With no such thing as a free lunch, what will be the price of Trump’s support? Mishpacha’s news analysts unravel the scenarios

As the dust settles below the Israel-Iran horizon, did Iran’s nuclear program really get knocked out, and for how long? Does the trouncing of Hamas’s Iranian paymasters mean a breakthrough in Gaza is near, and is regional expansion of the Abraham Accords realistic, or even safe? With no such thing as a free lunch, what will be the price of Trump’s support? Mishpacha’s news analysts unravel the scenarios.

Panelists

Binyamin Rose, Mishpacha’s editor at large and writer of Rose Report

Gedalia Guttentag, Mishpacha’s deputy editor

Avi BlumEsq., writer of Knesset Channel

Jake Turx, Mishpacha’s Washington correspondent

1: The shooting has stopped over the Israel-Iran corridor. So, as the dust settles, who won and who lost?

Rose:

Israel, with help from the US, caused much more damage to Iran than Iran did to Israel — but this was expected, because Iran cannot match Israeli and American superiority in weapons, defense systems, and intelligence gathering. The campaign fell short of outright victory because it had limited goals and aimed for a quick ending. The only real win would have been for US or Israeli special forces to take control of Iran’s nuclear sites, ensure their destruction, and recover the “missing” 800 pounds of enriched uranium Iran could still use to make atomic weapons.

The repeated claims that regime change was not a goal weakened the entire effort. There’s no way to stop Iran’s nuclear program without removing the regime that has aggressively pursued its nuclear ambitions with malicious intent.

GG:

By all conventional measures, Israel had extraordinary military success against a large country over 1,000 miles away. Beginning with an opening strike of clockwork precision, it achieved aerial dominance, decapitated Iran’s military and scientific leadership, and knocked out many of the country’s nuclear facilities. America also had a good war: Trump bombed Iran, and got away with it.

But despite suffering humiliation, Iran avoided defeat. As was obvious from Iran’s last-minute strike on Be’er Sheva, Iran was a long way from beaten in that regard. In short, Israel humiliated Iran, but the regime still poses a major threat.

Blum:

This was an Israeli-American victory. Not total, but decisive, and not to be downplayed. For almost half a century, Iran was perceived as the regional superpower — a fearsome octopus whose tentacles engulfed the region, even snaking into the West.

A dejected Khamenei could declare victory from the safety of his bunker, but this time not even he believed it. Israel embarked on the operation having lopped off every one of the tentacles — Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria — and 12 days of outright warfare revealed that the weakness started at the head. Iran’s skies — its most important border — were fully occupied by the IAF.

Baseline scenarios predicted several losses, but not a single Israeli jet was downed — just a solitary drone. The IRGC’s command was decimated, and nuclear scientists dropped like flies. By the time the US entered the fray, Israel had done most of the work, paving the way to 35 minutes of glory.

Turx:

Iran won, but not in the way most people think. This war was never really about defeating the people of Israel — it was about subduing the people of Iran. Under the cover of sirens and missile launches, the Basij militia rolled out with chilling precision, crushing even the faintest hints of dissent. Protests once flickered with promise, but were extinguished before they could reignite.

While the Islamic Republic’s state broadcaster swallowed a few bombs, the regime’s narrative machine remains fully operational, broadcasting regime-approved talking points that Western media outlets often echoed uncritically.

Paradoxically, Iran’s supposed victory is masking what may be its greatest loss: a deeper erosion of trust among its own people, a weakening economy, and a military apparatus exposed under fire. The regime likely suffered more than we can see.

Israel, too, learned plenty. About Iran’s weaknesses, reach, and reaction speed. But so did Iran. The winner of this war won’t be determined by this round, but by who better leverages what they’ve learned come the next round.

2: Is Israel safer today than it was before the 12-day Iran war began and before October 7, 2023?

Rose:

Yes, we are. We have weakened the military capabilities of our enemies, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran. Regime change in Syria remains uncertain, but there are promising signs that Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (a.k.a. Al-Julani) understands he needs quiet on the Israeli front to legitimize and consolidate his rule.

For years, Israelis worried that Hezbollah and Iran might launch missile attacks, either separately or together, causing massive destruction and tens of thousands of casualties, G-d forbid, forcing Israelis to stay in shelters without electricity and running water for weeks. Hashem has spared us, and the efforts of our defense and security teams to develop anti-missile and early warning systems proved more effective than expected. Still, the 29 lives lost during the Iran campaign and the billions of shekels’ worth of property damage serve as a reminder that we cannot afford to become complacent.

