Give In, Give Up

One of the most complicated issues Netanyahu faces is the hostage deal. Publicly, Netanyahu voices support for the deal, but in private his position is more complex. He strongly opposes any deal that involves the mass release of security prisoners, strengthening Hamas’s regime or legitimizing terrorism. Netanyahu is employing a sophisticated strategy of “yes, but….” He supports a deal in principle, but sets conditions that make it impossible given Hamas’s terms. In this way, he’s able to weather the Kaplan protests and the pressure from the United States without opposing a deal in principle.

Tired of endlessly justifying himself, Netanyahu now prefers to prove that he’s right through action, in the belief that the results will speak for themselves.

“No one wants the hostages to come home more than me,” he told us. “I brought back dozens of our hostages, and I’m doing everything I can to get them all. Everyone who pressured me for irresponsible concessions over the past year effectively wanted me to endanger Israel’s security. One day even they’ll understand that my stubbornness saved the country.”

Netanyahu ponders for a moment, then adds: “By the way, I’m not just talking about my rivals. There were also partners who pressured me to surrender, to pull back. They told me: ‘Trust the Americans, trust the Europeans, we can always return to Gaza later.’ Could we have achieved what we did — almost complete obliteration of Hamas’s military capabilities — with a feckless policy of surrender, of conceding strategic assets that our brave soldiers won in Gaza through sweat and blood?”

You’ve paid a harsh price for your position. There are mass protests, and some very harsh things are being said of you.

“I know. So what? If I made concessions, the media would applaud me. And maybe I would be popular in Europe and all sorts of places, but I would be betraying the mission I’ve been entrusted with by the Jewish people and by history.”

On Many Fronts       

Hamas’s surprise offensive after Simchas Torah was a turning point not only in the history of the state, but also in the life of Benjamin Netanyahu himself. The most experienced player on the field, Netanyahu found himself facing the most complex security situation of his career. So complex that almost no one in the political arena believed he would survive, as the political reality instantly changed beyond recognition. The judicial reform, until then the focus of the controversy surrounding him, became an afterthought.

Before the war, Netanyahu fell victim to Yariv Levin’s ambitions and his own political inertia. The justice minister’s judicial reform — a project whose scope and planning Bibi wasn’t party to — was the new government’s first move, and quickly sucked the oxygen out of the political system as protests erupted on the streets. Netanyahu believes to this day that the calls by leftist protestors to refuse to report for reserve duty weakened the country in a way that contributed significantly to the events of October 7, but he isn’t ready to have that discussion at the moment, certainly not publicly. From the moment war broke out, politics gave way to war mode. Netanyahu had to deal with a cruel new reality that required him to transform from a political leader to a war leader.

And as a war leader, Netanyahu has proven more determined than ever, contrary to the image he earned over the years. Once known for his cautious-to-the-extreme approach to fighting Israel’s enemies, Netanyahu has shattered all expectations over the past year, changing the perception of his role and the political reality around him.

In both Lebanon and Gaza, Netanyahu has emerged as the most decisive leader on the scene: from the Philadelphi Route to the heart of Beirut’s Dahiyeh suburb, he’s demonstrating an ability to withstand international pressure the likes of which few prime ministers before him have faced; from the Netzarim corridor to the rooftops of Lebanon’s missile arsenals, Netanyahu has displayed tenacity and determination. The secret, among other things, lies in his self-imposed detachment from a notoriously hostile media. Unlike in the past, Netanyahu hasn’t been watching TV or obsessively monitoring commentators’ opinions.

Alongside the almost complete destruction of Hamas’s militarily capabilities and the crippling blows on Hezbollah, Netanyahu can claim credit for the assassination of senior Hamas leaders Mohammed Deif, Saleh el-Arouri, Marwan Issa, and Ismail Haniyeh, as well as Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah, Fuad Shukr, and Ibrahim Aqil, not to mention the spy-thriller-like beeper operation and a host of other covert actions that the public isn’t aware of yet.

Our conversation with the Prime Minister was a rare moment of candor. Known for his skill in repeating catchy slogans and prepared talking points, Netanyahu surprised us by setting aside the script.

It’s hard to say whether this openness was calculated or spontaneous, which leads the question: Is this a real change in approach, or a temporary reaction to a state of emergency? Is the Netanyahu we’re sitting with the general who will continue to lead Israel in the coming years, or will the calculated and cautious politician we’ve always known return?

Netanyahu spoke frankly. About the loneliness of the job; about the fact that few, if any, can be trusted. And also about the two phases of the war.

“I’m just as determined in the north,” he told us, days before the war in the north entered its high-intensity stage. We asked about the hundreds of thousands of residents of northern Israel who are still in exile in their own country. “We’ll show great determination in the north as well, you’ll see that. My reasoning has been that we can’t fight on two fronts simultaneously. First, we achieve our goals in Gaza, and then we seek a decision in the north with all the strength we’ve shown over the past year. Northern residents will return to their homes — this is a mission that I’ve taken on myself, and no pressure, domestic or foreign, will budge me from it.”

