Eli Feldstein's arrest isn't justice — it's about sending a message

Photos: Flash90

Amid the sea of leaks that flood from the upper ranks of Israel’s government, only one leaker has been targeted with the kind of treatment that the Shin Bet normally reserves for terrorists

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month after Eli Feldstein, a talented and dynamic 32-year-old spokesman who’d landed a job with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, was arrested and hauled away in the middle of the night by hooded Shin Bet agents, then denied access to a lawyer during an intensive weeklong interrogation, the questions surrounding his case have only grown stronger.

Feldstein was accused by prosecutors of damaging Israel’s state security by leaking a highly classified internal document seized from Hamas to Germany’s Bild newspaper. The document outlined the terror group’s strategy for surviving the IDF’s operation in Gaza by leveraging its hostages in psychological warfare on the Israeli public. The document had come into Feldstein’s possession from a line officer in military intelligence — bypassing normal channels. Prosecutors say the leak endangered intelligence sources inside Gaza.

But in Israel’s murky world of leak and counter-leak, it appears that the over-eager Feldstein may be a pawn in a larger war — between the defense establishment, and the political right wing led by Netanyahu. The question is whether prosecutors have overreached in their investigation of Feldstein.

“The glaring issue here is the selective enforcement — that’s the crux of it,” says attorney Moshe Osditcher. “After all, journalism in Israel depends on leaks. Whether we like it or not, that’s an integral element of the free press in this country.”

Feldstein, who’d served as a military spokesperson in the army, was sure he’d made the right decision to pass the information along. What he didn’t know was that the investigation that would lead to his downfall was already underway.

Feldstein’s messages to Yonatan Urich, a close advisor to Netanyahu, uncovered during the investigation, raise probing questions about the fine line between state security and the public’s right to know.

Why This One?

It all started in April 2024. A reserve officer in Military Intelligence, whose identity remains classified, came across a fascinating Hamas document detailing the group’s strategy to wage psychological warfare against the Israeli public via the hostage negotiations. The officer immediately sensed that this intel had to reach the political echelon.

But the officer’s superiors in the Intelligence Directorate decided not to send the document through the usual channels. The pretext: More up-to-date information was available. But the reserve officer wasn’t convinced, and began looking for a way to get the information directly to the prime minister. His father-in-law, an acquaintance of Feldstein, would be the fateful link.

“I’m in possession of classified information regarding possible foreign involvement in the events of October 7,” the officer wrote Feldstein in a WhatsApp message.

Feldstein, who didn’t have security clearance, was instantly piqued. Within an hour, he’d written to Netanyahu advisor Yonatan Ulrich: “My source, a senior officer in the military intelligence directorate, wants to transfer classified material to the prime minister with extreme urgency. Insane material.”

The first meeting between the two took place in the shul in the Kiryah building. Not in the fortified military bunker — Feldstein didn’t want to be spotted there. In the meeting, the officer explained the intelligence community’s modus operandi. But that was only the beginning.

The decisive moment came in early September. Six hostages were murdered in cold blood by Hamas, and their bodies were found in a Gaza tunnel. Feldstein decided the moment had come to use the classified document to influence the public conversation about a hostage deal. He first passed it on to Channel 12 News, but the military censor blocked its publication.

Feldstein wrote Urich to ask for connections to the Western press. He added, “Something big is brewing.”

The answer was Yisrael Einhorn, a contact with the foreign media. Within days, the document was in Bild’s hands. The Bild exposé was an immediate success, but also the beginning of the end.

The IDF immediately recognized that this was a “top secret” document. What began as a routine investigation of a leak quickly turned into a Shin Bet operation. On October 27, late at night, investigators arrived at Feldstein’s home. There they found the original document, along with two other classified documents.

Feldstein was held in detention for ten days without access to a lawyer — a measure usually reserved for captured terrorists. It was clear that this had become more than an investigation of a leak. The State Prosecutor’s Office had drawn up a grave indictment: aggravated espionage, punishable by life in prison.

