Testing Grounds

If Israel was surprised by the drone arsenal wielded by Iran and its proxies, it had no grounds to be, because thanks to the Ukraine war, the game    change was well underway long before October 7.

The battlefields of Ukraine have become the largest testing ground in the world for drone warfare. The numbers are remarkable: In September alone, Russia dispatched 1,331 drones toward Ukraine, with an average of 44 a day. As the underdog, Ukraine has in turn turned to drones to offset the vast disparity in conventional force between the two sides. And it has been successful: Ukraine managed to shoot down 1,107 of Russia’s drones, an interception rate of 83%.

Russia’s drone fleet is largely of Iranian origin, highlighting the way that Tehran has become a pioneer in the large-scale deployment of the aerial craft.

Iran’s involvement with drone technology began in the 1980s during the war with Saddam’s Iraq. The revolutionary regime used primitive drones for reconnaissance and for attack. Alongside ballistic missiles, Tehran learned to view unmanned aerial platforms as ideal assets to compensate for its lack of a modern air force.

That expertise in drone technology was shared widely with Iran’s proxies from Iraq to Lebanon, and came to Russia’s aid when the latter’s invasion of Ukraine stalled in 2022.

Initially, Iran shipped drones to Russia, where they were quickly deployed against Ukraine. Pictures of the delta-winged Shahed-136 kamikaze drone diving on Kyiv in 2023 were evidence of a power shift, as Russia went begging cap in hand to Iran for help.

That quickly led to a technology-sharing agreement, with Iran providing the know-how to build drones in Russia, in return for which Russia will supply Tehran with the modern fighter jets that it’s lacked for decades.

At a small factory in the Tatarstan region of Russia, the drone revolution is underway. Based on recently revealed documents by a hacker group, Russia paid Iran $1.7 billion — some of it in gold bars — in order to build a factory that would produce more than 6,000 drones a year. Each such drone costs a mere $20,000.

That cost highlights the approach that Iran has chosen — one that is brutally effective, Instead of competing with more advanced Western technologies, Iran develops relatively simple devices, which are cheaper and easily mass produced. The Iranian Shahed-136 drone, for example, is outfitted with a simple two-stroke engine, whose noise is so typical that Russian soldiers call it the “moped.” At the same time, it can carry payloads of up to 40 kilograms, and it can fly distances of 1,500 miles (2,500 km).

The Iranian-Russian cooperation reveals the depth of the revolution. The documents that were revealed depict a comprehensive plan that reaches far beyond the simple acquisition of drones: The Russians send workers from Central Asia who speak a language similar to Persian to the factories in Iran so that they can be trained to produce the devices and serve as the core of manpower in the new factory in Tatarstan. At the same time, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah are training Russian soldiers in Syria to activate Shahed and Ababil drones.

Behind the Times

The historical irony is that Israel, which today is facing this drone threat, was the global pioneer in the field.

In the early 1970s, Israel’s aircraft industries had already developed the Scout — an advanced reconnaissance drone. The propose was to compile a precise intelligence picture, especially after the lessons of the Yom Kippur War and the increasing need to photograph and track enemy positions.

Israel used that head start during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. That conflict marked a turning point in history: For the first time in history of wars, more flying hours were logged by unmanned aircraft than by combat planes. Throughout the war, Israel’s drones were constantly hovering over the battle areas. But then, this technology was still nearly exclusively controlled by advanced armies.

Hezbollah, which learned from Iranian experience, turned itself into a significant player in the field. Today, the organization has a fleet of some 2,000 unmanned aircraft, many of them advanced models from Iran, alongside self-produced drones. During the Second Lebanon War, the organization tried to use explosive drones, but its abilities have been significantly upgraded since then. In 2014, Hezbollah revealed that it operates a fleet of drones for reconnaissance as well, and received from Iran not only the actual devices, but also the technological abilities, training, and practice.

That expertise was demonstrated time and again during the last year, as Hezbollah drones have led the mighty Israeli Air Force on regular — and embarrassing — chases up and down the country. Cell phone footage of jets and attack helicopters searching for cheap, noisy, but elusive Hezbollah drones are a humiliating reminder of Hezbollah’s edge. So too is the high-quality camera footage of Israeli military bases captured by roving Hezbollah reconnaissance drones.