GG:

For now, yes. By all accounts, the ayatollahs lack the capacity to dash for a nuke, the regime is cowed by the results of the war and is at a historic low. Shorn of their proxies, their decades-old strategy lies in tatters.

Blum:

In American sports, unlike in Europe’s soccer, there’s no such thing as a tie. It’s winner-take-all, and the losers walk away empty-handed. After a decades-long streak of strategic draws since the Six Day War, Israel claimed a clear victory in the 12-day war with Iran.

Seeing the reactions in the Arab world, it’s clear that perception-wise, Israel’s deterrence has never been stronger.

The global perception is critical in every war, especially in the Middle East. Israel’s security strategy as a small country in a hostile environment has always relied on deterrence and Israeli military supremacy. That supremacy was whittled away over the past few decades, and on October 7 seemed to have been lost for good. Less than two years later, the clear victory over Iran bolsters Israel’s credentials as the strongest military power in the region.

Turx:

Militarily? Possibly. Emotionally? Definitely not. Strategically? Well, it depends on how you define “safe.”

Israelis are more aware than ever of their vulnerabilities. October 7 shattered the illusion that terror was containable. The 12-day war with Iran proved that even distant threats can strike home.

3: The 12-day Israel-Iran war feels like one of history’s turning points, like the Six Day War. Was it indeed a turning point? And if so, what has changed, and why?

Rose:

To answer this question, we need to understand why the Six Day War was a turning point. The Six Day War permanently changed the region’s physical map and geopolitical alignments.

That war saw Israel greatly expand its borders, reclaiming biblical lands of ancient Israel, including Jerusalem, Judea, Samaria, the Golan Heights, and Gaza. It permanently removed Jordan as a combatant on Israel’s eastern border. Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the father of Pan-Arabism, resigned in disgrace — the first step in a peace process that culminated ten years later in the US luring Egypt out of the Soviet orbit to sign the Camp David Accords.

So far, there have been no major or even minor convulsions resulting from the 12-day conflict with Iran. No territory has changed hands, the Iranian regime remains in control and defiant as usual, and while Iran lost significant military and nuclear assets, no one is suggesting that Iran suffered the crushing military defeat that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan experienced in 1967.

GG:

Bibi’s war was a turning point because it crossed the Rubicon as far as the Iranian regime is concerned. Having attacked Iran once, no one doubts that Israel will do it as many times as it takes. And the most important thing about the US strike was that it happened at all, because what happened once will happen again if the Iranians resume their program. It’s a turning point because war-war has replaced jaw-jaw.

Blum:

Binyamin Netanyahu surprised everyone, perhaps even himself. “We were wrong about him,” Yedioth Ahronoth’s Nachum Barnea admitted candidly. Throughout his career, Bibi has been seen as someone who talked big but avoided big decisions. After over 30 years of rhetoric about the Iranian threat, his image as “Mr. Security” was shattered on October 7, and it seemed he would end his career as “Mr. Debacle.”

On the eve of the strike, and even when the planes were already in the air, Israeli TV pundits mocked Netanyahu’s indecisiveness. Bibi surprised everyone by going all in, displaying not only operational capability but the savvy to bring the American president on board. The element of surprise belonged not only to the IAF in the skies of Tehran, but to Netanyahu — in Israel.

Turx:

Not quite a turning point, nah. If anything, we’ve barely wrapped up the pre-season. The world just watched a scrimmage — a high-stakes one, with real casualties and real damage — but in terms of geopolitical shifts, we’re still warming up.

The Six Day War redrew borders and rewrote history books. This war? It exposed weaknesses. It sharpened grudges. It eliminated some hardliners and humiliated others. So far, the only thing that changed was Trump’s mind, and even that not by much.

4: What about the war surprised you, and why?

Rose:

It shouldn’t have been a surprise, but seeing unity among Israelis from all backgrounds was inspiring. The media softened its usually negative coverage and supported the government. Everyone recognized Iran as a common enemy and agreed on the need for military action. Running for shelter multiple times a day and often at night was stressful and frightening, and about 50% of all Israelis don’t have a “safe room” in their apartments or a shelter they can reach quickly. Still, the Homefront Command performed well, providing timely updates with only a few misses.

GG:

The Iranian missile threat was long known and feared. But why did a handful of missiles do more damage in the last minutes of the war than enormous missile salvos did last year? Much is unclear about the capacities of Israel’s air defense — weaknesses that invite Iran to fire once again.

Turx:

I was surprised that it started on a Thursday night–Friday morning, given that nearly every major event since October 7 unfolded on Shabbos.

5: The administration and media are clashing about the effectiveness of the attacks and whether Iran's nuclear program is knocked out and for how long. Whom to believe?