“Feldstein is an Israeli patriot, an ardent Zionist,” Netanyahu said in an unusual video in Feldstein’s support. “There’s no way in the world that he would have deliberately done anything to endanger the security of the state.”

But the real question is not Feldstein’s motivation. The question is why, out of all the leaks throughout the war, law enforcement cracked down so hard on this one in particular.

The answer to this question takes us into the complex relationship between the prime minister and the defense establishment, and raises difficult questions about the conduct of Israel’s law enforcement in wartime.

Selective Enforcement

In a top-secret meeting in the Kiryah bunker on October 11, 2023, critical strategic information about the IDF’s capabilities was presented. Within hours, that information had been leaked to the press. There were no arrests, no Shin Bet interrogation. Nor were there any later, when details of cabinet deliberations on response to the Iranian attacks were leaked, or when the details of hostage negotiations were made public.

Since the start of the war, there has a been “a flood of severe leaks,” as Netanyahu put it in his video in support of Feldstein. Throughout the war, the Israeli government has found that every sensitive discussion, every strategic decision, finds its way to the media. Sometimes within minutes, always within hours.

“These leaks provided information of enormous value to our enemies, to Iran, to Hezbollah, to Hamas,” Netanyahu said.

But the embarrassing truth is that leaks have become a normal part of Israeli political culture — a tool in political power struggles, a way to influence public opinion, and sometimes even leverage in negotiations.

Take, for example, the August 2 leak from top-secret meetings on the hostage issue. A participant leaked the demands by some officials for compromises with Hamas. The leak served a clear agenda — exerting public pressure on decision makers to close a deal. No one was interrogated.

“You don’t have to be a genius to understand why none of those leaks were investigated,” Netanyahu said.

Attorney Moshe Osditcher, who has extensive experience with political cases, backs up Netanyahu’s point. “This is selective enforcement, because you see leaks emerging from the Security Cabinet before meetings even conclude, and no one investigates that. Entire military plans are published by the media alongside sensitive security documents, and yet no action is taken. Legally speaking, once selective enforcement is proven, the case must be dismissed.”

Indeed, the pattern of selective enforcement cries out to the heavens. In response to the questions raised by the affair, the state prosecutor’s office tried to explain what made Feldstein’s case different: “This is not about the mere leaking of a document, it’s about an attempt to create a direct route bypassing the military system.”

But this explanation crumbles in the face of reality. Every leak, by its very nature, bypasses the system. Any leak to a journalist is, as the Likud’s response notes, “the transfer of classified information to a person who is not authorized to receive it.” The only difference is who leaked the information and for what purpose.

The practice of circumventing through foreign media is so widespread that it’s almost a protocol. Dozens of items in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and CNN throughout the war were based on information barred from publication in Israel. No one was dragged out of their bed in the middle of the night.

Even Feldstein’s course of action — first presenting the information to the Israeli media, and only taking it abroad after the censorship blocked its publication — is effectively standard procedure. So what’s so different about this case?

The answer may lie in the contents of the document itself. In contrast to other leaks, which were intended to weaken Netanyahu or exert public pressure on him, the document leaked by Feldstein revealed Hamas’s strategy of dividing Israeli society, serving a narrative contrary to the one pushed by the media.

“It’s only this leak, which tells the truth about Hamas’s strategy to deceive Israel and the world and places the blame [for the failure of the cease-fire talks] on Hamas, that the state prosecution sees as a grave breach of security meriting investigation and arrest,” the Likud noted cynically in its statement.

But beyond the question of the contents, an even more troubling question arises: Why didn’t this document reach Netanyahu in the first place? Is it possible that intelligence officials are filtering critical information from the prime minister? And if so, who gave them this authority?

“This isn’t the first time vital information has been withheld from me,” Netanyahu claimed.

Which takes us to the real purpose behind the unusual arrest and indictment.

Paying the Price

“The indictment was filed against them, but its purpose is clear — to hurt me.” At first glance, this claim by Netanyahu in his video sounds like an attempt to play the victim. But a closer look reveals a troubling picture.

