Israel saw deterrence; Iran smelled weakness

In the Gaza war of 2021, Israel thought it had played tough with an aerial bombing campaign — but Iran smelled weakness, and October 7 was born

Beirut, September 2021

Just after the end of Israel’s 2021 ground operation in Gaza (dubbed “Guardian of the Walls”), Brigadier General Esmail Qaani of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and commander of its Quds Force met with senior Hamas officials for a debriefing. The conclusion of the meeting was clear: The confusion on the Israeli side proved that the time had come for what they called “the Great Campaign” — what we now know as the October 7 massacre.

“[Guardian of the Walls] marked a turning point in the conflict between us and the thieving Jews,” reads a internal document captured from Hamas’s military wing. “This campaign is a stage in the humiliation and disgrace of the Zionists at the hands of its mujahideen servants, so that we can move on to the phase of eliminating their entity and erasing its existence.”

Hamas’s September 2021 meeting with senior Iranian officials focused on analyzing Israeli military tactics and strategy in preparation for the October 7 attack. Hamas’s leadership reported to the Iranians that Israeli strikes on Gaza during the campaign had been minimal. They pointed out that Israel had failed to inflict significant damage on Hamas’s tunnel system, the “Metro,” or on its military nerve center — despite Israeli claims to the contrary.

The success of intelligence coordination between Hamas and Iran during the fighting led to a decision to increase cooperation. On July 1, 2022, a document captured from Hamas shows that Ismail Haniyeh reported to Yahya Sinwar about a secret meeting organized by Iran’s Saeed Izadi, a.k.a. Haj Ramadan, head of the Quds Force Palestine Branch, with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Three possible scenarios were discussed at the meeting: a large-scale strategic campaign involving all elements of the “Axis of Resistance” (excluding Iran itself); an intermediate campaign with partial participation; or an operation by Hamas alone. According to the document, Nasrallah expressed support for the first and most comprehensive scenario, stating, “The data and circumstances confirm that this is a realistic and achievable scenario.”

All of these confidential documents, seized by the IDF during the fighting in Gaza, reveal the full picture for the first time: The October 7 attack came about not as a plan hatched over the previous few months, but rather as part of a grand strategy that began to take shape after Yahya Sinwar’s 2011 release from Israeli prison in the Gilad Shalit deal. It was kept on the back burner for years and was ultimately refined, funded, and guided by Iran following Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021.

The seized documents include correspondence between Hamas leaders and senior Quds Force officials, operational plans, and records of financial transfers. Taken together, they paint a troubling picture of systematic and thorough preparations —specialized training in Iran, formation of elite units, and development of land and sea smuggling networks. Above all, they demonstrate Hamas’s close coordination with Iran and Hezbollah in preparation for what was defined as “the phase of eliminating the Zionist entity.”

Imposition of Will

The documents seized in Gaza reveal the complex relationship between Iran and Hamas in the years leading up to the October 7 attack. A key document, dated July 30, 2020, signed by Abu al-Baraa (Marwan Issa, deputy head of Hamas’s military wing), details the extent of Iranian financial support: Between 2014 and 2020, Iran transferred $154 million to Hamas’s military wing, and smuggled advanced and expensive weaponry into Gaza.

However, the financial relationship had its ups and downs. Between 2017 and 2018, money transfers were halted, apparently due to a crisis in Hamas-Iran relations following the terrorists’ warming ties with Saudi Arabia. The crisis revolved around Hamas’s support for the legitimacy of Yemeni president Mansour Hadi after the Iran-backed Houthi rebels took over the capital, Sana’a. Ironically, five years later, the Houthis would become one of the fiercest Iranian proxies supporting Hamas.

The documents reveal the existence of the “Shadow Unit” — an elite force within Hamas’s military wing operating under the direct supervision of Yahya Sinwar. A November 2019 intelligence document records the secret dispatch of four of the unit’s fighters to Iran, via Turkey, for “top-tier training in piloting military drones.” The document emphasizes that “this mission was conducted under classified instructions from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards” with the goal of “enhancing the capabilities of the elite members of the Al-Qassam Brigades.”

This intricate system was managed on the Iranian side by Saeed Izadi, known as Haj Ramadan, head of the Palestine branch of the Quds Force. The documents describe him as a key figure who oversaw financial transfers, approved training programs, and managed the delicate relationships between the involved parties.

During this period, Iranian control over Hamas’s decision-making centers solidified. A December 2016 document illustrates how Izadi leveraged economic power to exert pressure, conditioning financial transfers on the approval of specific senior Hamas officials.

“If the day comes when the decision is made to cease support and cut ties, we will inform you directly, with full transparency and without shame,” Izadi wrote to Mohammed Deif, a clear indication of the power he had accumulated.

This was the infrastructure upon which the later attack plan was built: a structured financing system, special operational capabilities, and an effective Iranian control mechanism over Hamas’s leadership.

“The most important outcome of any war is the imposition of will, and you have achieved that in this war,” Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani told senior Hamas officials at the September 2021 meeting. Referring to the riots in Lod and other cities with mixed Arab-Jewish populations, he added, “The enemy lost stability even within the territories of 1948.”

In hindsight, it is clear that the 2021 Gaza war was an Iranian-orchestrated operation designed to be a prelude to the “great campaign.” During the conflict, Hamas operatives studied everything and took copious notes. They analyzed Israeli intelligence, the home front, and how defense systems responded to intensified rocket fire. They learned how to ignite violence in mixed Israeli cities. In other words, they had two weeks of “live-fire training.”