Having fallen behind in the emerging technology, Israel was caught napping. Worse, pride may have prevented the IDF from attempting to learn from the experience of others. According to reports from Kyiv, the Ukrainian army reached out to Israel at the end of 2022 and offered to share the knowledge it had accrued.

“We told the Israelis — we invite your experts, your engineers, to visit us and learn about these drones,” a former Ukrainian defense minister revealed to N12, an Israeli channel. “Regretfully, our invitation was not taken seriously.”

Chicken Kyiv

The threats that the new drones pose challenge the traditional defense perceptions. While the advanced air defenses of Israel and those supplied by the West to Ukraine were programmed to deal with the threats of missiles and high-speed advanced planes, they struggle with the “simpler” threat. The drones fly low and slow, and they are easily evaded not because of advanced technology, but rather because of their simplicity and the materials with which they are made.

NATO is trying to help Ukraine by sending hundreds of frequency scramblers  — which work the same way radio jammers do, by transmitting radio signals that interfere with telecommunications — but the solution is limited: A very large number of scramblers is necessary to protect sensitive locations, and the scrambling itself only makes it difficult for the drone to accurately strike the target; it does not disable them. Because the Iranian drones are not particularly accurate to begin with, scrambling the frequencies might even lead to additional civilian strikes.

The Ukrainians, for their part, have developed creative solutions. One of them is the Sting drone, which was developed specially to strike down the Shahed drone. The new system, recently disclosed by the Telegraph, is able to fly more than 100 miles per hour (160 km/h) and at altitudes nearing two miles (3 km). The Sting is designed as a classic quadcopter drone with four propellers, and a large dome protruding from the center that contains the explosive device and a camera. It is operated from the ground using virtual reality glasses that enable the operator to see exactly where the drone is flying to.

Ukraine is an inspiring example of how cheap and relatively simple technology can be a game changer. While NATO is grappling with the question of how many expensive Patriot missiles to supply Kyiv with, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky announced an aspirational goal of producing 1.5 million drones this coming year, with the goal of increasing production to 4 million a year. These numbers may have sounded delusional a decade ago, when drones were the exclusive purview of advanced armies.

This change is also manifested in the military structure: Ukraine recently launched its “unmanned systems force” — the first military branch in the world dedicated to drone warfare. It’s a significant shift in traditional military tactics, and recognizes the fact that the future belongs not only to superpowers with huge air forces, but also to those wise enough to exploit the efficiency and effectiveness of cheap and relatively simple tools.

A New Era

The strategic significance goes far beyond the immediate battlefields. When an organization like Hezbollah can have a fleet of thousands of drones, and Russia can produce 6,000 drones a year in one factory, the strategic calculations of military conflicts change completely. It’s not a matter of quality versus quantity — it’s a revolution in the accessibility of air power.

On the Israeli front, the challenge is especially complex because of the small geographical area. What takes a drone in Ukraine many long hours of flight time over vast swaths of territory becomes an immediate threat in Israel, requiring a response in minutes. Hezbollah takes advantage of this: The drones are dispatched from areas very close to the border, which cuts down on the response time available to Israel’s air defenses. Based on what was seen in the Golani base strike, even when the threat is detected, sometimes time is too short to carry out an effective response.

The growing accessibility to drone technology poses another challenge: The appearance of FPV drones (first-person view). These are even simpler devices whose cost ranges between $150 and $500. In Ukraine, they are already produced in “mechanic shops around the country,” as the former Ukrainian defense minister noted. Experienced fliers can use them to destroy tanks and armored vehicles worth millions.

The process of democratizing of air power requires rethinking the concept of air power superiority. While in the past it was a game only for superpowers, today, any player, big or small, can exercise significant air power.

“The ability to neutralize strategic assets in Israel using drones such as these is negligible — such an aircraft that carries not more than 40 kg of explosives and thhat enters Orot-Rabin in Hadera, for example, will not shut down the electric grid,” explained Leor Segal, the CEO of Third Eye, in an interview with Globes.

The numbers speak for themselves: Since the beginning of the war, more than 1,200  drones have been sent from Lebanon. More than 300 drones have struck in Israel and the rest — about 80% — have been intercepted and shot down.

As a result of the hit last May on the Tal Shamayim balloon — the surveillance balloon that provided the IDF with an aerial view of the northern region and was intended, among other things, to thwart the drone threats until it was struck by a drone itself while it was on the ground —the defense establishment was required to draft new detection and interception strategies.