Let’s start with the charge itself: aggravated espionage, with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The State Attorney’s Office is quick to explain that this ceiling is only theoretical, but the very use of this clause indicates its intent.

“The claim that any of the suspects deliberately acted to harm the security of the State of Israel is a sinister claim,” Netanyahu said, “one that is fundamentally unfounded.”

So what really happened? Was Eli Feldstein, an officer in the reserves who’d risen through the yeshivah world into the prime minister’s circle, really acting with intent to harm state security? Or is the system using the most damaging tool in its arsenal for ulterior purposes?

“It’s the rule of expectations,” the State Attorney’s Office explained in a statement.

If someone takes action with a substantial risk of harming state security, they can be convicted even without proven intent to do so. It cited the Kurt Sitte affair, in which a physicist sold state secrets to foreign nationals. But this highlights the absurdity of comparing someone who sold state secrets to Israel’s enemies to a spokesperson trying to bring vital information to the public’s attention.

“This case should never have been opened in the first place, because there’s no actual security breach,” argues Moshe Osditcher. “From reviewing the indictment, it’s clear that the two individuals didn’t leak the document itself to the media. Without delving into sensitive details, I can say the document contains no so-called ‘fingerprints’ that could reveal the source. Moreover, the content published — about Hamas stalling in the negotiations — was already public knowledge.”

And then there’s the question of compartmentalization. How is it possible that such a critical document detailing the enemy’s strategy didn’t reach the prime minister’s desk? The official explanation — that more up to date information was available — seems especially forced given the fact that the document outlines Hamas’s long-term strategy.

“The prime minister must have access to all relevant intelligence, and this information, despite the prosecution’s claims, is both significant and pertinent,” Osditcher argues. “If such information was concealed from him, then that itself is the real crime.”

The Likud echoed this point in its statement: “It’s unreasonable to keep critical and relevant information of this type from the political echelon as well as from the hostage negotiators.”

“What are we talking about here?” demands Osditcher. “A document the prime minister is not only entitled but obligated to receive. And it’s in his authority to decide if and when it should be revealed to the public.”

Indeed, it’s hard to shed the impression that individuals in the military bureaucracy made their own decisions about what the prime minister should and shouldn’t know. This leads us to the real question: Is the defense establishment, with the backing of the State Attorney’s Office, at war with the prime minister? Is this affair part of a broader struggle for control over information and decision-making?

“This witch hunt won’t deter me,” Netanyahu said.

But the question is not only one of deterrence. The question is whether, in the chaos of war, with Israel facing threats on seven fronts, the different branches of government are focused on internal power struggles or joint victory.

The way Feldstein was dealt with — his dramatic arrest, the denial of a lawyer, the severe charges — increasingly makes it seem like it was meant to send a message. Not only to potential leakers, but to anyone considering challenging the defense establishment’s monopoly on information.

“If masked men come to you in the middle of the night, put you in detention, isolate you, handcuff you, threaten you with life imprisonment if you don’t give them what they want, a person can break down,” Netanyahu said.

Feldstein and the intelligence officer, two people who believed they were acting for the good of the country, now find themselves paying a steep price. But their story is only the tip of the iceberg. It exposes a system in which the struggle for control is more important than the truth, in which law enforcement is a political tool, and in which the line between state security and the power of the system is blurred beyond recognition.

“The truth will come to light,” both Netanyahu and the State Prosecutor’s Office promised.

The question is what truth, and at what cost.

“This is a case that never should have been opened, and now that it has been, it should be closed without delay,” Moshe Osditcher declares. “There’s no case here. At most, we’re talking about some minor disciplinary action within the IDF against a non-commissioned officer, and nothing more. The decision to open this case and the overblown manner in which the prosecution is handling it suggests either a deliberate targeting — specifically of Netanyahu — or an attempt to intimidate the public. Either way, two good people are paying the price.”

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1038)