The Iranians backed their words with action. As early as May 31, 2021, just days after the fighting ended, Izadi sent a letter to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh announcing the allocation of an additional $10 million for Hamas’s military wing. On June 5, Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa sent a letter to Izadi requesting urgent Iranian assistance in rebuilding their strength. In an unusual move, they appealed to him to intercede with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to secure a $500 million budget for two years.

The documents show that the September meeting was the turning point. Hamas’s leadership reported an unexpected success to the Iranians: Despite the damage in Gaza, the organization had managed to preserve most of its operational capabilities. They noted particularly that the tunnel system — “the Metro” — remained virtually intact, and that Israeli Arabs had also joined the battle. This led to the conclusion that the time had come for a larger operation.

Following the meeting, an accelerated process of force-building began. A December 2022 letter from Marwan Issa to Sinwar documents an agreement with the Iranians on a monthly budget of $7 million “to prepare for such confrontations.” The letter also reveals plans for a sophisticated smuggling network: A land route through Yemen via a trusted network of smugglers, and — unbelievably — a plan for maritime smuggling using a submarine.

Hamas leaders did not limit their force-building efforts to Gaza. On May 22, 2022, Khaled Mashal and Marwan Issa corresponded about establishing a significant Palestinian force in Lebanon. According to the documents, Iran’s Izadi explained to Mashal, “Establishing a project for the Palestinians in Lebanon is not just a decision, but rather lies at the heart of our philosophy of engaging all nations in the struggle to liberate Palestine.”

The plan was ambitious: Initially, 2,000 Hamas fighters would organize in Lebanon, with the goal of expanding the force to 10,000 fighters. Command over the new force was to be coordinated with Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, while Hamas would be responsible for recruiting operatives from Lebanon’s Sunni population. Iran committed to funding the initiative, including training and armament.

However, a sharp internal dispute emerged within Hamas. Khaled Mashal opposed the idea of the new force being subordinate to Hamas’s leadership in Gaza, arguing that the external leadership, under his command, should manage the Lebanese operation. In a letter to Issa, he described fierce arguments with Izadi on the matter and advised, “Do not listen to Haj [Ramadan].”

The dispute over the Lebanese force reflected a deeper struggle for control of the organization. Izadi worked vigorously to remove figures opposed to Hamas’s subjugation to Iranian rule, primarily Mashal.

In July 2021, he wrote to Sinwar: “Unfortunately, Brother Abu Al-Walid [Mashal] and his misguided policies bear responsibility for many of the failures and problems that have occurred in the resistance axis.”

Beyond the Battlefield

Concurrent with the formation of the Hamas force in Lebanon, Iran launched efforts to restore Hamas’s relations with the Assad regime in Syria, which had been severed in 2011 due to Hamas’s support for the Syrian opposition.

Iran viewed this as a critical component in solidifying the “resistance axis,” and exerted heavy financial pressure on Hamas to see it through. A September 2022 document reports that Haniyeh informed Sinwar that the Iranians had halted financial transfers for four months to coerce Hamas into renewing ties with Syria.

The documents also paint a broader picture of Iranian involvement in Gaza, which extended far beyond military support. Iran simultaneously worked to build deep cultural influence in Gaza, in what was referred to in documents as “the Shia-tization of society.” A document from the “Palestinian Committee for International Quds Day” reveals an ambitious $5.5 million plan that included educational and cultural initiatives, scholarship distributions, and even a Shiite-themed soccer tournament. According to the document, all projects were “fully funded” by Iran.

Iranian control also extended to Gaza’s media. A classified May 2023 document reveals that Iran funded a coalition of radio stations affiliated with Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Popular Front, with a monthly budget of $120,000. Established in 2014, this media network was described as “loyal to the resistance axis,” with broadcasts designed to promote Iranian narratives.

However, Iran’s involvement was not confined to Gaza. The documents reveal that Iran also deployed Hamas operatives against Egypt. An intelligence document records how Mahmoud Abdul Karim Said Karam, a Hamas operative, was directly handled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. He left Gaza through the Rafah tunnels and carried out a terror attack against the Egyptian military. The document links him to a deadly attack in July 2020 near the village of Rabaa, about 30 kilometers from the Suez Canal, in which 40 Egyptian security personnel were killed.

The Hamas documents seized in Gaza paint a troubling picture of a dual intelligence failure on Israel’s part. Not only did Israel fail to detect the preparations for the October 7 attack, but it also did not realize that the 2021 Operation Guardian of the Walls, which was perceived in Israel as an operational success, was in fact a carefully planned “live-fire exercise” orchestrated by Iran and Hamas.

While the IDF spokesperson boasted about the operation’s achievements, senior Hamas officials sat with commanders of Iran’s Quds Force and analyzed exactly what worked: how the tunnel network survived, how the Israeli home front responded to massive rocket fire, how the defense systems coped, and how clashes erupted in mixed cities. Two weeks of in-depth study of Israel’s vulnerabilities led to a clear conclusion — Israel was vulnerable, and the time had come for the “great campaign.”

Over the next two years, right under Israel’s nose, a complex plan was put into motion. It involved the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars, specialized training in Iran, the establishment of elite units, and a sophisticated smuggling network.

The disturbing question remains: How did all these warning signs — the massive Iranian funding, the close coordination with Hezbollah, the establishment of a Hamas force in Lebanon, and the elaborate smuggling network — not raise red flags within the Israeli intelligence community?

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1052)