“We cannot allow Hamas to regroup”

Photo: Flash90

The celebrations over the release of Daniella Gilboa, Naama Levy, Karina Ariev, and Liri Albag, the second group of hostages freed in this initial phase —expected to conclude in four weeks — offered a reprieve from the upheaval in the IDF following the resignation of Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi.

Halevi, Israel’s top military officer during October 7, faced sharp criticism for his wartime leadership, particularly in recent months. Although his official departure is scheduled for March 6, the government has already begun considering successors, signaling a shift toward a more aggressive and proactive posture against Israel’s adversaries.

Meanwhile, despite the ceasefires in the south and north, the IDF has initiated operations in the West Bank, another major stronghold of Palestinian terrorism.

To understand what we might expect from the next chief of staff and how Israel’s many active fronts might evolve, we spoke with Brigadier General (Res.) Amir Avivi. He emphasizes, “The agreement to free hostages doesn’t mean we won’t resume fighting. The State of Israel has an obligation to win this war.”

Voices across the spectrum in Israel were demanding Herzi Halevi’s resignation, but it’s surprising he would step down in wartime. What’s your take?

Herzi Halevi was the general in charge during the disaster of October 7. After 15 months of conflict, during which military successes have been few and far between, and with widespread grumbling in the ranks over his handling of the war, I believe this is an opportune moment for him to step aside. Some argue this isn’t the best timing, but I consider it necessary.

Defense Minister Israel Katz has presented a short list of candidates: Eyal Zamir, former IDF deputy chief and current director-general of the Defense Ministry; Maj. Gen. Amir Baram, the current IDF deputy chief; and Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai, the former Ground Forces chief. What can you tell us about them, and who do you think is most likely to be chosen?

In general, all three are good candidates. However, I believe Eyal Zamir has the strongest chance. He previously served as IDF deputy chief and, crucially, has spent the last three years outside the military, meaning he wasn’t part of the leadership during October 7. As commander of the Southern Command, Zamir was the last to plan comprehensive control over Gaza. When he was deputy chief, he voiced opposition to some of the entrenched ideas within the military. These factors make him a solid option.

I know Tamir Yadai very well. I served under his command when he was brigadier general of Division 80. He commanded the Golani Brigade, the Ground Forces Command, and the Central Command. He’s a strategic thinker and often thinks outside the box. His one limitation is that he’s never served as deputy chief.

As for Amir Baram, the current deputy chief, he commanded the Northern Command and led the Paratrooper Reconnaissance Unit. He is highly qualified but was in active service on October 7. This association with the current military leadership could be seen as a liability.

Looking at the full picture, I think Eyal Zamir has a clear advantage.

What objectives should the new chief of staff prioritize?

All the candidates understand that the ultimate test will be to secure victory in this war. It’s worth noting how unusual it is for a chief of staff to step down in the middle of a conflict. The new chief faces a unique set of challenges, not only in Gaza but also in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The next chief will be judged on how effectively he handles these issues. This is not a chief of staff taking over during peacetime — he’s stepping into a war.

Since October 7, the perspectives of most Israelis, and undoubtedly those within the military, have shifted dramatically. The new chief will also face scrutiny over appointments of captains — leaders who are combative, innovative, and unafraid to take military risks. What we need are wild horses, and the new chief must be capable of leading and harnessing them effectively.

In recent days, we’ve seen military operations intensify in the West Bank. What should we expect to happen there?

Given the significant challenge posed by the limited availability of ground forces, the IDF has focused its efforts in a targeted manner. Initially, the bulk of forces were concentrated in Gaza. After ten months, they were redeployed to Lebanon. Now, with the ceasefire in Gaza, efforts are shifting to Judea and Samaria. It’s important to understand that this war is ongoing, requiring forces to move constantly between fronts. There’s extensive work to be done by security forces in Judea and Samaria, and the current operations are part of a sustained campaign there. Disbanding terrorist cells there will take time.

The ceasefire deadline has passed, and tensions are high in the north. Is it possible the war with Hezbollah will resume?

We are currently in an extremely sensitive moment. Officially, the ceasefire in the north ended today. Hezbollah is attempting to exert pressure by sending personnel to southern Lebanon. The IDF has made it clear: “We are not leaving Lebanon until Hezbollah withdraws all its forces from the region.” This situation is precarious, and there is a strong likelihood that Hezbollah may decide to attack or take provocative actions that endanger us.

The Northern Command is fully prepared to deliver a decisive blow to Hezbollah if necessary. The message is clear: We will not allow Hezbollah to reestablish itself in southern Lebanon, break the agreement, or challenge us. If necessary, we are ready to resume the war.

That said, we’ve seen indications that Donald Trump, in this new term, wants to avoid conflicts. Will Israel be able to strike without provoking US discontent?

Israel will not compromise on this issue and will strike Hezbollah if it attempts to engage with us again.

Two rounds of hostage releases have been completed, and seven have returned home. What comes next?

We must remember that we established clear objectives for this war — the eradication of Hamas as a military and political force in Gaza, the return of all hostages, and the establishment of a Gaza without a terrorist government. At this moment, the possibility of advancing the return of hostages has arisen. This comes at a painful cost, one that will undoubtedly affect us in the future, but the imperative to bring back the hostages is paramount. However, this doesn’t mean the fighting is over. The State of Israel is obligated to win this war.

The critical question is what will happen once the first stage of this hostage agreement concludes. Assuming all 33 hostages included in this phase are released, how will we pressure Hamas to release the rest? This complex situation may compel us to return to war.

We’ve all seen the images of thousands of terrorists during the release of the hostages. Does this suggest they are regrouping?

The individuals in those images are cowards who fled to Al-Mawasi — a designated “safe zone” for Palestinian civilians — and hid behind them. They’re now putting on a show, donning clean uniforms that have never seen a day of combat. The reality is that Hamas has suffered devastating losses, with tens of thousands of casualties and severe damage to its military capabilities.

That said, it must be crystal clear: If we don’t continue addressing this problem, they will regroup and rebuild. That is something we absolutely cannot allow.

Let’s turn to Iran, who’s pulling all the strings. Will Israel finally deliver a strong blow against Iran?

Israel’s military focus will now shift decisively toward Iran. Our air force has already conducted significant operations in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Yemen. The full weight of Israel’s power is now aimed at Iran.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1047)