Rose:

It’s too early to trust anyone. Many parties have a political stake in portraying the military campaign against Iran as a complete success, and I believe that is both premature and irresponsible. It can take weeks or even months for different intelligence agencies to provide accurate assessments, and they need that time to work quietly, without false bravado in the background. The fact that Iranian forces are already on the ground, making their assessments and beginning to repair the damage, without IAEA inspections, means we may never fully know what Israel and the US accomplished or failed to achieve.

GG:

Trump obviously has an incentive to claim total victory, and many of his detractors are likewise biased against his success. Ultimately, as former Israeli national security advisor Yaakov Amidror told me, the Iranian nuclear program is comprised of many more critical parts than the subterranean facilities at Natanz and Fordow. Between killed commanders and destroyed facilities, they’ve sustained a serious blow.

Blum:

Second-term Trump is proving that he’s in charge, not his security officials, such as Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. In Israel, though, it’s a different story. The chief of staff, the head of the Mossad, and other defense officials remain proudly independent, refusing to echo the political echelon’s messaging. For this reason, I think we can trust the head of the Mossad, who described the result as follows: “The threat was significantly thwarted.” Not obliterated, but not slightly damaged either. Significantly thwarted.

Turx:

Honestly? I’d be surprised if anyone knows for sure. Neither the White House, nor the pundits, and probably not even half the engineers in Natanz. The fog of war is thick, and the fog of centrifuges, concrete, and uranium is thicker.

Assuming the enrichment facility that was struck wasn’t buried deeper than 300 feet, and assuming it was reasonably close to the vertical access shaft, then it’s likely as useful now as Ebrahim Raisi’s helicopter.

But if it was further down, or connected via horizontal tunnels to a network elsewhere, then those radioactive ambitions may just be biding their time. Iran’s nuclear program has survived assassinations, cyberattacks, and sabotage. Digging a new shaft? That’s a construction project, not a crisis.

6: There’s something interesting about the timing of the attacks and the way they developed. Trump gave Iran 60 days to come to a deal, and on day 61 they attacked. Bibi said that it would be a two-week campaign, and so it was, more or less. So the question is, how scripted was all of this? Was this some Bibi-Trump grand plan all along, or did Bibi indeed bounce Trump into something that he was reluctant to do?

Rose:

Iran’s tactics might have influenced the 60-day deadline, because that’s the time frame Iran set for the EU in 2019 to protect its financial and oil sectors from US sanctions. The Trump administration imposed these sanctions after it withdrew from Obama’s nuclear deal. Some reports suggest Prime Minister Netanyahu planned to launch Operation “Rising Lion” in April, but agreed to delay it to avoid disrupting Trump’s announcement of negotiations with Iran, and 60 days was the agreed-upon timeline. Deadline diplomacy is a common strategy, and while there’s no proof that Trump and Bibi coordinated the entire operation, Israel used the 60 days to gather more intelligence on Iran and improve its battle plans.

GG:

Like a pair of partners in tennis doubles, Bibi seems to have set up Trump for a smash. Israel’s strikes weakened Iran to the point that Trump could step in and lay waste to the nuclear program with far lower risk than previously.

Blum:

There’s one thing not even his worst critics will deny — Trump doesn’t fake it. When he stood on the White House lawn and went off on Israel and Iran for violating the ceasefire, he meant every word. When he invited Netanyahu to the White House in April and told him to his face about the start of the direct talks with Iran while praising Erdogan, Trump wasn’t playing around. At the time, he genuinely believed that he’d be able to secure a diplomatic resolution.

A master of sensing opportunities, Netanyahu knew that Trump, unlike Obama or Biden, can’t be openly defied. He went along with it, betting that the Iranians would string Trump along and avoid commitment.

Instead of blowing up the relationship, he stayed with Trump, ultimately pouncing on two critical opportunities. The first came when the Iranians continued to play games after Trump’s 60-day ultimatum expired, and the second when the Iranians turned down Rubio and Witkoff’s overtures after the start of the Israeli operation. At that moment, Netanyahu offered Trump his favorite sort of deal — minimal risk with maximal profit.

Turx:

In hindsight, it seems obvious: the war would be over the moment the US delivered its lethal dose of vitamin B-2.

Once negotiations began, the clock started ticking, and the world waited to find out if the Iranians would voluntarily agree to dismantle their nuclear program [anticlimactic spoiler alert: they didn’t]. Meanwhile, Israel spent those 60 days counting their toys, checking their stocks, and determining how long it would take for them to plausibly eliminate all threats ahead of a final US bombing raid. They beat their own estimates by two days.

