“They built a ring of fire around Israel and thought Israel would crumble. It’s clear that did not work”

There are grounds for optimism, rationales for realism, a solid basis for healthy skepticism, and some mandatory pessimism when evaluating Israel’s logic in signing a 60-day ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.

Let’s start with the realism.

The IDF is strained to capacity. In addition to maintaining a standing army with an estimated 180,000 soldiers on full alert, Israel has called up some 300,000 reservists during the past year. Some have served seven consecutive months away from their homes, families, and jobs.

The war has exacted a steep economic toll. The Bank of Israel estimates that by the end of 2025, Israel will have spent more than $60 billion (NIS 220 billion) on war expenses, not to mention lost revenues. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that more than one million hours of work are lost each month because soldiers are on the battlefield instead of at the office.

It’s no secret that in its waning days, the Biden administration, starving for foreign policy achievements, pressured Israel into signing the ceasefire agreement by withholding arms and by threatening to take revenge for Israeli disobedience by supporting a UN resolution calling for a mandatory and enforceable ceasefire on terms even more onerous than the deal Israel agreed to, and perhaps another resolution under which the US would have recognized a Palestinian state.

These were two nooses dangling in the air over Prime Minister Netanyahu’s neck. The 60-day break in the fighting ends after the Trump-Vance administration’s first week in office. Israel hopes it can be renewed on more favorable terms or get more leeway to fight if it crumbles beforehand.

After the security cabinet voted 10-1 to approve the ceasefire (Itamar Ben-Gvir was the lone dissenter), Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu addressed the nation, outlining three reasons for agreeing to the deal. First, he said it would enable Israel to pivot to the Iranian threat, on which he did not elaborate. Second, it would allow the IDF to update its military forces and equipment. Third, the neutralization of Hezbollah would isolate Hamas. Bibi also noted that the IDF had already achieved virtually all of its military goals in Lebanon.

Former national security advisor Major-General (retired) Yaakov Amidror agreed with most of Bibi’s assessment when he addressed the Jerusalem Press Club late last week and said that while Israel can’t declare victory in its seven-front war, the biggest loser to date is Iran.

“They built a ring of fire around Israel and thought Israel would crumble,” Amidror said. “It’s clear that did not work. Now they have to think about a direct war with Israel. That was their nightmare. They didn’t want to be exposed.”

Taming the Beast

With Hamas and Islamic Jihad on their last legs in Gaza, Iran has lost one powerful proxy on Israel’s southwest border. While Hezbollah is still a powerful organization, Amidror contends it’s no longer a proxy that can deter Israel.

“We know its weak points, and we know how to continue to destroy them if there is a need,” Amidror said. He said Israel can use the timeout in the north to restructure its air force and all intelligence services to take on enemy number one: “We know we have a job to finish concerning the Iranian nuclear effort.”

The healthy skepticism comes from Dr. Jonathan Spyer, who fought in the Second Lebanon War in the IDF reserves. That war ended with an August 2006 ceasefire, with Hezbollah agreeing under UN Resolution 1701 to withdraw its forces north of the Litani River. Had they kept their end of the bargain, this would have given Israel an 18-mile buffer zone along its northern border.

Spyer returned to Lebanon in late 2007 to observe the process by which Hezbollah was reestablishing itself south of the Litani, despite the beefed-up presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the UN peacekeeping force, UNIFIL.

Spyer is currently the editor of the Middle East Quarterly. He wrote a piece last week for the Spectator, a British weekly, recounting Hezbollah’s numerous violations. “One glimpsed it in the signs familiar to anyone who knows the area: in the lone men on motorcycles deployed and observing in the villages, in the cars without license plates and with blacked-out windows on the roads, speeding along the highways, signifying the group’s half-seen presence.”

Even after the immense damage the IDF has inflicted on Hezbollah, Spyer contended that Lebanon is still host to an Iran-implanted deep state that is much stronger than the official bodies of the state.

“The LAF, heavily infiltrated by officers and soldiers with links to Hezbollah, is not going to prevent [Hezbollah] from reemerging and rearming,” he wrote.

Act Now, Explain Later

There are two reasons to believe this time might be different.

The first is the enforcement mechanism. Instead of leaving it to the UN to enforce, a US-led committee will oversee the current arrangement. The second is the existence of a side letter from the US to Israel endorsing Israel’s right to take action against rocket and missile launches and hinder military resupply efforts coming from Syria, which has all it can handle in fending off rebels who despise Hezbollah almost as much as they hate Syria’s Iranian-Russian backed Assad regime.

However, even side letters are often not worth more than the paper they’re written on.

Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, wrote a piece for the Middle East Forum last week expressing some necessary pessimism, saying no one should celebrate.

He cited comments from Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX), who accused the Biden administration of coercing Netanyahu’s acceptance by withholding vital munitions, and that should have raised a red flag before Israel raised a white flag.

“Hezbollah is a terror group, and Lebanon is a failed Mafia state,” Rubin wrote. “US support for Israel’s defense against its adversaries should be absolute. At worst, Biden reminds enemies that they can try their best to attack Israel and other US allies and that if they can extend the fighting from days to weeks or months, Washington will pressure their allies to concede. In the fight against terror, America has become a liability to its more clear-eyed allies.”

Donald Trump will upend any Biden doctrines shortly after taking office, but it’s too early to tell how that will plug into Israel’s battles. Trump wants to avoid foreign entanglements that distract him from the domestic shakeup he’s planning.

Trump may well lend military and vocal support to the IDF to do as it sees fit, provided it does so quickly and efficiently and leaves the US out of the fighting. If so, Israel will have to act forcefully and independently. Amidror said the IDF must be vigilant on multiple fronts, from Iraq to the Mediterranean and all lands in between, including Syria and Lebanon, to stop Hezbollah from “regrowing the beast on our border,” as he phrased it.

We can’t be content with just saying something when we see something. We have to do something. “It must be understood by the US, Lebanon, and the French we will act immediately, without notification, and only after will we explain to whoever will ask questions,” Amidror added.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1039)