civilian targets as well,” says Dr. Swed.

Perhaps the steepest challenge facing the US military on small drones is not learning how to use them, but getting the domestic industrial base to produce enough of them.

Over the last three years, Ukrainian drone production has boomed, and it’s on track to churn out up to three million units this year. Some producers are established companies, others are small shops, and quite a few are produced by citizens who have found night jobs selling homemade drones to Ukraine’s army.

According to a recent New York Times report, America’s 500 drone-capable companies turn out less than 100,000 per year. Many have little experience with military use. The article highlighted the technical shortcomings of many of their products.

A bigger problem is that China produces the lion’s share of high-quality drones. That nation’s leading drone manufacturer, DJI, makes 70 percent of all UAS’s sold worldwide. Most of its products range between $300 and $5000.

The US Defense Department seems poised to test whether a surge in demand can stimulate the still-germinating domestic drone industry. A program aimed at acquiring 10,000 cheap, expendable drone systems (known in bureaucratese as “purpose-built attritable systems,” or PBAS) over the next year, opened up bidding for companies to produce drones for less than $2,000 apiece. Many other such orders are in the works.

This push compliments another Trump administration goal: developing domestic production of rare-earth magnets, which are key component of most drones. The industry is presently dominated by China, but more US mining and production is underway.

“The number of drones the military ordered to date have been in the dozens per year,” says Dr. Kelly. “You can’t expect a commercial firm to create enormous capacity when you buy so few. They have the ability to ramp up, companies just need the resources and investment to turn profits. If the secretary of defense’s memo is put into action, they’ll have both.”

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1071)