Trump’s foreign policy instinct has always been “make a move, win fast, get credit.” This didn’t require some scene-by-scene script with a storyboard and plot twists. It only needed a single datapoint: Once the bunker-busting capability was authorized, everything else became a countdown to impact.

7: Does the trouncing of Hamas's Iranian paymasters mean that a breakthrough in Gaza is near, and what form will that take?

Rose:

Trump’s move to leverage the momentum to reach a deal in Gaza was predictable. If he can pressure Israel and Iran into a ceasefire, why not try the same approach in Gaza? What Israel must avoid is allowing Trump to manipulate it, and both sides need to learn from Iran that an incomplete resolution benefits no one.

Trump must give Israel enough time to establish sufficient military control in Gaza so Hamas understands that its defeat is inevitable. There should be no partial agreements, such as releasing ten hostages now and ten more in six weeks, or commitments from Israel to end the war and withdraw without eliminating Hamas and allowing the IDF to destroy the remaining Hamas terror infrastructure without risking the lives of Jewish soldiers. These are fair demands considering what Israel has endured, and we can’t afford to be timid about expressing this to the Trump administration.

GG:

Hamas was always semi-independent of Iran, and the hostages they hold give them the same leverage that they previously held. But Iran’s fall will give pause to all the killers in their employ — it is far more possible to envision local leaders quietly lowering the flag, and their control of the Gaza street crumbling.

Blum:

If it’s up to Trump, the war in Gaza will end soon, opening the door to an expansion of the Abraham Accords. But Bibi has a problem. The Gaza war can’t be won by the clean, clinical IAF — that takes the much more cumbersome infantry.

The hostages held by Hamas in Gaza also make it a uniquely intractable issue. If Bibi bends to Trump there too, he could weaken his coalition — his rightist allies have already demonstrated their willingness to resign from the government over a Gaza ceasefire.

Turx:

Not likely. Hamas, like their Iranian patrons, views every loss as a test of faith, not a signal to reassess. They’re dug deep, not just in tunnels, but in theology. In their minds, holding out equals holiness, and patience increases their recompense, while surrender would mean admitting that Al-lah’s promised victory isn’t coming.

They’ve plunged themselves into a sunk-cost theology: The more they lose, the more convinced they are that the next miracle must be just around the corner. That’s not a group poised for compromise, it’s one bracing for martyrdom.

So no, a Gaza breakthrough doesn’t appear near.

8: Trump reportedly wants to parlay that victory into a regional grand bargain involving expansion of the Abraham Accords to include Syria and Lebanon, Hamas exiled and international management of Gaza, and a Palestinian state. Which of these is realistic and safe for Israel?

Rose:

Israel must have a clear bottom line in any peace process with its neighbors: Does the proposed plan improve Israel’s security? If it does, Israel can consider it. If it weakens Israel, territorially, politically, or security-wise, Israel must clearly state that.

Peace with more Arab and Muslim countries is desirable, but Israel should be realistic about what the Abraham Accords will accomplish, and be more demanding of the nations that join. So far, it doesn’t affect the average Israeli who isn’t involved in export-import or couldn’t care less about a vacation in Dubai or saving a few hours on a business trip to Hong Kong or Singapore because we can fly over Saudi airspace.

The idea that normalization with Saudi Arabia will end the Arab-Israeli conflict no longer holds water, especially as Turkey’s belligerence increases. Israel should also insist that any ceremony for new Abraham Accords signatories be held in Jerusalem or somewhere within Israel, rather than on the White House lawn or the Saudi royal palace. The Arab and Muslim world must prove it respects Israel’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including its control over Judea and Samaria; otherwise, the peace is just a piece of paper.

GG:

Syria is probably the lowest-hanging fruit, because its new regime demands the least in exchange for a breakthrough. It wants international investment, and won’t condition relations on a Palestinian state, which isn’t really a prospect. If the Gulf states insist on the latter, it’s hard to see a solution in Gaza.

Blum:

Expanding the Abraham Accords is an appealing option for Bibi as well. Concessions to the Palestinians, on the other hand, won’t survive the court of public opinion, especially after October 7. A right-wing government will allow Fordow to be rebuilt before it accepts a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria.

Turx:

Expanding the Abraham Accords to Syria and Lebanon sounds like a win on paper, but based on my recent visit to the region, pushing for formal normalization too soon could backfire. Better to let business, trade, and quiet partnerships do the heavy lifting first. Let trust grow organically without the stigma of calling it “Abraham Accords,” or the danger that could engender.

There’s no such thing in international politics as a free lunch. What will Trump’s support have cost Israel in terms of concessions?