Netanyahu’s plan all along was that when the operation in Rafah was completed, the focus in Gaza would shift to low-intensity, targeted operations against terror infrastructure and leaders in the strip, with the bulk of Israel’s military might being redirected to the north. The ultimatum to Hezbollah would be stark: come to a political settlement or the IDF will enter Lebanon in full force.

Why now, after the north has been under bombardment for a year, with no significant military reaction? Netanyahu isn’t a believer in multi-front wars. The fighting in Gaza took longer than expected, but in order to concentrate forces in the north, Israel’s military presence in Gaza would have to be severely reduced, leaving only minimal forces in the Gaza Strip for targeted operations. Netanyahu believed that Nasrallah would ultimately cave, and that military pressure would lead him to sue for a truce on terms favorable to Israel.

Throughout the war, various senior officials have said that we can pull out of Gaza, because we can always go back in if we have to.

“So they said. They said it at Oslo and they said it during the disengagement from Gush Katif. The same people who now want us to surrender the Philadelphi Route said back then, ‘We’ll return to Gaza when the first missile is fired.’ ”

Netanyahu also spoke about the “conceptzia” — the idea held by both the country’s most senior politicians as well as top security officials, that a small, technologically smart army is all Israel needs to defend its borders; that Hamas would abandon ideology for economic gain and that monthly Qatari payments to the terror organization would ensure quiet (a policy that he himself oversaw); and that appeasement would bring peace — and how it continues to dominate the public discourse and demand concessions even after October 7.

“Suddenly there are voices demanding a ‘unity government,’ ostensibly to help with the war,” Bibi said. “When there was a genuine need for a unity government, I was the first to welcome in Gantz and Eisenkot. But now it’s turned into a plot to overthrow the government. They want to push Ben-Gvir out, and then twist the knife in and topple the government. We can’t let ourselves be baited into this.”

Behind “Gaza First”

Since the outbreak of the war, Netanyahu’s loneliness at the top has become more palpable than ever. Up close, you can see the heavy burden of responsibility that he carries. In a time of war, every word is weighed carefully, but the tension between the prime minister and the security establishment is evident. With ultimate — if not direct — responsibility for the October 7 debacle resting on his shoulders as leader for much of the past 15 years, Bibi knows that he’ll have to answer to the public despite his recent successes in prosecuting the war.

But even in private conversation, he sticks to the line he’s taken publicly: Dwelling on the failure in wartime weakens Israel. When the war ends, he says, he’ll answer everything — although he thinks that the security establishment were the principal sources of failure.

As a result, Netanyahu manages security policy himself, to an unusual degree relying on confidants such as Tzachi Hanegbi in the security arena and Ron Dermer on the international scene. Still, Bibi Netanyahu’s most challenging battle isn’t on the front lines, but inside the security cabinet regarding the war strategy. Toward the beginning of the war, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant took the hawkish line: a preemptive attack on Lebanon before entering Gaza. The rationale was clear — Hezbollah is the head of the snake, the power behind Hamas. Netanyahu, on the other hand, advocated the opposite: Gaza first, then Lebanon.

Some senior IDF officials and cabinet members were dismissive of Netanyahu’s position. They believed that Gaza was an easy target that could be tackled quickly and with limited force. “What’s Gaza anyway?” was the prevailing attitude. The reality turned out to be much more complex. Netanyahu was shocked to discover how unprepared the army was for the Gaza campaign. Lack of operational plans, ammunition shortages, and numerous logistical hitches have exposed significant gaps in the IDF’s capabilities.

Netanyahu’s main insight proved correct: Victory over Hamas wouldn’t come in two months, as many believed, but would require at least a year. Even this, he believed, would only be the first stage in a much longer campaign. According to foreign reports, Gallant also advocated assassinating a senior Hezbollah leader at the start of the war, which Israel had the operational capability to do. Netanyahu, from a broader strategic vantage point, rejected that option as well. Netanyahu is not a believer in multi-front wars.

Netanyahu’s Gaza-first strategy was not just a military plan; it’s the core of Israel’s security policy. In choosing to focus on one arena, Netanyahu took a high-stakes gamble, putting his trust in total success in Gaza as the key to addressing broader regional challenges.

The consequences of this were far-reaching. While the focus on Gaza postponed a high-intensity confrontation with Hezbollah, it also jeopardized Israel’s security on the northern border. The longer the fighting continued in Gaza, the greater the pressure from the international community. In the domestic arena, Netanyahu’s insistence on entering Gaza first, followed by the recent dramatic and unparalleled successes in Lebanon, have strengthened his political hand.

But even now, the main question is whether the Israeli public and the international community will give Netanyahu the time needed to achieve his goals in Gaza. Tactical flexibility will be critical; Netanyahu must maintain his strategy in the face of unexpected developments on the ground. And always in the background is the economic situation. The longer the war drags on, the higher the costs to the economy.