Israeli Lesson

The solutions that Israel is developing reflect the change in perception. Instead of relying only on expensive systems, Israel is shifting emphasis to multilayer defense systems that integrate simpler means alongside high-tech solutions.

The Defense Ministry, for example, is examining the use of old Vulcan cannons that were taken out of army service decades ago, the idea being to mount them on the chassis of an armored vehicle to serve as a traditional chain-gun system. At the same time, a deal worth some NIS 2 billion was signed to expand the supply of Magen Ohr laser interception systems. The idea is to generate a protective envelope under which the cheapest and simplest solution complements the more sophisticated systems.

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant green-lit a tender for an effective anti-drone solution that can be rapidly deployed, whether from a big industry name or a start-up company. There is a significant financial challenge: how to produce a solution that will be both cheap and effective against a threat that is so easy to produce.

Two weeks ago, a special test was held in southern Israel with eight defense industry companies, during which drones were shot down with a variety of new technological developments. Israel Aircraft Industries showed its “Baz Meduyak,” an advanced solution that will enable interceptions at long range. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems presented its “Typhoon” — a 30mm weapon that is remotely operated and can intercept a variety of aerial threats, expected to be integrated into the defense of strategic sites.

Aerobotic, in cooperation with Rafael, presented an advanced system with a multiuse interceptor. Xtend, partnering with Axioma and Elbit, presented advanced drone intercepting systems.

General Robotis presented the development of the “Pitbull” system to intercept at medium ranges, and Smartshooter presented an innovation to enable precision targeting of a wide range of threats.

The war in Ukraine provides important lessons for dealing with the drone threat. The Ukrainians developed a range of methods, from groups of mobile units firing machine guns fitted with thermal cameras, to the expansive use of electronic warfare. But as alluded to earlier, the Ukrainians have been most effective at developing cheap drones that intercept the Russian drones.

The Ukrainian experience highlights the cat-and-mouse game between attackers changing their modus operandi and defenders adjusting to the new tactics. The Russians have learned to fly their aircraft over highways so that the roar of vehicular traffic drowns out the sound of the drone motors. In response, the Ukrainians have begun to place ambushes along roads that have been identified as preferred flight routes.

A viral video on social media showed an aerial dogfight between two drones: A Ukrainian quadcopter, produced by a Chinese company called DJI Maveric, was able to down a Russian quadcopter by striking one of its rotors.

Israel faces a more complex challenge due to the multifront war it is fighting. Ukraine is battling a threat from one direction, while Israel must fend off drones from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Each front presents its own challenges: Lebanese drones are launched from so close by that they are hard to detect in time. Yemeni drones cross the Red Sea and circle back over the Mediterranean Sea. Iraqi drones travel along a long and complex flight path.

Hezbollah has developed clever tactics that make it hard to detect launch sites early, deploying drones ready for launch concealed in built-up areas near the border. As Israel adjusts to the tactics, Hezbollah finds alternatives, as shown by the attack near Metula on May 16, in which Hezbollah first used a drone carrying a Russian S-5 missile. A few months later, Hezbollah drones were able to reach Caesarea and Binyamina.

Droning On

The reality that a recreational drone can outwit sophisticated air defenses and send millions scrambling for the shelters has forced the IDF to reorient itself to face a new, more complex reality. In the past, Israel’s clear technological superiority was a significant deterrent. Today, when organizations such as Hezbollah can operate hundreds of drones at a tenth of the cost of combat planes, the equation has changed. It’s not only a matter of technology or budget — it’s a significant shift in the way modern war is conducted.

While the IDF estimates that there has been an improvement of interceptions to 90% success, the see-sawing fortunes of the drone hunters highlights the fact that warfare is a race between attacker and defender, technology and counter-technology. Ukraine’s experience against Russia — and now Israel’s against Iran — highlights the fact that Tehran’s mastery of the cheap, effective technology has dramatically rewritten the rules of war.

When a drone launched by a Yemeni militia can cross the Red Sea and strike Ashkelon, it becomes clear that the borders between the battle front and the home front, between military superpowers and small organizations, and between advanced technology and simple solutions — are growing more blurry.

What started as an Israeli military program in the 1970s has become a new global arms race — where it is not necessarily the most advanced or the wealthiest one who wins, but rather the one who can adapt most quickly to the changing reality.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1035)