Rose:

By now, we should all be familiar with Trump’s style. He grants favors first and expects repayment later when both he and you recognize that you owe him. Netanyahu is equally shrewd, knowing when to give in and what he can afford to offer. I emphasize my bottom line here: If Israel needs to concede to Trump, it should only be in areas that do not threaten Israel’s security. And in areas where it does, Israel must stay firm and clearly explain why it needs to stand its ground.

Blum:

After Trump’s boon, it’s worth remembering that there’s no such thing as a free lunch. In a Trump administration, Israel is tied to the US more than ever. It’s hard to see Bibi refusing a “direct order” from Trump — see the cancelation of the major retaliation planned to the Iranian ceasefire violations.

The American strikes weren’t just charity — Trump made a clean profit. Israel had paved the way to an easy American win. Unlike during the Biden administration, it’s now America rather than China that’s seen as the most attractive ally.

Even Europe now understands that Trump can’t be trifled with, as seen as the recent NATO confab, where his demand for increased defense spending was accepted almost unanimously. Bibi may have had a good lunch, but chef Trump picked up three Michelin stars.

Turx:

Political capital. Israel’s job was to ensure Trump looked like the decisive statesman who stopped Iran and stabilized the region. He demands nothing more than a receipt that he can hold up as proof that only he can bring peace through strength.

Trump is now accepting all nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize to his private residence at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C.

Any bold predictions for the post-Iran war era?

Rose:

The Netanyahu trial will end with a unique plea deal. Netanyahu will agree to resign sometime during Trump’s final year in office, in 2028, allowing time for collaboration and the finalization of the next military MOU. The deal will also set a date for Likud primaries before Bibi’s resignation, to select a new party leader. This way, Bibi can secure his legacy, and the prosecution can claim victory by forcing him out of office.

GG:

Having supported a close ally to use major force, and deployed America’s stealth bombers in a show-stopping display of might, China and Russia will be more respectful of Trump. The West no longer looks like such a paper tiger.

Blum:

Peace will remain a dream. Israel will upgrade its capabilities and stay on its guard. Trump has already announced that regime change in Iran isn’t on the agenda, so the last word has yet to be said.

It’s on the Saudi front and perhaps even the Syrian front that Trump and Netanyahu will face their big test. A breakthrough will rocket both of them to all-time highs. This time around, the fates of the two leaders are linked, in war and in peace.

Turx:

Bold prediction? We’re not in the post-Iran war era, not even close. What we just witnessed wasn’t the end of a chapter, it was the table of contents and acknowledgments. Wait for chapter 1.

The Cost of War

Binyamin Rose

The Bank of Israel Governor said the 12-day war cost Israel’s economy $5 billion, although he expects us to recover rapidly. This is on top of the high cost of the Gaza war and the battle against Lebanon. Assuming we will remain on a war footing for the foreseeable future, can Israel maintain its standard of living and status as a Start-Up Nation?

We can never overlook the economic impact of war on a small country. Israel cannot afford prolonged wars, but it also cannot afford to fall short of victory because of budget constraints. Israel’s overreliance on the high-tech sector for exports and tax revenue now presents economic risks.

Israel should collaborate with the Trump administration to expand the US-backed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which will help position Israel as a strategic bridge between Europe and Asia. Additionally, Israel should pursue the proposed 3+1 economic ties involving Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the US.

While Israel’s top defense contractors have growth potential, staffing remains uncertain, especially with tens of thousands of workers needing to leave their jobs for reserve duty. Israel should promote the aliyah of skilled workers. It must move beyond just talking about reducing bureaucratic red tape and implement solutions so the country can attract significant investment capital to grow its economy.

Air travel and tourism has been badly disrupted by the last two years of war, as foreign airlines have either stopped flying into Israel or curtailed service. Can I book a flight to Israel in the near term with any confidence that I will be safe and my itinerary will remain intact? Can the Israeli government take measures to expand flight options?

Airlines will continue to be cautious in the near term as conflicts could flare up again. It’s hard to ignore the feeling that some airline cancelations seem more like a boycott rather than decisions based on security concerns, but Israel needs to accept this reality rather than trying to interpret motives.

Meanwhile, only one missile landed near Ben-Gurion Airport, one of the world’s most secure airports. Israel can no longer rely solely on a single international airport. The new Ramon Airport near Eilat is too small and far from the city center. Israel should expedite two other airport projects — one in the Negev and another between Jerusalem and the Dead Sea — so that travelers have more choices and that any attack on one international airport won’t close the country down.

(Originally featured in Mishpacha, Issue 1068)