In the international arena, Netanyahu is faced with the enormous challenge of maintaining Israel’s crucial relations with the US in the face of conflicting interests and a changing geopolitical reality. In Netanyahu’s worldview, the American front is complex and dangerous. Behind the statements and the smiles, the prime minister takes a much more somber view of US-Israel relations than does the general public, exacerbated by his deep frustration regarding the administration’s position in the various stages of the war, including in delaying arms shipments and applying pressure on issues such as an escalation in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu continues to navigate internal and external pressures, determined to prove his path right. This is a test not only of a military theory, but also of Netanyahu’s ability to lead Israel through one of the most complex periods in its history. He stands at a historic watershed, and the decisions he makes in the coming months could reshape the entire region.

The Verdict of History

As the State of Israel marks one year since the outbreak of the war, Bibi Netanyahu is already fully immersed in planning for the day after. Known for his strategic thinking, the prime minister sees two possible routes, and is carefully navigating between political landmines and national challenges.

Part of that plan was the recent addition of former nemesis Gideon Saar to the government. While Saar won’t get the defense portfolio just yet due to the situation in the north, his addition is Bibi’s trump card, giving the prime minister the political backing to avoid new elections and to serve out his term, which ends in late 2026.

But the road is fraught with obstacles. Netanyahu fully understands that his success hinges on continued success in Lebanon, maintaining military superiority in Gaza, passing the highly controversial draft law, and even whether Donald Trump prevails in the US elections. Each of these factors is a challenge in itself.

Added to this, the white albatross of public criticism hangs around his neck, and he’ll have to face tough questions about his policies of appeasement in the years leading up to the massacre.

Still, you can’t help but admire the man’s ability to bear the weight of political power, a challenge none of his predecessors have been able to meet. Bennet lasted one year. Lapid several months. Ehud Barak a little more than a year. Olmert resigned in disgrace after the Second Lebanon War. Even the legendary Menachem Begin, one of the few leaders admired by both the right and the left, famously announced at a certain point in the First Lebanon War when the death toll of young soldiers was too much for him to bear: “Eini yachol od — I can’t do it anymore.”

Netanyahu faces a thornier array of challenges on every front — political, military, diplomatic — than any of his predecessors. With no real support from allies, he has to shoulder every decision and every crisis on his own — finding temporary respite in his books and in his private pool, which gives a few minutes of relief from the ongoing pressure.

Is Netanyahu really the only leader capable of healing the nation at this time of national trauma? It’s hard to ignore the courage, confidence, and determination he displays in managing constant crises. He stands firm, a knife between his teeth, against challenges that would overwhelm other leaders. At every juncture, he has to face the anxiety alone and make fateful decisions.

Netanyahu stands at a critical crossroads, navigating between political survival and the national mission of rebuilding the country and leading it forward. His ability to balance these two missions will determine his legacy and the future of the country. At the moment, despite all the criticism and skepticism, he’s still standing at the helm, his eyes on the horizon, steering the ship through the storm.

Into the Jungle

In our sit-down with the prime minister, another aspect of his personality emerged: It’s no secret that he’s a history buff and devours historical tomes and biographies — and when he puts on his reading glasses, he transforms from prime minister to impassioned historian. He opens the book In the Moment of Truth, which the two of us cowrote seven years ago, tracing the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s dialogues with Israel’s decision-makers and his involvement in the country’s security. (Not many know it, but parts of the book were inspired by conversations we had with Netanyahu at the time.) He turns to the chapter, “Occupying Damascus,” highlighting passages and reading aloud a section analyzing the “conceptzia” that preceded the Yom Kippur War. It seems that the same complacency and collective blindness repeated itself exactly 50 years later. For him, this isn’t mere historical trivia, but the key to understanding the present.

But the historical irony doesn’t go unnoticed — he, too, was part of the current conceptzia and he is aware that he himself is becoming the next chapter, the one that’s yet to be written.

At a cabinet meeting the next day, Netanyahu brought the book and read passages out loud to his team. This is a picture of a leader who today sees himself as one man against the world.

Some will call this megalomania. But when considering the alternatives, it’s hard not to see what he means. Netanyahu, for all the criticism against him, embodies a deep historical awareness of the survival of the Jewish people. And for those who’ve been listening, his references to G-d are much more frequent than before, both in public and in private.

Finally, Netanyahu smiles. “You know, when I sat down with you a few years ago, we relived the words of the Lubavitcher Rebbe in his conversations with me. Over the years, and especially over the past year, he’s been in my thoughts many times. When he told me that ‘a day will come when you’ll have to fight against 119 people,’ I understood that this was my mission — to fight the battle out of a deep sense of faith, without being intimidated by anyone. I’m not just talking about political opponents, but also about partners and friends who get cold feet or freeze in the moment of truth. In the end, the responsibility is on me, and I hope they understand that determination, and faith, is our key to survival in the jungle of the Middle East.”

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1033)